The holding of public bonds by banks: empirical evidence from the recent financial crisis by Talpo, Alberto
 
 
UNIVERSITA’ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA 
 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE ED AZIENDALI 
“M.FANNO” 
 
 
CORSO DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE IN  
ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TESI DI LAUREA 
 
 
THE HOLDING OF PUBLIC BONDS BY BANKS: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES FROM THE RECENT FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
 
 
 
 
RELATORE: 
 
CH.MA PROF.SSA CINZIA BALDAN  
 
 
 
 
                                                                   LAUREANDO: ALBERTO TALPO 
 
MATRICOLA N 1131180 
 
 
 
ANNO ACCADEMICO 2016 – 2017 
 Il candidato dichiara che il presente lavoro è originale e non è già stato sottoposto, in tutto o in 
parte, per il conseguimento di un titolo accademico in altre Università italiane o straniere.  
Il candidato dichiara altresì che tutti i materiali utilizzati durante la preparazione dell’elaborato sono 
stati indicati nel testo e nella sezione “Riferimenti bibliografici” e che le eventuali citazioni testuali 
sono individuabili attraverso l’esplicito richiamo alla pubblicazione originale. 
 
Firma dello studente 
 
_________________ 
 

Index
Abstract 8
Introduction 9
1 Bonds and Characteristics 13
1.1 Financial Markets Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.1.1 Money Market Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.1.1.1 Treasury Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.1.1.2 Repurchase Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.1.1.3 Instruments involving Banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.1.2 Capital Markets Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.1.2.1 Fixed Income Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.1.2.2 Structured Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.1.2.3 Equity Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.1.3 Derivative Instruments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.2 Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2.1 Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.2.2 The Major Traders in Bond Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2.3 Types of Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.2.4 The U.S. Bond Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.2.5 Risks to invest in Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2 The Recent Global Financial Crisis 42
2.1 Why are Markets so Uncertain? A brief explanation. . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 The Great Recession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.2 Facts occurred previously . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2.3 Causes - Bank Insolvency versus Bank Illiquidity . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.4 Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.2.5 Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3 The EU Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.2 A Tale of the Facts preceding the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4
2.3.3 Causes - Was Sovereign Debt the Cradle of the Crisis? . . . . . . . 74
2.3.4 Consequences and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3 Why Banks Purchased More Public Bonds During The Financial Crisis? 89
3.1 A Brief Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.2 Banks, The Global Financial Crisis, and Public Bonds. An Empirical Study 90
3.2.1 By Way of Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.2.2 Data and Elaborations Used to Run the Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.2.3 Preliminary Exploratory Analyses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.2.4 Quantitative Analysis of Bank Bondholdings . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.2.4.1 Why Pooled OLS Regression Does Not Work Well for
The Phenomenon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.2.4.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.2.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4 How To Overcome The Financial Crisis? Some Theoretical Proposals. 117
4.1 Performance-Sensitive Government Bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.1.1 Structure and Working . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
4.1.2 Opportunity Cost for Postponing Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . 120
4.1.3 Pricing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.1.4 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.2 Game Theory and The Tax To Eliminate Speculation in Sovereign Bond
Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.2.1 Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.2.2 Equilibria Without Anti-Speculation Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.2.3 Equilibrium Introducing The Tax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.2.4 Closing Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.3 Quantitative Easing Timing Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.3.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.3.2 Programming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.3.2.1 No Financial Crisis Jump . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.3.2.2 Financial Crisis Event . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4.3.2.3 Real Option Game - The Preemption Game . . . . . . . . 145
Conclusions 146
Appendix - Non Parametric Regression 148
References 153
Acknowledgments 160
5
List of Figures
1.1 Classification of Financial Instruments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2 Haircuts on Repos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Repurchase Agreements Operating Principle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Italian Public Debt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.5 Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) held by the Federal Reserve. . . . . . . 22
1.6 Callable bond example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.7 U.S. Zero-Coupon Strips Principal Value and Interests. . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.8 Securitization assets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.1 Optimal Choice of the Investor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2 NASDAQ Technology Index during ”.com” bubble. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3 The Great Recession Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4 Securitization Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5 U.S. Real GDP change and M3 Growth Rate Seasonally Adjusted. . . . . . 62
2.6 Unemployment Rate Aged 15-64, Males and Females. . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.7 Relation between Sovereign Debt Risk and Banking System. . . . . . . . . 71
2.8 Debt Increasing Never-Ending Loop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.9 The Mundell-Flemming Trilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.1 Sovereign Bondholdings by GIIPS Banks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2 Ireland and Greece Sovereign Bondholdings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.3 Public Bondholdings and Yields. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.4 Government Bonds Heterogeneity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.5 Sovereign Bondholdings Across Time and Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.6 OLS Regression Limits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.1 Evolution of GDP Investment in Discrete Time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.2 Optimal PSGB Investment Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.3 Feasible Region For Stochastic Ordinary Differential Equation Solutions . . 126
4.4 PSGB and Straight Bonds Value Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.5 The Range of Strategy of The Game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.6 The Critical Zone of The Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.7 The Payoff Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.8 Payoff Region When Tax Has Been Introduced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6
List of Tables
1.1 Money Market Instruments Categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2 Bond Credit Rating by The Big Three Rating Agencies. . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1 Policy Responses to the Banking Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.2 Public Debt for some Euro Area Countries (% GDP). . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.3 Consolidated Private Sector Credit Flows (% GDP). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.4 Eurozone Indebtedness Increasing (% GDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.5 Main Indicators for France, Germany and GIIPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.1 Definition of Variables used in the Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.2 Statistics of Sovereign Bondholdings Pre and Post Crisis. . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.3 Factor Explaining Banks’ Sovereign Bondholding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.4 Factors Explaining Government Bonds Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
4.1 Performances of Debt in the two Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.2 The Nash Equilibria of the Game without Anti-Speculation Tax. . . . . . . 136
4.3 Results of Optimal Quantitative Easing Model with Jump Process. . . . . . 144
4.4 The Nash Equilibria of the Preemption Game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
7
The holding of public bonds by banks:
Empirical evidences from the recent financial crisis
Alberto Talpo
Abstract
The aim of the thesis is to study the determinants which led banks to purchase more public
bonds immediately after the Global Financial Crisis occurred.
I have analyzed bank public bondholdings of ten states over 2002-2014. Banks held more
public bonds in the wake of the Global Financial crisis, increasing the holding by 2.071
percentage points on average. Stylized factors which driven the propensity to retain a
higher quantity of public debt were private sector leverage, yields, and the amount of bonds
outstanding. The issuance of such debt mitigated when the 2008 crisis started whose
effects were reflected further in the economic-financial situation of countries.
The thesis is an aid for future researches on public bondholdings and banks relation.
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Introduction
The thesis calls into question why banks exhibited an inclination to acquire and then hold a
consistent share of public bonds afterward the borne of the recent financial crisis. In this
context, the elaborate takes a new look at the connection between the calamity started in
the U.S.A. at the end of 2007 and financial institutions. A dataset has been developed
which combines diverse resources on a quarterly basis for ten states, that is the epicenter of
the financial crisis, the UK, the worst-performing Euro Area countries, the Netherlands,
France, and Germany. The time framework covers the beginning of the economic boom
until the aftermath of the turmoil mitigation, i.e., from 2002 to 2014.
Throughout the thesis I use the terms ”i.e.” and ”e.g.” refer to Latin expressions id est,
which means that is, and exempli gratia, which denotes for instance.
The research is organized as follows.
Chapter 1 gives a brief overview of financial markets, defining what is security, and the
generic classes in which financial instruments can be collected. Elton et al. (2013) provide
a synthetic scheme to delineate how traders can negotiate in trading venues, directly with
the construction of portfolios or indirectly acquiring quotas of mutual funds. We
concentrate on the former way as banks hold sovereign bonds buying them into secondary
financial markets. Thus, the fundamental distinction between assets falls on the maturity
date. Moving along this line, Money Market Instruments represent debt securities which
have got the shortest expiration sets to one year. In contrast, Capital Markets Instruments
are characterized by a long-term maturity, or they do not exhibit a reference date to cease to
exist. The final macro category of the financial environment is posed by Derivative
Instruments, linked to other assets, financial or not, because prices and payoffs are affected
by performances of the so-called underlying.
A full space is given to bonds, being the core of the analysis. Their peculiarities are
extensively explained, ranging from the identity of the issuer to included provisions. Then,
typical traders who negotiate debt instruments are placed in four macro categories, together
with the distinction of bonds according to two criteria: the former one the kind of coupon
rates or the presence of embedded options, the second one the nature of the debtor, where
public bonds are elucidated. Finally, risks to trade such securities are clarified because
traders could not detect potential risks of purchasing securities even if considered risk-free.
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The second chapter examines the Global Financial Crisis as it shocked the international
financial markets making them even more volatile and risky. A little example opens the
chapter delivering a generalized idea of why trading venues are so uncertain. Once the
concept has been expounded, the Great Recession is tackled due to its relevance for the
spread of a banking crash around the world. Albeit recession connotes every epoch, it
usually manifests itself by means of inflation with a duration equal to six months as Keeley
and Love (2010) underline. However, restore interbank markets requires a long time, the
effects of such a calamity were huge. Congdon (2015) states that the disaster began in the
fourth quarter of 2007, caused by a bubble in real estate. The factors which contributed to
the rapid expansion of the recession date back to the economic boom, an expansive period
the U.S.A. lived after the ”.dom bubble”, namely at the beginning of 2002 up to the borne
of the crisis. They were the slump in interest rates due to the FED policy to favor people to
obtain easily loans where the only collateral was the immovable property, ”yen carry trade”
which made Japan invest in a relevant bulk of U.S. sovereign bonds, blended with oil prices
shock and the high demand for Chinese goods.
All these entailed the subprime meltdown which stopped real estate, and banks were
plunged into a tough situation since their business activities exacerbated a lot. There is still
considerable ambiguity with regard to the proper cause which favored the banking sector
deterioration. Congdon (2014) compares two theories, the Mainstream approach and the
Monetary Interpretation. The main difference between them lies on who must be
condemned: the classical view points the finger at commercial and investment banks due to
their irresponsibility to prevent insolvency; while the less famous insight claims illiquidity
to be the seed of the negative growth. A key problem about the former theory is that there
are no strong empirical evidences which support it. An alternative consideration of the U.S.
turmoil is provided by Piketty (2014) who argue that inequality turns out to be the real
cause. A serious limitation with this argument, however, is that inequality can last for many
years, it does not reveal vicious cycles as negative growths hold generally, but especially
there is no correlation with the Great Recession.
Signals that the worldwide crisis sent were unemployment jump, GDP plunge, and
flight-to-quality. Solutions to mitigate them invoked interest rate reductions, quantitative
easing, and financial sector protections as Verick and Islam (2010) evidence principally.
The Eurozone Crisis came from the U.S. recession. The traditional thought about its
development is attributed to Sovereign Default risk. Many researchers contend, on the
other hand, that this evidence is not exhaustive. Many studies have been published on the
right cause of the Euro Area financial crisis. Lane R. (2012) reaches the conclusion that the
euro design is the root of the sovereign debt plague. Storm and Naastepad (2016) lists
several reasons for the disagreement with respect to such a common idea. The jump of
private sector indebtedness is the fundamental of our breakdown. Authors’ theory is fully
endorsed by data. Pereira B. and Rossi (2015) focus on the balance of payment imbalances,
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arriving to formulate the concept of a foreign exchange crisis due to real exchange rates
mismatching and bank bailouts. Engel (2016) claims that the crisis is an intrinsic
characteristic of markets, he distinguishes normality from the turmoil via herd and
isomorphic behavior definitions which in turn are tied. The crisis is necessary to trade in
not-turbulent marketplaces.
Naturally, the outcomes of the crisis were public deficit surge, an exaggerated use of fiscal
austerity, bailout became very common, unemployment soaring, and balance of payment
deterioration.
To halt the wave of negative consequences, Pereira B. and Rossi (2015) solution is the
return to separate currencies, which might increase the competitiveness of the poorest EU
countries, but the long-run costs would avoid its implementation. Fre´de´ric Lordon has
proposed a common currency attached to national currencies, with the European Central
Bank a sort of intermediary; Eurobonds adoption to prevent speculation, or a stronger Euro
fiscal union to avoid national output movements as outlined by Lane (2012).
Chapter 3 investigates the question of why banks bought a consistent amount of public
bonds over the 2008 crisis. The investment in this type of obligations augmented by 2.071
percentage points on average, with a peak of 7.465 percentage points in the UK.
Few academics have addressed the problem of the attitude those institutions kept towards
debt instruments whose prices touched the minimum levels during that time. Gennaioli et
al. (July 2014) have uncovered the relationship which links sovereign default, government
bonds, and banks, including some episodes of a banking crisis in the sample from 1998 to
2012. This thesis is a preliminary attempt to demonstrate drivers of banks bondholding in
empirical terms after Lehman Brother’s default. To determine the holding of treasury
bonds, fixed effects panel data models have been utilized being able to capture all the
variability inside each nation which constitutes the dataset I have constructed. The most
striking result to emerge from the data is that private credit-to-GDP ratio, bonds
outstanding, yields, and the financial crisis supply a positive benefit to the escalation of
monetary financial institutions public bondholding. Sovereign default makes banks less
prone to acquire the securities (only Greek episode is incorporated in the sample), above all
when both time and country effects are controlled. On the other hand, governments
declined the issuance of public debt when the downturn initiated or they decided to
strengthen interest rates.
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The fourth chapter delineates theoretical solutions to overtake the disaster. Bank et al.
(2011) create a reliable financial instrument, denominated Performance-sensitive
government bond which awards policymakers when they emend measures to lock deficit
upturn since agents will ask for lower nominal rates. Difficulties to put in place the project
in reality may surround insufficient secondary markets, arbitrage and speculation chances
after the issuance, or decision lag given that politicians do not recognize economic shocks
immediately.
The second framework passes to Game theory where Carfı` and Musolino (2012) have set
up an interesting game where a large speculative bank, a central bank, and a distressed
government are the players. The goal of authors is to find out a tool to neutralize gains
from speculation within sovereign bond markets altogether; this latter increased fast right
away the banking ”freezing”. They have discovered a tax which vanishes short-selling that
the bank can exploit to obtain massive profits. The starting point is to ignore such a tax,
with the consequence that the second and the third gamers will opt for purchasing the
largest quantity of bonds available, the speculator for its account, the central authority to
curb yields upsurge which damages ulteriorly the government. When the ”medicine” is in
action, the Nash equilibria switches, the large financial institution goes out to the market,
whereas Mario Draghi buys public bonds to bail out the close to the default state.
I have developed a model that has the target to pinpoint the optimal threshold which makes
the central bank enact Quantitative easing program. Stochastic dynamic programming has
been crucial for all stages of the pattern whose basic version not inspect uncertainty driven
by the banking crisis outbreak; the more sophisticated variant envisages the control of such
doldrums though a Poisson jump process placed within the stochastic process of public
bond prices.
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Chapter 1
Bonds and Characteristics
1.1 Financial Markets Overview
The financial world has increasingly become important during the last hundred of years.
A key factor in the rapid expansion of that world is played by High-Frequency Trading
(HFT) which contributed (and it still doing so) to transact a large number of orders at fast
speeds, exploiting powerful computers, sophisticated algorithms, and getting involved high
turnover capital. HFT was the primary cause of Flash Crash on May 6, 2010, in U.S. stock
exchanges where a large fundamental mutual fund firm placed an execution of a sell order
whose size was equal to 75.000 E-MINI S&P 500 derivative contracts, taking into account
trading volume only (execution rate set to 9%). Down Jones Index went down to 4%-5% in
few minutes because of that algorithm trading technique. Such an order jeopardized both
E-Mini and stock markets due to the borne of two liquidity crises as the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
reported (there is a strict relationship between E-MINI and stock markets).
Financial instruments are used for a lot of purposes when traders negotiate into markets.
Harris (2003) mentions that usages include asset exchanging, speculation, hedging, moving
wealth from a point to another point of time, or simply for entertainment.
Therefore, traders can negotiate securities in every financial market. Security is defined as
a legal contract representing the right to receive future benefits under a stated set of
conditions. (Elton et al. 2013)
Financial instruments cannot be classified with a unique method. Figure 1.1 proposes a
useful and representative scheme to understand the main classes of assets bought or sold in
markets.
13
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Figure 1.1: Classification of Financial Instruments.
Source: Elton et al. (2013)
Thus, an agent can negotiate either via direct or indirect investing. The former one
comprises assets which broadly represent a type of contract on a private or government
entity. The second one regards a financial intermediary (e.g., mutual, pension, or hedge
fund) putting together a host of securities acquired through direct investments and then
selling their parts to financial institutions which are used to holding them in the portfolio.
The direct investing can be classified beside the life that investors expect instruments will
have. Money market instruments are the assets whose maturity is less than one year. In
addition, they are identifiable depending on the nature of issuer (public or private).
Capital market instruments own maturity higher than a year. They are categorized into two
main classes, that is Fixed Income instruments and Equity instruments, where the first ones
can also be distinguished according to the issuer as for the money market securities.
Derivative instruments are the last category to be considered. Their payoffs and prices are
estimated by the value of an asset called underlying.
The way to trade in an indirect way falls outside the scope of this section. The goal is to
provide the reader a concise but at the same time extensively description of the core
concepts of financial assets negotiated directly by individuals as much accurate as possible.
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1.1.1 Money Market Instruments
Money market instruments are defined as short-term debt instruments with the maturity
equals or less than one year, very low-risk, and highly liquid. They are issued by
governments, financial institutions, and corporations. Returns are closely affected by
issuing entities. The minimum size of a transaction is typically large for this type of
instruments (greater than $ 100,000), along with the fact that some money market
securities are not actively traded on exchanges (The New York, London, and Tokyo Money
Markets are among the world’s widest). Considering the minimum transaction size and the
lack of liquidity for some issues, many traders who want to buy or sell these assets can
swap to mutual or hedge funds (i.e. to trade in money market funds).
Table 1.1 highlights the main money market instruments.
Table 1.1: Money Market Instruments Categories.
Source: Elton et al. (2013)
In the years immediately before the financial crisis of the previous decade, money market
securities were to an increasing extent used by financial institutions as collateral for many
transactions with a certain degree of safety. Such a crisis made agents avoid to use them
since they were no longer be considered so much harmless. We will go to carefully
describe the major assets belong to this environment in the next paragraphs.
1.1.1.1 Treasury Bills
Bills are financial assets with less than one year until the date that they will be redeemed
by the original borrower. (Pilbeam 2005). Bills could or not could be offered to the same
organizations that buy public bonds. Treasury bills (T-Bills) are therefore bills issued by
governments (e.g., Germany and the U.S.A.) to augment short-run funds, so they are
considered as the least risky and the most marketable of all money market instruments. The
maturity varies from 4 weeks to 1 year. T-Bills do not entail any payment of coupons
making them a sort of zero-coupon debt assets issued at a discount to the nominal or
redemption value, with the holder benefits entirely from capital appreciation. The return
obtainable stems from the difference between the purchase price and the amount that
15
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lender receives at maturity. They are sold in minimum denominations1 ($ 10,000 in the
U.S.A.) with periodical issues. For instance, the U.S. Federal Government creates and then
issues 91 day and 182 day T-bills every week, along with 52 week Treasury bills at a
monthly frequency. UK Debt Management Office issues 28 day and 91 day T-Bills each
week (on Monday), other than 182 day Treasury Bills on a monthly basis. To trade these
instruments, a very liquid secondary market proves to be exploited. Hence trading happens
at low transaction costs. We will see in the second section of this chapter that bonds, the
most used and known debt instruments, also benefit the existence of large secondary
markets. T-bills are sold at auction in two different ways. Bid price auction happens when
individuals pay the price they bid. Strike price auction calls for the payment of the same
price. In other countries, such securities are known as Bon du Tre´sor (France),
Schatzwechsel (Germany and Austria), GKO (Russia), and Buoni Ordinari del Tesoro
(BOT) in Italian financial markets. It is worth noting that Treasury bills with short maturity
(typically three months) and mini-bonds2 are very employed to manage liquidity due to
their ability to cover temporary offsets of cash flows.
1.1.1.2 Repurchase Agreements
A Repurchase agreement (Repo or RP) is a type of secured, collateralized, short-term
lending, usually between banks, assuming the structure of an agreement between a
borrower and a creditor to sell and repurchase a security (government assets are much used
due to their default-free feature and the presence of many large size public debt markets).
A borrower, who usually coincides to a government securities dealer, institutes the
operation by contracting to sell securities to a lender at a prefixed price and simultaneously
incurring to buy back such assets at a future date at a well-defined price. The difference
between the two values represents the lender’s return, well him or her gain. Securities
exchanged depict the collateral for the transactions where the amount required depends on
the risk of this guarantee.
Haircuts were used to discount the face value of Repo Mortgage3-Backed securities (MBS)
during Great Recession since financial instruments are generally devalued when their usage
coincides with collateral activity, in order to get a ”cushion” that lending parties evaluate in
case market value falls. A haircut is a difference between prices at which a market maker
can buy and sell a security. The term is also used to indicate the percentage by which an
asset’s market value is reduced for the aim of calculating capital requirement, margin and
collateral levels.
1The term ”Denomination” is generally understood to mean the classification of the face value of financial
instruments.
2In the financial world, Mini-bonds usually refer to debt instruments bought by investors for lending
directly to businesses.
3Mortgage, ”ipoteca” in Italian Law, is the collateral attached to every immovable property purchases in
real estate markets.
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The maturity of repurchase agreements is usually less than 14 days, sometimes overnight
(i.e. equal to a single financial working day). The counterpart of the repurchase agreement
trades a reverse Repo to buy a security at a certain price and to sell it back at a price and
time specified a priori.
Figure 1.2 shows haircuts applied on RPs before the financial crisis.
Figure 1.2: Haircuts on Repos.
Source: Valdez et al. (2016). © IMF (October 2008) Global Financial Stability Report
The following scheme may turn out to be useful to illustrate, in simple terms, how a
repurchase agreement works (securities used in the transaction are stocks).
Figure 1.3: Repurchase Agreements Operating Principle.
Source: Valdez et al. (2016).
As one can note, trader A sells shares to the counterparty B, and he or she obtains a
protection for the exposition of selling the stocks (namely a guarantee). After that, trader B
gives back such shares to trader A who is obliged to pay the collateral and interests
accrued.
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1.1.1.3 Instruments involving Banks
A host of money market instruments allows investors to finance or satisfy their needs
passing through the bank. I shed light on several assets which make these purposes feasible
for every trader who needs to complete some peculiar operations.
Certificates of deposit (CDs) are momentary deposits, often with a bank, not withdrawn
until the maturity (even if early withdrawal penalty is actually allowed which has the
structure of a given amount of money), whose duration ranges from 3-18 months to 5
years. They are sold by banks, thrift organizations, and credit unions. The lenders might be
investors who seek to obtain funding with low-risk and interests given by the safety of
assets. They can be issued in the form of zero-coupon or fixed/floating securities. In
general, certificate of deposits with longer maturity provide coupons. Instead, those whose
life is up to a year coincide with zero-coupon. After issues, CDs are negotiable in a similar
manner to bonds. They implicate some advantages both for the lender and the debtor. On
the one hand, creditor’s advantage is drawn on the chance that he or she has to get money
back earlier by easily selling such an instrument to somebody else. On the other hand,
borrower’s advantage consists of lending of money for a specific period.
Bankers’ acceptances are contracts whereby companies enforce the bank to pay a specific
sum of money on a particular date (typically within six months). The bank agrees to
receive a bill and may also discount it, or the client may discount it with another bank.
These acceptances often operates as a guarantee for international import operations where
the creditworthiness of one trader is unknown to the trading partner. CDs and bankers’
acceptances are traded at rates that depend on the credit rating of the bank that backs
them.4 Eurodollar and Eurodollar CDs are particular kind of U.S. deposits often supported
by non-U.S. banks.
Commercial papers are unsecured loans with a brief duration (the major common ones
have a maturity equals to one or two months) released by relevant and high standing
companies or corporations, typically used to face temporary cash flow needs. A discount
program is many times planned for them. Yields are partially determined by the credit
quality of the borrower.
Interbank deposits are short-term deposits carried out among banks, employing to provide
for momentary lack or excess of liquidity. Interbank market is an over the counter (OTC)5
market, in which the interest rate applied depends on the match between the demand and
the supply of deposits.
4CDs are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation up to a limit of $ 10,000 in the U.S.A.
5A decentralized market, without a central physical location, where market participants trade each other
via a lot of communication methods such as the telephone, email and proprietary electronic trading systems.
OTC markets are less transparent than exchanges and are also subject to fewer regulations.
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London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and Euro Interbank Offered Rate (EURIBOR)
are the most important interest rates in this financial environment. The acronym LIBOR
stands for the rate at which large international banks in London lend money among
themselves. It should be emphasized that LIBOR is used as a base rate for many types of
long-term loans. Thus, one of its primary purposes is addressed to U.S. loans. The interest
rate is computed for a set of currencies (e.g., U.S. Dollar, Yen, Euro) with severe maturities
such as overnight (rate lists today and it will expire tomorrow), spot/next (rate lists today
and it will expire in two days time).
EURIBOR denotes the interbank rate which has calculated by European Banking
Federation since 1999 as an average of interbank exchange ask rates due to the link of
LIBOR and EURIBOR to rates applied on the transfer of deposits. Furthermore, this latter
is calculated at 11 a.m Central European Time inside a well-known panel of banks, having
a high credit standing with life encompasses from one week to a year.
The overnight interbank deposits interest rate in the European Euro Area (EEA) is denoted
as EONIA, and it is computed by the European Central Bank as an average of overnight
performances carried out by creditor institutions inside EU interbank markets.
1.1.2 Capital Markets Instruments
Capital Markets is the class of financial markets that involves in trading assets with a
medium/long-run maturity (i.e. greater than twelve months) and those with no specific
maturity a priori. Fixed Income instruments and Equity instruments are the categories
where such securities can be collected. Fixed income instruments have got cash flow
patterns over time; Equity instruments promise to yield to the holder future gains of the
institution that he or she believes it will keep having or it will get ongoing business, with
the reward supplied in the form of dividends.
1.1.2.1 Fixed Income Instruments
Fixed Income instruments6 are instruments of capital markets characterized by the
existence of scheduled payments over the years. Harris (2003) underlines that all debt
securities are collectively known as fixed income products. Fixed-rate bonds are the most
famous in this category. Issues are put into default if there is a lack of satisfying a prefixed
payment, with all remaining ones due immediately (interests plus principal value). The
yield received is expressed as a predetermined interest rate as long as the investor does not
sell the security before its maturity. Fixed income instruments can be differentiated
according to specific characteristics such as the identity of the issuer, the collateral given to
the lender, the maturity until the repayment date, or the type of disbursement of interest. I
6In Italian markets, they are called Titoli obbligazionari.
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highlight that market prices are different from those that traders have to pay when fixed
income securities are purchased, in particular, who buys a bond must add to the quoted
value the accrued interest from the last coupon payment.
Examples of fixed income debt assets will be discussed now. A better explanation of the
most famous category of fixed income securities, bonds, will be provided in the next
section.
Looking at the U.S.A., Treasury Notes and Bonds are fixed income instruments issued by
the U.S. Federal government. The first ones have a maturity from 1 to 10 years; the second
ones own a maturity higher than ten years. These debt securities give to the holder coupons
every six months and principal, that is the amount lent, on the maturity date. Another
important distinction concerns the feasibility of some Treasury bonds to be callable, while
Treasury notes cannot be recalled earlier under any circumstances. Call provision will
carefully be explained when bonds will be discussed in detail.
Focusing on Italy, Italian Treasury issues a broad range of debt instruments because of its
high public debt which persisting in the last years. Figure 1.4 shows the evolution of debt
in Italy from 2001 to 2015.
Figure 1.4: Italian Public Debt.
Author’s elaboration. Data Source: Istat.
To report some issues, Certificati del Tesoro Zero Coupon (CTZ) are zero coupon debt
securities with a life equals to 24 months. The gain of buying them comes from the
difference between the nominal value and the purchasing price. CTZ are sometimes
associated with BOT, in fact they are also called superBOT or Bottoni.
Buoni Poliennali del Tesoro (BTP) are fixed coupon securities with medium/long-term
maturity (e.g., 3, 5, 10, 15, and 30 years). Such a fixed coupon is paid in half a year, as for
Treasury notes and bonds above explained. Italian Treasury never triggered the early
redemption of debt, Certificati del Tesoro (CTOs) excluded. Such financial assets were
issued for the first time in 1998 with a maturity of 8 years and fixed coupon rates. The
redemption provision was composed by a put, not a call option. The exercise of this
embedded option permitted the lender to exit earlier from the investment at the half of life
of the instrument about, without prejudice on capital in case of the boost of rates.
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Certificati di Credito del Tesoro (CCT) are other interesting bonds in our country markets
because they distinguish from BTP due to their floating rates and maturity sets to 7 years.
The principal is fixed, while semi-annual coupons vary in function of 6-months BOT yield
and after the first coupon.
1.1.2.2 Structured Bonds
Even if Structured Bonds are more hybrid financial instruments than fixed income
instruments, it is worth to explain some of them because they incorporate both fixed
income assets and derivatives (especially options) features and they lie between debt and
equity instruments as we will see soon.
Reverse Floater are floating rate bonds, whose coupons are inversely connected to an
interest rate (for example, Treasury rate, Federal Fund rate, or interbank rate) since if
coupon increases, index rate goes down.
Convertible Bonds are bonds with predetermined maturity and fixed-rate coupons. They
allow the holder to change him or her bonds in stocks (according to a scheduled conversion
rate), in other words, to transform himself or herself from creditor to shareholder respect to
the issuer of securities. To create a portfolio of convertible bonds is the same of buying
bonds plus call options. Reverse convertible are inverse convertible bonds because the
holding of them is similar to a portfolio built with bonds and put options.
Preferred Stocks, whose translation is ”Azioni privilegiate” in Italian, deliver accurate
payments to the trader by the distribution of dividends with a regular path. The failure to
meet these payments does not lead to bankruptcy implicating the repayment of debt by
tranches. The broad accepted use of the expression ”Tranche” refers to the order with
which a creditor is paid when a lack of cash arises. Seniors are the lenders with the highest
grade for repayment; juniors are the final investors will see the fulfilling of debt payment
completed. Therefore, when an enterprise fails to do so, dividends are cumulated, and
those connected to preferred stocks must be settled before any common stockholders will
be paid.
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS) are securities where the payment of coupons and the return
of the principal are guaranteed by a claim on the underlying assets. (Patrick J. Brown
2006). ABS include loans, home mortgages, commercial mortgages, automobile loans,
student loans, and credit card debt. A classical representation of this type of assets is
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), building in tranches with different maturities and
risk levels. Pilbeam (2005) reported on securitization as the process of borrowing money
through issuance of a security which is backed by stream cash flows or other assets.
Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) were created by banks during the Financial crisis to
collect money from the market used to buy loans or credits in a wide range of credit
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institutions. SPVs then issued instruments called Residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS), CDOs even granted by Credit default swaps (CDS) to pay to banks the purchase
of such loans or credits. ABS were crucial during that period due to their large composition
in the portfolio of many financial institutions. RMBS and CDOs were the most well-known
ABS in that violent episode. Figure 1.5 shows the holding of MBS in the U.S. pre and
post-crisis with all maturities.
Figure 1.5: Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) held by the Federal Reserve.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
1.1.2.3 Equity Instruments
Equities, or Common stocks, provide stockholder some earnings as he or she participates to
the future profitability of the company. After creditors of the firm are paid, satisfying
shareholders’ compensation is done by distributing dividends that portray earnings for
investors. Holders of shares have limited liability because if the company is distressed or it
goes to bankruptcy, they will lose the original amount invested only, not their equity.
Preferred stocks are often intended as being common stocks, but this is misleading because
the former ones are hybrid securities that stay between bonds and equities.
1.1.3 Derivative Instruments
The final category analyzed is derivatives that are securities whose values derive from a set
of instruments (not necessarily with a financial nature). The other name of derivatives is
Contingent claims because they are strictly affected by the performance of underlying
assets. Probably the fastest growing sector of the financial markets today is that of
derivatives (Valdez et al. 2016).
Section 2 carefully explains a particular category of debt instruments, Bonds, which are
recognized as being very useful to lend or borrow money. In addition, they are crucial both
to understand the other parts of thesis and to uncover why many financial institutions hold
plenty of public debt instruments in their portfolios, especially during the Global Financial
Crisis.
22
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 1
1.2 Bonds
I have singled out bonds in many occasions within the previous sections and paragraphs,
even when financial instruments which own bond and derivative peculiarities have
explained. I have done that since bonds are more and more exploited by all entities who
seek to raise funds most safely as much as possible. The idea to lend money via
”banknotes” is often unsuitable both for the lender and the borrower. The creditor will not
get any insurance against the capability of or the willing to repayment by the counterpart,
whereas the debtor might face the credit or default risk with the consequence of not longer
be able to honor the refund, incurring to legal actions. I anticipate that bonds own a put
provision that helps the borrower in case of particular events (default included) to compel
the issuer to buy back securities. Difficulties that the lender or the debtor faces might be
true even when the interest rate at which money is borrowed suffer from a reduction. In the
microeconomics literature, substitution and income effects demonstrated how loan changes
in response to a drop in interest rate blowing savings of individuals. For the first effect,
opportunity cost falls at present since everyone must give up to a quantity of future
consumption for any additional marginal amount (i.e., a euro, a dollar) of actual
consumption. Consequently, savings will drop. For the other effect, the lender will have
less money goes back namely he or she will be poorer for the falling of interest rate. If one
supposes that actual consumption is a normal good, in other words, its demand raises if
disposable resources of individuals increase, less income induces to enhance savings.
Combining the effects, the borrower’s savings will be reduced, the lender’s ones will go up.
As Choudhry (2010) points out, Bonds are commonly referred to as fixed-income
instruments. This terms goes back to a time when bonds paid fixed coupons each year.
Nowadays, that scenario is actually not so much true because there exists severe kind of
debt assets which pay floating coupons or they are linked to an index, leading to the
concept that bonds belong to fixed income securities world then they are traded in capital
markets7. Indeed, issuers of bonds try to accumulate long-run debt capital.
To define bonds, Fabozzi (2012) argues that a bond is a debt instrument requiring the
issuer (also called the debtor or borrower) to repay to the lender/investor the amount
borrowed plus interest over a specified period of time. In this manner, bonds are mostly
negotiable loans in broad and liquid secondary markets. I stress that primary markets are
markets in which corporations raise new capital, secondary markets are markets in which
existing, already outstanding securities are traded among investors. (Brigham et al. 2013).
Bond issues are composed by a fixed date when the amount borrowed is due and the
contractual amount of interest (generally paid at prefixed times). The maturity date is the
7Debt instruments are used to be classified by their time horizon. In the U.S. for instance, bonds are those
debt securities which own medium/long maturity otherwise, the word ”note” can detect short-lived securities
in some debt markets.
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date on which the invested capital must be paid back. If the issuer of bonds does not default
or redeem the issues before the maturity date, the bondholder is assured of a scheduled
cash flow path as long as he or she holds assets until the maturity date.
Bond prices are meaningfully influenced by policymaker choices and exogenous economic
facts as well yields on individual public bonds are important indexes for the economy of a
country as a whole. Consequently, the level of return is crucial considering that it indicates
the direction that economy is covering and the economic-financial conditions of the state.
I will explain the fundamental characteristics of bonds available in financial markets in the
following paragraph.
1.2.1 Features
Every bond has got some particular features. In this paragraph, I illustrate them to better
figure out the structure of these instruments.
The first cited is the nature of issuer because such assets vary in function of the debtor.
Local government authorities, sovereign governments, companies, corporations, and
supranational entities (such as the European Investment Bank) constitute the major issuers.
The term to maturity denotes the number of years that the lender will wait for having the
payment by the debtor of the amount lent plus any relative interests associated with it. The
maturity stands for the date that debt will expire and consequently, the borrower will
redeem the bond paying back the principal value. Maturity or Term are other terms with
which maturity is called in literature. The only method to modify the term to maturity of a
bond derives from provisions incorporated in it. According to the maturity, short bonds are
typically characterized by life from 1 to 5 years, medium bonds’ life ranges from 5 and 15
years. Finally, long bonds own a maturity longer than 15 years. The term to maturity of
bonds is significant because the creditor is able to formulate some expectations about the
time at which the lending amount will go back alongside the coupons due. Additionally,
yields (in other words, earnings) by the investment in bonds fluctuates according to it, and
the prices of such securities are also dependent on the term.
The principal, to be more precise, the principal value is the amount that debtor promises to
pay to the lender (i.e. bondholder) at the maturity. The issuer has to comply with this
obligation since the principal is the amount that bondholder has lent to him or her. In
literature, there are other nouns to refer to the principal that are Redemption value,
Maturity value, Par value, or Face value. Brown J. (2006) highlights that some bonds do
not specify a final maturity date. These bonds often designate that they may be redeemed
by the issuer on or after a specified date and at a particular price, subject to a notice period.
That kind of debt instruments are known as Undated bonds, Irredeemables, or Permanent
interest-bearing securities.
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The coupon8 or nominal rate is the interest rate obtained by the individual who purchases a
bond. The coupon rate is expressed in percentage and when multiplied by the face value is
equal to the amount of the coupon in currency unit. Coupons are not distributed by an only
manner (zero coupon bond does not entail any payment of coupons. We will see them in
the upcoming paragraph). In U.S. debt markets, they are paid at a semi-annual frequency,
while in European Markets usually, that happens every quarter or year. In general, each
bond is traded at a price strictly below to the nominal or redemption value, i.e. at a
discount. The reason is that if interest rate applied to compute the ”cash” value of coupons
starts to rise, bonds will only be able to sell at a markdown from the face value since who
buys assets can trade new bonds at the principal and paying a higher rate. Vice versa, to
sell a bond with a premium means that its price is greater than the par value, hence there is
the presence of a higher interest rate concerning other bonds owing to the same term, for
example. Another feature of nominal rate is given by the degree of which prices of bonds
are determined by interest rate changes: higher the interest rate of coupons, bonds’ price
fluctuates less according to yield variations.
Fabozzi (2012) considered the planning of principal payments to be a significant
characteristic of bonds. Him theory is based on the hypothesis that the par repayment of a
bond issue can call for the principal to be fully repaid at maturity or the par comes back
from the creditor over the life of the bond. Amortization schedule must then develop.
Amortizing securities are those securities originated from loans with amortization schedule
such as MBS and ABS. Amortized loans are primarily home, personal, or auto loans. They
do not properly have a term because this latter uncovers only the date at which principal
will be given to the investor. Instead of the maturity, alternative measures are exploited as a
weighted average.
Most embedded options have incorporated inside bonds since the first issue to alter some
conditions. The term embedded is used because the option element cannot be separated
from the bond itself. (Choudhry et al. 2014). Such options permit the debtor or the
bondholder to replace some conditions with others, even if they might be triggered by
sudden exogenous events like the issuer is taken over by a third company or the tax status
of the issue is no longer the same of that initial.
The most famous option is the call provision which can be exploited by the issuer to settle
the debt (all or partially) before the maturity date. Bonds which own this provision are
called callable bonds. The provision can be exercised at the borrower discretion. Earlier
debt repayment is dangerous for the lender because the term to maturity becomes
obviously altered, inducing the investor’s interest to likely face a downfall. To be more
precise, the issuer can substitute the security initially agreed to the sale with a new
instrument having a lower coupon or interest rate. As a consequence of it, the bond’s
market price will vary. A callable bond is though as a trading strategy consists of buying a
8The origin of this term stems from the condition whereby bearer bonds are those bonds with no registered
holders. The entity that issues such debt instruments has the ownership of bearer. The bondholder are used to
get physical bond with coupons one time which indicated the interest amount which he or she can obtain.
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common bond and selling a call option which acts as a cap9 for bond’s price. The equation
1.1 seems to be accurate to explain this statement in mathematical terms. I propose a
similar version of that of Choudhry et al. (2014) (P indicates the price of an instrument).
Pcallable bond = Pbond −Pcall option (1.1)
Considering 1.1, if the value of the call option increases, the callable bond is influenced in
negative terms. To put it another way, if the individual who gets the bond decide to sell the
call provision (remember that it is represented by a short position on a call option), he or
she obtains the price of such an option which depends on the exercise date. Furthermore,
call feature has terms affected by its evaluation too. Call options included in bonds have the
characteristic of European options ”killed” just at the maturity or American option which
can be exercised at every time before the expiration. Naturally, American options will be
more expensive than EU ones beside the early exercise. Figure 1.6 reports an example of
the redemption of debt earlier.
Figure 1.6: Callable bond example.
Source: Brown J. (2006)
If the borrower has the chance to transform the term taking an advantage for the repayment,
the lender can it as well, with the consequence to be entitled to sell the bond to the debtor.
Put provision makes the action practicable due to the right to enforce the issuer to buy back
the security at the principal on one or more dates. I underline that the put feature included
in put-able bonds may be only used if particular events happen.
These bonds are similar to callable ones, even though their strategy is set up on a long
position both for common bonds and put options. Choudhry et al. (2014) express that
exploiting an equation and we provide an analogous version of their:
Pput−able bond = Pbond +Pput option (1.2)
9A cap is the greatest threshold that an interest rate can reach. In literature, interest rate cap is a derivative
instrument composed of a number of European call options (known as caplets which have particular interest
rates) expire on the date the floating debt rate will be reset.
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Note that if the value of put option raises, even the value of a bond with put provision
augments. Put feature acts as a floor10 on conventional debt security’s price.
Other thoughts for bond’s peculiarities regard the collateral and the place in which trade
and quotations are made. When the borrower decides to issue bonds, he or she has to state
what kind of guarantee will be available to the buyer of such issues. Shapes of the
collateral vary a lot. Asset backing helps the investor in case of debtor’s default since it
gives the opportunity to evaluate bonds at least their principal. Negative pledge implicates
that the issuer did not pledge himself or herself to sell new bonds with a stronger claim on
them in the future. Collateral could be absent in case of subordinated debentures or
government bonds. For debt instruments issued by government authorities, they are
practically risk-free. If they are sold in domestic currency, there exists the chance to put in
circulation more money to cover any shortages and repay the debt. The weakness comes
from the transformation of public bonds in risky assets because the coupon and redemption
value payments might occur in a devalued currency.
The quotation of bonds is sometimes carried out in exchanges. A typical mistake
committed by traders is to think that bonds will so be negotiated in regulated markets. This
assumption looks to be true for many government bonds but if one cherry-picks the bond
market for the negotiation, he or she can see that in the Eurobond market, a huge quantity
of buying and selling of public bonds takes places on OTC markets in connection with
market makers. Retail investors are few for such debt securities for the presence of high
minimum denominations, or the quotations were not created in exchanges.
1.2.2 The Major Traders in Bond Markets
Bonds features are exhaustively explained in the previous paragraph. However, the main
agents purchasing bonds in debt markets must be listed to investigate their typical attitude
with respect to bonds. I have chosen to dedicate a brief subsection to such traders to give a
general panorama to the reader. Furthermore, banks are important buyers of government
bonds and this will be the aim of the thesis to be proved.
Following the proposal of Choudhry (2010) to consider the time horizon of the investment,
bond market traders can be collected in four principal areas. Short-term institutional
investors are the investors who negotiate above all in money markets among which banks,
money market fund managers, and treasury desks of some corporates. Central banks trade
in this kind of debt markets too. These investors formulate short-term decisions and
expectations about future movements of instruments. I highlight banks might be expose to
10A floor is the lowest threshold that interest rate achieves. Like the cap, there are derivatives linked to the
floor, called interest rate floors, which are developed by a host of European interest put options, with severe
interest rates and they cease to exist on the date the floating rate will be reset. Both interest rates floor and
cap are very employed for interest rate hedging. Cap and floor terms are usually used when one refers to
derivatives.
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respect some liquidity constraints by holding a portion (often considerable) of short-term
securities in their portfolios. This last statement will result true when I run econometric
analysis in Chapter 3 because banks hold a huge quantity of government debt instruments.
Long-term institutional investors are those with longer investment horizon. This category
includes pension funds and life insurance companies. The length of investment horizon is
correlated with the nature of liabilities that such investors own.
There is a class of investors characterized by a mixed time horizon called Mixed horizon
institutional investors which includes insurance companies, sovereign wealth funds, and a
lot of corporations, issuing bonds to increase their fundings.
Finally, Market professionals are a heterogeneous category since investors’ time horizon
spaces from 1 day to many years. Entities belonging to the category are represented by
investment banks realize proprietary trading which consists of trades carried out by
institutions (like firms or banks) to get earnings for their account, not through executing
agency orders, together with bond market makers in securities houses and banks dedicated
to customer services. Pilbeam (2005) maintains that a market maker acts as a dealer in a
financial security, quoting both a price at which he is willing to buy a security (the bid
price) and a higher price at which he is willing to sell the security (the ask price). The
difference, or spread, between the bid-ask prices represents a profit margin. Market-makers
provide liquidity for the market, a set of prices for investors, and reliable price information.
1.2.3 Types of Bonds
There is a vast amount of bonds despite the fact that common bonds, also referred to
conventional, plain vanilla, or bullet bonds are the most known. Bonds are principally
traded in OTC markets rather than exchanges. Some bond issues are highly liquid, others
are rarely negotiated. In developed countries, markets for such debt securities represent a
large segment of financial sector and they are vast and liquid. The initial point to list bonds
might result to be a bit arbitrary. One might pay more attention to the nature of the issuer
plays a significant role for all debt instruments rather than the form of nominal rates or
embedded options. In my opinion, the second one is more appropriate on which to start to
discuss because bonds are better differentiated one from each other with respect to the
presence or not of provisions, and kind of interests due to money lent to individuals or
institutions that could suffer from the financially distressed situation.
Following the classification of Brown J. (2006), Fixed-rate bonds or Fixed-coupon bonds
(Fixed-interest bonds in the UK) are bonds which provide coupons with a fixed interest rate
to the entity that owns them. This bond environment is divided into different parts.
Straight coupon bonds, also known as option-free bonds are referred to vanilla ones since
they give to the lender periodically interest rates plus the par value at the maturity.
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Call or put provisions are absent (the reason why they are called ”option-free”) inducing to
authorize neither debtor nor bondholder to alter the maturity. Precisely, any provisions are
not included in straight coupon bonds. The frequency of coupon payment differs across
markets (according to continent or country).
Zero-coupon bonds (ZCBs) are a particular class of bonds considering the coupon
payment. In literature, zero-coupon bonds, pure discount bonds, and accrual bonds are
three classes of languages that convey the same concept of securities. The term
zero-coupon has already met during the discussion of many marketable financial
instruments. I define it in a precise way, notwithstanding the meaning is quite intuitive.
Focusing on bonds, zero-coupon implicates to not pay any coupons until the expiration
though to give back the face value on a single date. To compensate and attract investors,
issuers of ZCBs typically sold them below the face value. The earning reaped is simply the
ability derived from the sale at the par, in other words, the difference which exists between
the redemption value and the price at which ZCBs were ceded by the debtor. A feature of
pure discount bonds regards the erratic approach of trading price from the price established
initially by issuing individual to the par value reached during the life of the instrument.
Undated bonds are a particular type of fixed-coupon bonds without a maturity date. The
borrower must keep providing the lender coupon payments, but he or she has the
possibility to use the call provision reliably. Given the opportunity to keep paying coupons,
perpetual bonds term mirrors the category of bonds addressed here.
Stripped, Strippable, or Strip bonds are debt instruments developed by splitting the
payments from bonds which own coupons and then selling separately each zero coupon
bonds obtained by this operation (they have different terms and maturity dates). Splitting is
done when there is a lack of ZCBs inside financial markets, for instance. Fixed-rate bonds,
as well as other bonds with coupons are involved in the process of creation of strippable
debt instruments. Bonds derived by stripping make pension fund and insurance companies
able to yield safe returns over time (for many years) due to the independence of coupon
rates on reinvestment activities. A final consideration for strips entails the feasibility that is
sometimes begun to ”recombine” bonds stripped in order to get back bonds with coupon
payments fulfilled systematically. Figure 1.7 is an extract of U.S. Treasury Strips face
value and the respective interest rates of coupons.
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Figure 1.7: U.S. Zero-Coupon Strips Principal Value and Interests.
Quotes are as of 3 p.m. Eastern time based on transactions of $1 million or more. Yields
are calculated on the ask quote.
Source: J.P. Morgan Pricing Direct Inc. via www.sstbond.com
We have treated bonds which hold an interest rate that does not switch over time.
Corporations issue debt instruments where the first coupon owns a determinate nominal
rate but the other coupons are computed by different interest rates. This is the case of
Step-up or Graduated-rate bonds.
We move on to consider bonds pay coupons with variable interest rates, the so-called
Floating -rate bonds, or Floating-rate notes (FRNs)11. Their coupon rate varies in function
of external measures such as LIBOR or EURIBOR which we have already explained.
Floating-rate bonds are in general reclaimed on a fixed date or they appear to be undated
bonds. As the coupon payments are attached to an exogenous variable rate, yields that
investor obtains are not predictable. Such payments have the purpose of push bond’s price
far away from the amount of loan. There is a spread given to bondholder with a fixed
margin nature albeit variable rate notes allow a margin which fluctuates. A trade-off is
borne by these considerations. While uncertainty derived from more risk of future earnings
makes a trader more adverse to invest in those debt assets, he or she is rewarded by more
frequently tranches of coupon payments, so the existence of a higher number of cash flows.
As for fixed-interest bonds, there is no an only method to deliver coupons because it occurs
every month, quarter, half a year, or 12 months. Cap and floor bounds are added to
coupons. Choudhry (2010) denotes that on time, called coupon reset date when the
nominal rate resets (in fact, the interest rate associated with coupons usually is readjusted),
floating-rate bonds are priced at the par value. I believe that to spend a few words about the
coupon reset is crucial since the attitude that many bonds own to clear nominal rates
attributed to coupons. The readjustment of FRNs is based on the formula that Fabozzi
11The term ”note” is often employed in finance to refer to a debt instrument with a maturity equal or less
than five years, namely greater than a bill but lower than a bond.
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(2012) reports with the name Coupon reset formula.
Reset rate + Quoted margin (1.3)
where quoted margin is the marginal amount that debtor promises to give on the interest
rate linked to the bond. If a floating-rate bond moves in the opposite side with respect to its
reference interest rate, then trader negotiates a Inverse-floating-rate bond (or Inverse
floater/reverse floater). This is only a recap of what we have seen in structure bonds
paragraph, although reverse floaters seem to be more hybrid bonds than straight coupon or
floating-rate bonds. If exogenous interest rate is an inflation rate12, the word linker is used
for the association with index-rate bonds.
FRNs are traded at a percentage of the cash value of coupons less accrued interests.
Fixed-rate bonds employ those metrics too. Nevertheless, the calculation of an accrued
interest completely differs if one treats fixed-interest bonds rather than floating-rate ones
due to the quotation of these latter as quasi-money market securities. Thus, the date of
coupon payments changes every time a fact happens within the market where notes are
quoted. Naturally, the market must be open in order the payments will be made on business
days. This is why conventions are applied to the issues. A final aspect that we stress
concerns when FRNs are issued in debt markets, they are rated with a premium which is
equal to that of the initial issue, with the consequence of the floating-bond’ price reverts to
the issue price (typically approaching the redemption value).
It should be noted that ”mixed” bonds are quoted in financial markets, both exchanges and
OTCs. They include features of floating and fixed-interest bonds, supplying fixed coupons
payments for a certain time span then they assume a variable shape.
The type of bonds represented by their coupon payments and provisions has been clarified.
Let’s consider another possible classification of these securities paying attention to the
entity who issue them. I have decided that identity of the issuer is relevant considering that
the perception of risks associated to the investment is highly influenced by who sells this
type of debt assets. Additionally, bonds are traded in a broad range of markets which
engages severe agents. Therefore, to figure out how they change in response of the
borrower is fundamental for the buyer as well as for the market.
The first class of bonds faced are Government bonds. The terms Public bonds, Sovereign
bonds are also employed with the reference of government debt. Thousands of bonds are
sold by the federal government in the U.S.A., the reason why Treasury bonds is another
locution allocated to government bonds. We must pay attention to a subtle distinction
rarely captured between government and sovereign bonds. If a foreign government issues
bonds since it is looking for funds, bonds are linked to the concept of sovereign debt.
Instead, when a government sells bonds in its own currency, government bond is a term
12In Italy, Istat estimates the Indice Armonizzato dei prezzi al consumo (IAPC) con o senza tabacco used
lots of times as a proxy for European inflation rate.
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more appropriate. Nevertheless, the two nouns are equally employed by traders.
”Sovereign” might be more precise since ”government” expression does explicitly not
point out whether bonds are denominated in the domestic currency or not.
Public bonds represent the borrowing of state due to the large deficit of countries which
leads to a lot of issues of debt, especially today. Sovereign bonds constitute the widest
share of bond markets. Investors believe that government will be able to fulfill the
commitment to fully repay its debt and it will not default, or better, the probability that
government will turn out to be in default or distress situation almost vanishes. Hence, these
bonds are considered risk-free and they represent the best credit risk albeit this is not so
reliable nowadays13. Government debt markets are very liquid for this reason, along with
sovereign bonds have high liquidity and lower trading costs than other assets (for instance,
corporate debt securities, equities, derivatives). Settlement occurs immediately after the
transaction (one day generally) and special tax advantages are sometimes attached to
stimulate traders to buy these bonds. That involves the selling of bonds with a different
yield to maturity, Flower bonds which are U.S. Treasury debt instruments usually sold at a
price much lower than principal. However, they have got a provision which consists of the
chance to buy them at the par value in payment of estate taxes. Consequently, their price is
set above than the initial one and yield will be lower than traders would obtain if that
provision has not been embedded into such bonds.
Purchasing sovereign debt implies that earnings will be lower than those of other bonds
(e.g. corporate bonds) caused by yields. Government bonds own fixed coupon rates and a
well-defined principal. They are therefore considered as fixed-interest bonds. Provisions to
alter the term to maturity by the issuer can be presented. For example, the government is
able to enforce bondholder to sell back the bond before the maturity at a specified price.
Sovereign bonds are issued by the central bank in France, Germany, or the U.S.A., the
Ministry of Finance in Japan, or by the Debt Management Office in the UK, Portugal.
Moreover, the issuers might be specialist dealers or a syndicate of banks in stated
proportions. Other features concerns pricing expresses in decimal or fraction and whether
government bonds are bearer securities (”titoli al portatore” in Italy) or not. Bearer means
that a registered owner does not exist.
Municipal bonds14, also called Local Authority or Public Sector bonds are debt instruments
released by entities smaller than treasury or government e.g. counties, airport or port
authorities, post offices, cities. Their major distinguishing characteristic is the exemption of
interest from federal and sometimes state tax. Municipal bonds are sold in two different
kinds. Revenue bonds are backed by revenues of the agency that issue them. Obligation
bonds leans on the faith and credit of the issuer. Municipal bonds have (rarely) default risk.
Since no taxable status, yields will not be higher than other bonds. Many entities issue
13See diverse sovereign crisis episodes as Argentina 2001, Chile 1993, Slovenia 1992.
14The name is particularly used for U.S. public sector. Municipal bond market is very large in that country.
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these bonds including SNCF, EDF, Gaz de France in France, German Unity Fund in
Germany.
Corporate bonds are debt securities issued by corporations and they can be publicly
negotiated or via private placement originated by the act of selling securities to a few
private investors exempted from registration in the SEC under Regulation D. Comparing to
public offering, private placement is a cheaper manner to increase fundings by
corporations, typically with a bank or an insurance company.
Corporate debt markets are much less active than government bond markets since many
issues are infrequently traded after the initial offering or not traded at all. However,
borrowers are very wide with different skills to carry out their duties respect to lenders.
There are markets that could be weak like European Corporate Bond market or strong like
in the U.S.
Corporate bonds are pledged by the credit of issuing company. The ability to generate cash
flows, along with the meet of obligations of the issue determine the default risk which has
got different levels affected by the nature of the issuing entity and the maturity of
instruments. Credit risk is increasingly linked to default risk. Provisions are included in
these bonds e.g. call provision, convertibility, and sinking fund. Companies trigger the
right to obtain bonds back when interest rates are lower than the initial ones. This occurs at
given price and dates. Sinking-fund provision is very useful for companies or corporations
as to the redemption of a part or the entire value of principal with amortization during a set
of points of bond’s life. Sinking-fund is considered equivalent to call provision. If that
redemption is fixed and not equal to the full amount of par, bonds are known as serial
bonds. Channels used to activate sinking-fund provision are composed by purchasing the
established share (less or equal than 100%) of the face value in open markets delivered to
the Trustee15 or to call a portion of the bond at face value, similar to a call provision used
partially. Sinking fund also serves to buy corporate bonds in debt markets until a maximum
price unless there is a lack of bonds whereby the provision allows the issuer to redeem
randomly bond shortfall. Instruments show a shortfall in case of the existence of excess
amount that regards the available cash amount. A share of corporate bonds can furthermore
be redeemed casually. The goal of the provision is to reduce default risk even though yield
can raise, declining bond’s price.
Considering the type of corporate bonds traded in financial markets, Guarantee bonds
consist of bonds guaranteed by a third party that supplies a secondary ”insurance” for the
payment of principal value and interests. They are truly both corporate and municipal
bonds. The protector is in general a government authority or a fund entity. Debentures are
unsecured bonds issued by companies, though they result to be backed by assets such as
buildings or land since if default risk occurs, those assets are sold to repay the lender.
15Bond Trustee is a financial institution has got trust powers which give the debtor the power to enforce the
term of a bond issue, protecting interests of the lender in case of default of the counterpart..
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Investment funds sometimes invest solely in debentures. The shortage though is the
uprising of lengthy and tedious legal procedure before those bonds are disposed of and
replaced by other instruments. Subordinated debentures do not contain any guarantee and
have lower priority on claims on liquidation if the company defaults. Thereby, Bond
Indenture tries to give a collateral with a constraint on dividend distributions or new
additional debt. Debentures are priced with narrower interest rates than Junk or Speculative
bonds where these latter are corporate bonds with high yields that try to offset high
probability of default of the issuer.
Income bonds are very particular debt securities because they promise to the bondholder to
repay the redemption value only, with the relative coupons that the lender will get if
sufficient earning will remain to the company. Credit rating developed by the major rating
agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) for bonds in whom the issuing body coincides with the
company are listed in the below table. Gilt edged (or Gilt) characterizes securities issued
by UK Government. Investment grade means low credit risk, in other words, the investor
will be able to repay the debt with a high probability. Moody’s rates the highest debt
securities with the letters Aaa, S&P and Fitch with AAA. Aa or AA is the second top-grade
then A is the third one for all three agencies. There are also other degrees which indicate
lower ratings. A peculiarity of S&P and Fitch classifications is that a plus or minus sign
provides a narrower credit quality for every class. Moody’s exploits instead 1, 2, or 3. The
expression Prime is very accepted for bonds quoted AAA or Aaa. High quality identifies
AA or Aa debt instruments. Medium grade refers to triple B. We separate principally
Investment grade bonds belong to the top four classifications from Junk, Speculative, or
Non-Investment grade that define bonds own a bad rating.
Mortgage bonds are debt securities backed by a pool of mortgages which coincides nearly
always to real estates. They are gathered regarding the credit quality of the debtor, that is
Prime loans and Subprime loans, along with they are divided beside whether or not they
conform to the underwriting standards of a federal agency or government-sponsored
enterprise bundling up residential loans to develop residential MBS. In literature, the
terminology ”loan” plays the role of synonym of ”bond” (recall that a bond is virtually a
liquid loan negotiable in the secondary market). Many mortgage bonds are held by banks,
insurance companies, or other financial institutions such as Fannie Mae, Sallie Mae, Ginnie
Mae. The most liquid of the publicly traded mortgage bonds are Ginnie Maes. They ensure
the payment of principal and interest on the mortgages and extracts fees for insurance and
collection of the mortgage payments. The process of securitization to create ABS (also
called Covered bonds) involves three major types of assets, which are Consumer
Asset–backed securities, Subprime Residential Mortgage–backed securities, and
Commercial Asset-backed Securities. A list of instruments falling into Consumer ABS,
Subprime MBS, and Commercial ABS is shown in figure 1.8.
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Table 1.2: Bond Credit Rating by The Big Three Rating Agencies.
Source: Choudry et al. (2014).
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Figure 1.8: Securitization assets.
Source: Fabozzi (2012)
Subprime depicts securities with low standing if one takes into account credit score
assigned to every individual who purchases assets (e.g. a house in real estate). Prime is
conceived as the top grade in severe scales (FICO is diffused to mark people in order to
grant loans for immovable properties in the U.S.A.).
1.2.4 The U.S. Bond Market
The U.S. bond market is the largest bond market in the world. Fabozzi (2012) approaches
this important market split it into six sectors that are U.S. Treasury sector, Agency sector,
Municipal sector, Corporate sector, Asset-backed securities sector, and Mortgage sector.
The Treasury sector includes all financial instruments issued by the U.S. government, i.e.,
T-bills, Treasury notes and bonds. Such a sector is vital in the valuation of securities and
the determination of interest rates in all bond markets.
The Agency sector is the smallest of the U.S. bond market gathering assets issued by
federally related institutions and government-sponsored enterprises. The securities
exchanged refers to agency debenture securities, debenture bonds that I have described
during the explanation of corporate bonds.
The municipal sector is the trading venue where local authorities raise funds through
municipal bonds. This kind of sector is split into two parts in function of how the interests
that investors receive are taxed at the federal income tax level or not. The tax-exempt
market is the widest one where interests are not taxable. The taxable sector is used to be a
small sector of the U.S. municipal bond market until 2009 when Build American Bond was
spread by the Federal government after that its size augmented a lot.
The corporate sector is composed of debt instruments put into circulation both by U.S.
companies and foreign ones. Firms borrow funds from banks in this sector. Commercial
banks that made loans are used to hold them in their portfolio but a full range of
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commercial loans are traded into markets nowadays. Investment and Speculative grades
represent the two areas of corporate bonds in U.S. debt market. Securities are well
classified based on the assignment of a credit rating determined by a third-party.
Asset-backed securities sector permits institutions to bundle loans or receivables to use
pools as collateral for the issuance of an asset. Captive finance companies are an example
of issuers of ABS, that is to say subsidiaries which supply funding for loans to customers
of the parent company to purchase the product manufactured.
In the end, in the Mortgage sector, securities are backed by mortgage loans, obtained to
buy residential commercial properties. Residential mortgage and Commercial mortgage are
the two macro areas of this sector. The first one incorporates prime and subprime loans16,
while the second one collects income-producing properties as a sample industrial
properties, including warehouses, health care facilities, office buildings. Nonagency
mortgage-backed securities are generally understood to mean the residential MBS not
issued by federal agencies as Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, or Freddie Mac mentioned above.
1.2.5 Risks to invest in Bonds
We conclude this first chapter of the thesis discussing the principal risks that every trader
must consider when he o she is deciding to invest in long-run debt securities namely bonds.
Before to explain the risks, it should be emphasized that every bond issue is listed with
Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures (CUSIP) number composed by
nine characters in the U.S or Canada. For other bonds, CUSIP International Number
System is applied (CINS).
Bonds like every asset are exposed to Market risk due to the variation of their market price.
The market risk of bonds assumes the shape of change of interest rate. For this reason,
Interest-Rate risk is another term used for market movements of bonds. The seller that is
the issuer of bonds will probably have a loss if interest rate rises and bond’s price declines
in value considering that bonds will be sold at a price below redemption value. Market risk
depends on embedded options, coupon, and term to maturity because they influence how
the price varies in function of interest rate changes.
Currency risk is the risk associated of appreciation or depreciation of exchange rate. To
better explain the dynamic of fluctuation of currency, transaction risk is the currency risk
induced by changes of investor’s revenues on a daily basis, translation risk instead affects
the balance sheet of financial institutions and companies.
Reinvestment risk occurs when a trader decides to reinvest interest rate gained by bonds
which suffer from market variability. Consequently, if coupons are reinvested at the current
interest rate, bondholder might loss some earning of investment since that interest rate
might fall (the additional amount due to reinvestment operation is referred to
interest-on-interest). If a trader wishes he or she hedged against this risk, Immunization
16Subprime mortgage crisis started by subprime RMBS loans during Great Recession.
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strategy is appropriated to exploit a balancing effect stems from raising of coupons because
of interest-rate risk and reduction of them given by reinvestment income. To do that, the
duration of a portfolio constituted by bonds must set up to be identical to the duration of
liability to minimize immunization risk, i.e. the yield that traders want to lock-in will not
result in the minimum total return of the portfolio. In a certain way, immunization risk is
thought as reinvestment risk. The duration of a bond measures the degree of variation of
the price in response of a raising or falling of the interest rate.
When an individual purchases bonds with high nominal rates and early cash flows, or the
creditor holds them for a lot of time, reinvestment risk is surely greater.
Credit risk arises when the debtor is unable to fulfill the duty of repayment principal value
and any relative coupons. The risk is usually divided in three components, i.e. Credit
spread risk, Default risk, Downgrade risk.
Credit spread risk is the risk that variations of credit spread entail a drop of market price of
bonds hurting the borrower. The credit spread is the excess premium required by investors
to address more risk associated to take a long position in riskier securities (e.g. corporate
bonds) than securities issued by safer entities such as government or Treasury (they are
virtually risk-free financial instruments).
Default risk regards the risk whereby issuer of bonds does not meet the obligation
stipulated by the bond issue. In Italian law, default stands for ”inadempimento” and it is the
opposite of fulfilling. Who buys the bond will not be sure that the amount lent and nominal
rates will be paid in the future. Thus, understanding when a party is in default in a financial
contract becomes crucial because it means that the counterpart is not fulfilling the
obligation which is subjected. To give a simple example, an interest swap derivative
agreement is signed between two parties, say, part A and part B, where every 30 days, one
of the two parties must pay to the other the difference between market price and the
nominal amount of the contract. How much A or B must exactly pay? The proper term
emerges because let’s suppose that A will not provide for that payment, A will default, with
the consequence of inducing B to go to the judge to ask to enforce the defaulting party
either the obligation to pay or to charge interest on the payment for the delay. The unique
possibility is that A is in default though B must have in mind the terms of A. If A fails to
perform such an obligation, notwithstanding the order of the judge, another judgment will
likely happen before default, stating that A will compensate the counterpart with netting
(the offset of the value of payments between two or more parties in a contract, especially
for swaps) plus interest and damages due to the early termination of the contract.
Default occurs through defaulting on any notes or loan agreements, violating any
representations and warranties, or failing to perform obligations. Situations well-designed
for default are the failure to pay or deliver, breach of Agreement, Misrepresentation, rules
of default under specific transactions, and bankruptcy (”fallimento”), very common for
Italian companies in this turbulent period. Bankruptcy stands for a termination clause
dealing with the insolvency of the party, its Credit Support Provider (the entity issues the
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credit to the party), or Specified Entities.
The third component of credit risk is Downgrade risk acts as a bridge between credit spread
and rating. When creditworthiness of debtor enhances, credit spread tends to narrow and
vice versa. Deterioration of credit quality is not a good signal for the market as bonds’
price will fall down with a loss for the issuer.
Call risk arises when call provision is activated by the issuer of bonds to drop partially or
completely the issue before the term to maturity. The lender is worried about the
redemption of the obligation considering the negative effects reflected on him or her e.g.
reinvestment risk caused by calling of bond when interest rate is going down, yields and
coupon payments are not known with much confidence and bond’s capital appreciation
decreases due to the maximum threshold, like a cap, that price of callable bond must
respect (not greater than the value at which borrower triggers the provision).
Liquidity risk involves the measure of how far a debt instrument is sold from its indicated
value which comes from a recent transaction or the last market price. Liquidity is defined
as the ability to trade large size quickly, at low cost, when you want to trade (Harris 2003).
Dimensions that constitute liquidity are immediacy, depth, width, and resiliency, which in
turn are influenced by price, size, time, and the ability of prices to go back to the
fundamental values. If traders knew and analyzed all information about instruments
correctly, fundamentals would be values of instruments. Immediacy expresses how fast
trades of a certain size are planned at given costs. Depth is the concept of the size of each
trade that can be planned at given costs. Width, or market breath when it is referred to the
market, includes costs that traders must bear to negotiate financial instruments at a certain
size. Resiliency is the speed at which prices can revert to fundamentals due to imbalances
of orders undertaken by uninformed traders (exchanges are often resilient). Fundamental
values of instruments cannot be estimated with a precise method; otherwise, uncertainty
into financial markets would not exist and everyone who enters into them would gain
without any risk. Therefore, how much information are required as well how to collect
them make the estimation of fundamentals very technical and not so straightforward
(informed traders, above all value traders, are the ideal candidates to do that operation).
Markets have liquidity characteristic when there are a lot of standing limit orders, small
bid-ask spread, short-selling is allowed, and low levels of volatility (determined by
investors’ decision and lacking liquidity). Another fact that comports liquidity in markets
regards the presence of specialists inside them.
Operational risk arises when negative scenarios occur, but they are not touched to financial
environment. This world collects e.g., fraud, system failure. A fraud event was Banca
Etruria subordinated bonds. The bank wanted to place its very risky bonds as much as
possible to the clients, whereas it should have done the best clients’ interest. Placing bonds
is not a good starting point for a credit institution, although collecting money from the
public is the principal business of every bank. To perform the placement, being a financial
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service listed in Annex I of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)17, all this
regulation can be applied. As a result, Banca Etruria needed to implement a valuation or
clients’ risk profile to place such bonds.
The most important deliverable documentation is the prospectus, even though it resulted in
being too much difficult to understand by the retail clients. Key Information Document
(KID) is more simple to read and comprehend since its index-related nature. KID will be
included in MiFID II binding in January 2018. Nevertheless, Banca Etruria was able to
meet all the retail clients after computing their risk profiles and changing them from low to
high levels to place its harmful bonds. A lot of Banca Etruria branch managers were
investigated to have done this fraud.
Volatility risk cares the worries that bondholders face when the volatility of interest rate
goes up producing a negative impact on bond’s price. In particular, callable bonds of MBS
have the worst prices when volatility starts to raise because of the presence of an option,
with the form of a call provision, whose value raises if uncertainty strengthens because the
trader bears more market risk via volatility increment (especially in the short-term). As a
consequence, the buyer leaves a more valuable option to the seller.
Basic risk is one of the main risks linked to purchase bonds that jeopardize lender’s
financial position when a specific risk exposure in security is hedged via an asset whose
attitude is equal to that original.
Concentration risk is possible in circumstances where financial institutions or corporations
make investments in a single type of bonds, or in a precise market. Diversification helps
traders to overcome the problem.
Pre-payment risk might begin if ABS claim the enforcement to repay early the residual
debt with the risk to address reinvest income if interest rates go down during that period.
Government bonds are subject to risk too. The default of a government or a country may
let it not to fulfill the obligations due by investors. Such a risk is referred to Sovereign risk.
Finally, even the risk to not figure out or know the main risks, challenges, and imbalances
which take place for purchasing debt instruments will probably constitute a huge
problematic for lenders, banks included.
Before to pass to Great Recession that will carefully discuss in the following chapter, I
argue that liquidity risk must be further explained since liquidity meaning is confused with
market risk many times, along with no fairly definition of liquidity appears in literature.
Choudhry (2010) considers two completely different fields that portrays liquidity risk. He
suggests that liquidity risk is the potential risk arising when an entity cannot meet
payments when they fall due. It may involve borrowing at an excessive rate of interest,
facing penalty payments under contractual terms or selling assets at below market prices
(forced sale risk). It also refers to an inability to trade or obtain a price when desired, due
to lack of supply or demand or a shortage of market makers.
17MiFID is the main directive, i.e. a set of general rules, that EU Financial markets adopt.
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A basic thought on liquidity engages the level of an asset to be rapidly traded with any
effect on the market price of that security. Liquid bonds holding by investors may be sold
until the term of maturity at a fair price according to liquidity concept. Factors that
influence to a certain extent liquidity risk will be better investigated. Nature of issuer
depicts an important piece of the bond’s characteristics puzzle again in light of if the entity
that issues these debt securities is high standing, there is a high probability that bonds will
be liquid.
Size is one of the four dimensions of liquidity having the positive effect to augment the
degree of liquidity of instruments.
Embedded options make bonds less liquid due to the fact the traders who buy bonds to hold
them until the maturity, they wish they had an ”insurance” on the future coupon payments,
which in turn it is impossible to obtain if provisions are inside debt instruments because of
the redemption chance is given to the issuer.
Currency is another meaningful variable for liquidity risk that conducts not to purchase
bonds express in a given currency if traders suspect that it will face a depreciation against
another currency. Bonds with a particular currency could be cheaper than another kind of
debt instruments, notwithstanding this, agents will not choose to buy them.
Denominations tend to make bonds illiquid when the minimum size negotiable by each
agent in financial markets is singled out.
A narrow bid-ask spread is viewed as the presence of liquid bond markets.
The existence of liquid bond indexes, other than a small group of investors affects
positively the liquidity of bonds. The time elapsed from the issue of bonds negative
influences liquidity. Many bonds flow into portfolios of long-run investors after a
remarkable time frame.
41
Chapter 2
The Recent Global Financial Crisis
2.1 Why are Markets so Uncertain? A brief explanation.
We have analyzed meaningful channels whereby entities are willing to borrow or lend funds.
Governments, banks, investment banks, and firms undertake financial debt instruments to do
that. Bonds play a crucial role in the operation thanks to large benefits debtors employ for
the aim of improving their indebtedness condition. Unfortunately, drawbacks must be taken
into account every time we conduct a trade considering that the financial world is risky;
differently, a vast range of assets would not exist, and cut-and-dried earnings will occur.
Let’s suppose that a unique risk-free asset with a yield of 3% is available to an individual
whose capital equals to $ 20,000. The agent recognizes there is always the opportunity to
borrow at a rate coincides with asset’s yield. For simplicity sakes, investment horizon is
articulated in two periods, say, period 1 and period 2. The question raised is: How much
should he or she save and consume to maximize the surplus? Once again, microeconomics
literature helps us to investigate the problem and find out a solution. To calculate the optimal
combination of investment and consumption which provides the best welfare for him or her,
one must consider indifference curves express preferences of the individual across periods.
Inside each curve, he or she has the same satisfaction grade, so the consumer is characterized
by an indifference attitude vis-a`-vis instrument combinations along a certain curve. Let’s
hypothesize that the utility function of the agent is represented as follows:
U(c1;c2) = ln(c1) + (1+ r)ln(c2)
where c1 and c2 indicates consumption at periods 1 and 2 respectively, r the interest rate
of such asset. The tangent point between budget constraint and indifference curves will be
located to reach the optimum consumption-investment equilibrium. To do that, we have to
impose the derivative of utility function rewritten in terms of c1 or c2 only be equivalent to
zero and simultaneously the sum of consumption at time 1 and the present value of c2 must
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be set no more than the consumer’s capital. Therefore:
c1+
c2
1+ r
→ c1+ c21.03 = 20,000 ←→ c2 = 20,600 − 1.03c1
∂U(c1;c2)
∂c1
=
1
c1
− 1.0609
20,600 −1.03c1
Putting the partial derivative equals to zero:
∂U(c1;c2)
∂c1
= 0→ 1
c1
− 1.0609
20,600 −1.03c1 = 0 ←→ 20,600−1.03c1 −1.0609c1 = 0
→ c1 = 20,6002.0909 ' 9,852
Substituting the value of c1 just computed in the first constraint, one obtains:
c2 = 20,600 − 1.03c1 = 20,600 − 1.03×9,852 ' 10,452
A is the equilibrium point in the below figure:
Figure 2.1: Optimal Choice of the Investor.
Author’s elaboration.
The individual prefers to allocate the capital on I2 because it guarantees him or her the ideal
balance to reach the maximum surplus by the investment. To understand this thought, let’s
consider I3, for instance. Since the individual is risk adverse as concavity of utility function
and the great quantity of consumption at time 2 indicate, the consumer would always be
attracted to the farthest curve from the origin, but there is no investment chance on it noting
that the agent would find himself or herself outside the budget bound.
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In addition, if another risk-free asset with a higher yield would be offered to the individual,
it will always be chosen as alternative respect to the initial one.
This straightforward example states that in a world without any type of uncertainty and
risk, even if trivial, traders will purchase the most profitable instrument without a doubt.
The real financial markets are naturally risky and tough. When we buy bonds, particular
risks could occur although the issuer is the government or federal authorities. Such risks
have minutely discussed in the final part of Chapter 1.
We will tackle one of the worst economic-financial episodes happened ever, the Great
Recession in the following section. I maintain that the recession must be taken into
consideration because it detected a relevant driver of the European Debt Crisis started in
the Eurozone countries in the wake of the Great Recession ascension.
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2.2 The Great Recession
2.2.1 Introduction
The first decade of the twenty-first century was a complete disaster for economy and
finance throughout the world due to a sudden massive recession which brings the world to
its knees. At the same time, the recession is not a new concept since almost each age
includes a negative period. What is exactly a recession? I explain it to the reader based on
the definition reported by Keeley and Love (2010): A recession is a period when an
economy grows more slowly or shrinks (sometimes called ”negative growth”). In technical
terms, it is usually defined as two consecutive quarters - that is six months - of economic
slowdown or contraction. The negative feature of the Great Recession is that the turmoil
stemmed from a set of complex situations led to a banking crisis. The effects were more
severe than negative growths caused by inflation. The economy shrunk twice or triple than
normal recessions. However, the Great Recession was very similar to a precedent crisis
started in the U.S.A. in the aftermath of the World War I, the Great Depression. The cradle
of the recent recession was precisely the U.S.A. where a bubble in real estate prices elicited
the borne of this financial catastrophe. When people experienced it personally, they did not
have the tools and ability congruous to track down the real cause hurt them. Was illiquidity,
insolvency, or inequality the dominant force of the global upside down? I will throw light
on the proper motivation linked to such a recent negative far-reaching episode.
Academics and practitioners supplied theories, which conflicted each other sometimes, to
uncover the plague of events which damaged a lot of countries 1. I claim that low interest
rates applied by the Federal Reserve System (or the Federal Reserve, FED hereafter) after
the ”dot-com” bubble, low interest rates Japan applied to rescue itself from the ”Lost
Decade”, with the consequence of the emergence of ”yen carry trade” which stimulated
purchasing of U.S. debt instruments carried out by the national central bank, other than the
impact of China and oil prices shock are the principal channels which contributed to spread
the sentiment that a harmful period of strong imbalances and volatility will be coming into
markets. All of them imposed a quickly falling of U.S. housing prices combined with the
deterioration of subprime mortgage securities’ prices. The recession was a sort of
”surprise” for many policymakers, traders, and multilateral agencies. A wide range of
academics was shocked too. In the next section, we will pay attention to the history of this
recession.
1Some states, e.g., India and Australia, were not much influenced by the Great Recession. We will better
see it in the subsequent parts of the chapter.
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2.2.2 Facts occurred previously
Congdon (2015) reports that the National Bureau of Economic Research has given the start
and end months of the Great Recession as December 2007 and June 2009. The period
leading up to the banking crisis was subjected to debates between who pointed out that a
quiet volatility was established inside markets (the Great Moderation era), and those
maintained the recession was born due to some trends originated by the absence of growth
rates in emerging and developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, the Lost Decades era,
or by the boost of oil and food prices began in 2002 and lasted for the fourth quarter of
2007, during the so-called economic boom which launched the Crisis-Before-The-Crisis
era. Verick and Islam (2010) outline the expression Great Moderation created by Ben
Bernanke, FED Governor at the time, referred to Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) countries in the period from the epoch immediately after the
1970s energy crisis2 to the burst of the Great Recession. Bernanke, at the meeting of the
Eastern Economic Association in 2004, underlined that fall of macroeconomic volatility
can be attributed to structural changes... and improved macroeconomic policies. For
example, technology shift was one of the structural changes. Nevertheless, the authors are
skeptical about the Bernake’s statement because they argued that this view contributed to
the dangerous underestimation of risk (namely that low levels of macroeconomic volatility
would continue), which was a major factor in the build-up to the crisis.
I maintain Bernake’s assumptions seem to be plausible by the monetary policy forced by
the FED to low interest rates at the historical minimum levels, albeit the main limitation of
him theory lies on negligibility of the gust of high instability delivered exactly by the
economic boom. I agree with the Lost Decades view instead of the other school since the
world did not be very stable as one could suspect.
A common outlook for the period between the end of the 1990s and Q4 2007 was a leap of
growth in developing countries. On the other hand, ”dot-com” bubble crashed in 2001,
letting a lot of companies with losses on market capitalizations or they defaulted. Bubble
describes, in technical jargon, a seesawing economic cycle realized via the jump of asset
prices which finishes with the tumble of them. The origin of that technology bubble is
dated back to 1995 when share prices in the Internet and Information Technology (IT)
fields rocketed. Such a boost affected interest rates and unemployment to slip, matched
with credit improvement due to traders wanted to buy more stocks with the hope to resell
them at greater prices. The underestimation of risks of the bubble induced shareholders to
purchase stocks increasingly as long as the FED augmented interest rates in 1999-2000.
Investors recognized a downward peak in the technology–heavy NASDAQ index and the
bubble collapsed. Figure 2.2 displays the technology shares blow during the ”dot-com”
bubble time.
2In the economic history, the general accepted use of the term Energy crisis refers to the turbulent period
the main industrial countries addressed petroleum curtailments which came up the 1973 oil crisis and the 1979
energy crisis entailed stagnant economic growth and price inflation, better known as stagflation.
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However, the positive sentiment about raising prices during the economic boom was driven
by the vivacious market behavior of traders, what Congdon (2014) indicates with the name
Animal spirits when he cites Akerlof and Shiller (2009), who are willing to buy at high
prices because they are confident to sell instruments with a profit in the future, independent
of their fundamental values. If no agents want to trade at great prices anymore, they will
liquidate assets causing the bubble contraction and then its blast. Nonetheless, the globe
lived a flourishing period derived from an increase in consumption in OECD countries by
means of a strong upward trend in private capital flows, exports, and the funds originated by
expatriates sent to their borne country, the so-called ”remittances”. In the developing states,
exports and investments portrayed the role of benefactors to stimulate expenditure, even if
food and energy price shocks took place close to the recession shown a wider threshold
of poverty. As the life teaches, overoptimism will bring to make some mistakes sooner or
later, especially in countries where economic and financial sectors are not so developed.
The major drawbacks of the antecedent period of the Great Recession were a mix of the
effects of trading, consumption, and investments improvement which masked the hint of the
downward spiral, blended with sticky wages. I will discuss the unambiguous signals the
economy provided markets to advise them of the incoming recession infected population as
a whole.
Figure 2.2: NASDAQ Technology Index during ”.com” bubble.
Source: Dzikevicius and Zamzickas (2009).
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The pillars had built up the base of the Great Recession were erected in the aftermath of the
”dot-com” bubble deflation.
First of all, the FED started to implement a cut interest rate policy attached to financial
instruments. To promote individuals and firms for borrowing money, U.S. Central Bank
carried out this act which pushed economy and spending up according to the increase of
loan and house prices, albeit salaries did not augment. Consumption increased via drawing
into families capital. The situation remained dangerous in developing countries considering
even the oil and energy shocks which struck prices of those goods during the dawn of the
crisis, locking-in growth and damaging populations left into a poverty status which was fed
by the improvement of demand for many commodities in emerging countries (e.g. the
so-called BRICS, an acronym stands for Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, or
CIVETS which denotes Columbia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey, South Africa),
China especially.
Japanese Central Bank adopted a reduction of interest rates, that is to say, a policy similar
to the recipe the FED created, to clean up the effects of the ”Lost Decade” (Japan was an
interesting actor inside the Great Recession period). Let’s illustrate the dark period which
undermined the country at the end of the 1990s. The term ”Lost Decade” regards the last
decade of the previous century when Japan was facing problems of output growth closes to
zero, a slight deflation, and public debt jumped above the 100% threshold of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in 1997. The Land of the Rising Sun experienced the high level
of debt in that year principally because of a positive trend in stock prices and the
establishment of a real estate bubble in the last years of the 1980s. We have to bear in mind
that bubbles always weak the sectors within they set themselves up, financial and real
estate markets in this case. Japanese government promptly responded with a downturn in
interest rates and a plunge of fiscal deficit. Remembering that where there is a recession,
local currency falls, deflation was superior to interest rate decrease, imposing an
appreciation of the yen real exchange rate (RER) which weights the readjustment of the
nominal exchange rate in response to price movements. RER measures the relationship
whereby goods can be exchanged among two nations. From a mathematical point of view:
RER = e× Pdomestic country
Pf oreign country
in whom e is the nominal exchange rate estimated dividing foreign currency and local one.
Japan was not wondered why its financial sector was performing so poorly. I underline the
”Asian Contagion” in 1997 exacerbated Japanese banking system and each consolidation
plan to halt the upsurge of national public debt. Therewith, exchange rate rose substantially
without restrictions. It is worth noting that if a government is in trouble, four different
policies are available to overhaul the debt. Such tools are Fiscal policy, Monetary Policy,
Public Debt Policy, and Industrial Policy. When the government tries to raise its spending
and low taxes, expansionary fiscal policy is in progress. Public debt has a proper
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inclination of increasing when the occurrence of a negative growth emerges. Looking at all
recessions people lived so far, the government earned less during a crisis than a boom
period or in normal conditions because taxpayers attempted to avoid or mitigate tax
payment. Furthermore, unemployment benefits designated by the government strengthen,
where the phenomenon is linked to Automatic stabilizers3. I suppose that subsidiaries
might prove to be truly helpful in the short-term and for countries in which labor market is
flexible, i.e., layoff is permitted without legal consequences (like in the U.S.). My
hypothesis takes inspiration from Fisher Equation and trade-off among unemployment and
inflation which Phillips Curve shows. Irving Fisher discovered a relation between the
nominal interest rate (i), that is the interest rate corresponded from banks, the real interest
rate (r) which stands for the increase of purchasing power, and the inflation (pi). He argued
that the sum of r and pi is equal to the interest rate of the banking sector. Equation 2.1
illustrates this relation from a mathematical perspective:
i = r + pi (2.1)
Phillips highlights that if policymakers tend to amend economy in the short-run,
unemployment will go down, while inflation will upturn. Vice versa, if a contraction of
output occurs, it will influence in negative terms unemployment, whereas inflation will
decline. Rearranging Fisher equation: pi = i − r. As a result, when the FED lowed
interest rates, it acted on the nominal ones, declining inflation, and rising unemployment.
Criticisms surrounded Phillips Curve which did not predict stagflation during the 1970s
when output was keeping below the long-run natural equilibrium. Despite that, such a
curve is still a great instrument which economists employ to predict economical macro
fluctuations in the short-term, with some improvements. The modern version includes the
substitution of inflation rate with salaries increment, the inclusion of expected inflation
(thanks to Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps) and supply shocks.
Conversely, states, e.g., Ireland or Hungary, decided to take the opposite direction declining
government expenditure and growing taxes.
Monetary policy collects interventions usually implemented by central banks to control
liquidity and interest rates in the economy. Acquisition of public bonds or liquidity
injection are the most common forms which composed this field. Japanese central bank
decided to adopt quantitative easing after the ”Lost Decade”, which is an unconventional
class of monetary policy to reduce the value of interest rates through the purchasing of
sovereign debt securities or other instruments from the market, along with the raising of
money supply within the economic system.
3Economic policies or programs useful particularly to counterbalance economic variations of states without
isolated policymakers or government interventions. In general, they gather transfer systems, unemployment
subsidiaries, corporate and personal taxes.
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Public debt policy consists of government debt management to enhance it and reduce
state’s vulnerability to domestic and external shocks. International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and World Bank in Revised Guidelines for Public Debt Management (2014) stated that
Public debt management is the process of establishing and executing a strategy for
managing the government’s debt in order to raise the required amount of funding at the
lowest possible cost over the medium to long run, consistent with a prudent degree of risk.
The industrial policy comprises measures taken by the government to motivate companies
to relaunch their manufacturing or service provided with the hope an incentive will happen
at the economic improvement. I believe this is the tool of last resort for the government
which seeks to deprive the output of a steady situation since it is sector-specific many
times, even though import-substitution-industrialization represent a wider policy trade in
whom some barriers are imposed on some industrial sectors.
Japanese monetary policy was mild during the ”Lost Decade”. Then, ”dot-com” bubble
driven the country to adopt other corrective instruments such as quantitative easing, banks
recapitalization, liquidation of bad loans, and the setting of interest rates close to 0 in 2001.
These tools alleviate the debt-to-GDP ratio which regrettably stayed at 185% GDP level.
Notwithstanding Japan done its utmost, the Great Recession brought back the Land of the
Rising Sun to a context equivalent to that already undergone. As money could be borrowed
at no costs given small interest rates, speculation became attractive feeding the buying of
foreign assets, in particular, Treasury bonds. The wave of Japanese speculators augmented
money in circulation and created an essential pillar for the borne of the U.S. recession.
Large exports of China contributed to constructing another pillar from 2002 to 2007.
Chinese exports worsened the U.S. economic and financial position due to its net worth
created by intensification of good sales abroad and deterioration of imports.
The final pillar links emerging and developing states located especially in Asian continent
with the U.S.A. since the unforeseen oil price leap led funds of those countries to be
transferred to this latter.
As one can understand from the paragraph, U.S. markets were stable at all over the
economic boom. This is the proof of my disagreement with the Great Moderation theory.
The subsequent goal will be to pick up the seeds of the causes fashioned the Great
Recession.
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2.2.3 Causes - Bank Insolvency versus Bank Illiquidity
The way to cover to understand the roots of the Great Recession is far from the ease. I
will attempt to be as clear as possible. The key of the recession was the insufficient work
done by the U.S. mortgage industry to prevent the subprime mortgages crisis. Before the
appearance of the negative growth, U.S. banks took care to assess the creditworthiness of
who asked a loan because they were fostered to carry on this practice. We focus on the
mortgage area being the container provoked the inception of the disaster. U.S. government
pushed citizens to purchase immovable properties thanks by amendments and structural
changes enacted in 2004. To recall the fundamental ones, American Dream home-owning
policy that George W. Bush established in order to sustain the poorest people to receive a
house, new tight rules forced to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (two government-sponsored
enterprises very active in mortgage sector) caused the institutions to design and build other
entities to sell their loans which in turn pay them money and allow to have collaterals,
in other words, to securitize the assets. Instruments created were Structured Investment
Vehicles (SIV) and Structured Purpose Vehicles (SPV)4. Finally, Basel II proposals, which
favored securitization process, along with the enhancement of oversight enforced by the
SEC against investment banks, which even produced benefits for them as falling down their
capital requirements and increasing fundings into the mortgage industry using mortgage
securitization.
All these actions made lending more feasible for everyone was looking for a financing to
buy a house, other than the abuse of usage of RMBS. Banks were not worried about default
or bankruptcy of their debtors as loans did not longer be appeared in assets of balance
sheets exploiting the innovative debt instruments transformation. When credit institutions
lent money, the loan was quasi immediately left to SPV or SIV which transformed it in a
marketable debt security. The practice of granting loans or credits and selling them to be
securitized is often labeled as the originate to distribute model. The securitization could
be run by investment banks as well, though this could impose on banks and other firms
handling mortgages to probably suffer from losses if they were not able to pass their loans
to such financial institutions (whereby commercial banks started to make securitization by
themselves). Bundling mortgages and tranche them, diversification advantage was given to
banks and bore risks influenced by the level of tranches. Junior, or mezzanine, tranches
are the most exposed to default expenditures due to low priority on claims. The framework
seemed to work well as long as tranches began to be sold off. As Allen and Carletti (2010)
stress, Purnanandam (2009) had discovered that mortgages lost a certain degree of quality
respect to when credit institutions did not exploit securitization. Another aspect we cannot
overlook regards reliability of credit rating agencies.
4SIV are a pool of securities such as mortgages whose goal is to make profits from the spread exists between
short-term debt and long-run structured financial instruments such as ABS or MBS. SPV are subsidiary
companies having a legal status, and they guarantee that obligations will be backed even in case of default
of the parent company.
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After the recession, lawsuits and inquiries emerged. To give a sample, S&P had to comply
with the payment of 1.5 billion of dollars in February 2015 since it was accused by the U.S.
Department of Justice to have performed a fraud. The rating agency altered the credit risk
of some instruments and lots of traders, especially mutual fund firms obliged to trade assets
safe enough (top four of the rating scale or at maximum BBB securities), bought them
unaware of the damages exhibited after the buying. Even Goldman Sachs fulfilled the
obligation to pay 5.06 billion of dollars to the U.S. Department of Justice for packaging,
securitization, and sale of RMBS during the Lost Decades period.
Allen and Carletti (2010) state that according to the mortgage incentives view of the crisis,
the whole procedure for checking the quality of borrowers, and the mortgages underlying
the securitization broke down... If the government regulated the mortgage industry to
ensure everybody had the correct incentives, then this would prevent the problem in the
future.
One question remains unresolved: What was the main cause of such negative growth? As
the reader can anticipate, a huge bubble in U.S. real estate market. The bubble is certainly
born after the FED dropped interest rates in the middle of the economic boom. House
prices started to go up, and American people had got a stimulus to ask loans with a narrow
interest rate (1% about). Meanwhile, house prices were beyond raising. Additional
incentives concerned tax advantages which came from the deduction of interest on
mortgages. The demand for immovable properties switched abruptly with a jump ever seen
in the history. Another contribution arrived from the credit boom during the Lost Decades.
I believe predatory lending5 is a tile of the loan slump puzzle in view of brokers were
searching for individuals who needed credit for real estates, they promised to offer a
sequence of loans with a reward destined not for clients but themselves. After having
uncovered the important driver of the crisis, there is necessary to dig up the factors which
contributed the wave of the recession to come to light. I propose the subsequent scheme
which illustrates the key drivers of the Great Recession efficiently.
The actors that have conditioned the crisis both directly and indirectly were for that reason
families, financial and housing markets, U.S. Government with its lax regulation, feeble
monetary policy, combined with the worldwide deficits and interconnections in global
financial system. Undoubtedly, narrow interest rates and the misuse of securitization
damaged U.S. markets.
5The operation carried out frequently by brokers to assist or persuade a debtor to contract an obligation, in
the form of mortgage, to obtain high fees or interest rates. Other practices have the shape of taking away the
borrower of equity or placing him or her in a lower credit rated loan that benefits the broker.
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Figure 2.3: The Great Recession Factors
Source: Verick and Islam (2010)
The debt instruments whose underlying coincided with a pool of mortgages were much
used (banks and investment banks traded a large volume of them) simply to pass the risk of
loans to somebody else to earn profits generated by purchasing them and reselling later in
exchange for an upfront fee6. All categories of ABS had a reference with subprime
mortgages during the Great Recession, to wit loans with a very low credit score associated
to the debtor. As one can find out, there was a tight connection between the housing bubble,
indicating the bubble evolved in the real estate market in the 2000s, and subprime loans.
When households and firms unmasked that barriers imposed on loans crumpled, they
initiated to borrow freely considering the only collateral banks worthed was immovable
properties, not whether the client would have been able to repay the principal and interests
accrued. Consequently, lending to individuals rated ”subprime” upturned enormously
without financial regulation did something to quiet the subprime mortgage phenomenon.
The instruments mostly exploited for loan sale activities were RMBS, CDOs, and CDS. In
the first chapter of the thesis, we deal with ABS, securitized assets which experimented an
incredible diffusion formerly before house prices acme. RMBS were the cornerstone of the
subprime meltdown. They represent ABS where the underlying layer holds mortgages
allowed retail clients, not companies. Since interest rates ranged from 0% to 1% after the
technology bubble, agents needed to invest in financial assets with a higher yield than
securities issued by Federal authorities. The request for prime loans was dried up,
convinced U.S. traders to switch to vary subprime loans such as No Income No job No
6In broad terms, the upfront fee can be defined as a charge imposed by a lender for processing a new loan.
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asset (NINJA) loans in whom borrowers will be suitable to a concession of a credit or loan
despite they do not have a salary or an employment; Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM)
loans where the debtor pays a certain amount of money estimated contemplating the
financial capability only and for the first period of the credit, say, 3 years, then the
repayment assumes a diverse structure and obligates the borrower to restore the principal
plus any relative interests; Payday loans which anticipate to the borrower a specific amount
of the salary given to payday shops, triggering a sort of vicious cycle due to the necessity
the debtor reveals to ask a further Payday loan to comply with the reimbursement of the
previous one. All subprime loans were the basis of the creation of RMBS via the
securitization procedure. How does it work? I will delineate the crucial stages. Initially, the
bank grants loans and put them together waiting for a purchaser who is willing to satisfy its
divestiture. Accordingly, the SPV, created by the bank most of the times, acquires loans by
collecting money from the market to have sufficient cash, in a transaction called true sale
which ensures mortgages will be backed even in case of the bank’s default. The operation
goes on, the bank receives the amount of cash yielded from the sale of loans, enabling it to
make other credit concessions. Finally, the SPV transforms loans in ABS subscribed by
investors and the cash raised is addressed to the bank. Once ABS comes alive, who buys
them bear the same risk to purchase mortgages, with the difference that the intrinsic credit
or default risk belongs to investors now. To sketch the hard-working process to securitize
residential mortgages into safe high-yield assets, figure 2.4 appears convenience.
Figure 2.4: Securitization Process.
Author’s elaboration.
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RMBS became a basis to construct other backed securities. CDOs were devised via the
securitization of RMBS because they claimed to give banks higher yields than ABS
obtained by residential loans. CDOs were rated with top grades due to the collateral CDS
provided. Hence, pricing of securitized instruments shown not to be so simple. CDS are
derivative instruments, in other words, swaps belong to credit derivatives family, which
typically employ a broad range of RMBS as underlying to transfer the credit risk
exposition of specific financial assets (more precisely, debt instruments) to one or more
other parties. The entity purchases CDS must give a flow of premium payments to the
seller until the maturity date. When issuer’s default occurs, the buyer will receive default
payment by the short party which comprises the premium of the security and interests
would have been originated from the default to the expiration date. The issuer of such
swaps is also called Reference entity. Short selling a bond of the issuer could be seen as the
same activity to purchase a CDS, this latter calls for actually more risk due to both the
leverage position7 that the long party must hold up, and the payments carried out to the
seller. Traders were attracted towards these high-grade instruments, for speculation
purposes too, causing the famous subprime meltdown which contributed to expanding the
recession. Thus, the Great Recession launched as a real estate market crisis translated itself
into a banking crisis following the subprime breakdown. Throughout the chapter, I have
used the expressions ”recession” and ”crisis” as synonyms. This is not completely correct
since the crisis is referred to a dangerous, unforeseeable and variable situation which hurt a
population under several aspects include industrial, environmental, economic-financial, and
social-political spheres. A recession is usually a consequence of a crisis.
The particularity of the Great Recession given rise to the drastic modification of how banks
had to do their work. The consequent banking crisis fixed the world in a tough position
from which to recover because the tools to rid countries from a global financial recession
solicited lots of years and much effort. I will carefully list the acts that governments and
institutions afforded to solve the issue in the final part of the section.
Shadow banking was preferred to the traditional system performed by commercial and
investment banks given that it admitted the refusal of responding to requirements which
financial firms must satisfy in normal circumstances. The non-regulated system developed
concurrently with the securitization, can be thought as the lending business financial
institutions effectuated each other outside the bounds imposed by common banking
network. Investment firms, hedge funds, insurance companies, and pension funds were the
actors behind such a ”shadow” environment which grew fast over the recession. They
could lend without be banks, in spite of they held on the same risks. To operate without
limits was very suitable for every company which allowed loans and made the
securitization. These financial intermediaries were not detected as banks by reason of they
7From a purely financial point of view, to long on a CDS is similar to buy a put option on credit rating of
the reference entity.
55
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 2
did not subject to regulatory authorities supervision, being free to use higher liquidity,
credit, and market risks not commensurate with capital provisions. Shadow banking
avoided conventional deposits integration to favor deregulated trading of CDS or
unchecked practices of regulated firms. No barriers and shortages which regular banking
system owned during the crisis let investment banks build up capitalized companies to
position owned directing businesses within them. High leverage, short-term fundings, risky
securities, inadequate liquidity, and no federal backstop marked the fragility of commercial
banking and the encouragement to opt for a more efficient system to complete financial
firms aims. After the subprime downfall, shadow banking came under scrutiny and
regulations. While the Great Recession was protracting, shadow banking collapsed. Adrian
and Aschcraft (2012) claim The collapse of shadow banking institutions and shadow
banking activities occurred both on the asset and liability sides. On the asset side, the main
issues were the underwriting standards. On the liability side, the main issues were related
to the fragility of wholesale funding. As a result of these fragilities, the government sector
set up a variety of backstops for the shadow banking system. These backstops consisted of
both liquidity facilities and solvency guarantees.
I state this form of banking was one of the components of the 2008 recession spread, and it
should have been more monitored since securitization was guarded by lending among
deregulated financial intermediaries. The mitigation of the banking crisis, at least partially,
would have been possible if some little reinforcements were binding to the traditional
system of banks. The negative growth changed expenditures radically for households and
firms. People lost confidence about the economic condition driven by volatile markets
which could have drastically undermined their savings inducing to spend less. Companies
were hostile to make investments; returns fluctuated too much to brave uncertainty. Loans
resulted expensive after the subprime turmoil, credit crunch was stabilized, halting the
”generous” lending which handsomely characterized the pre-crisis period.
The blame of all facts which led to the banking crisis seems to consolidate to commercial
and investment banks. Condgon (2014) compares two approaches where one of them is
many times reported by media and policymakers. He distinguishes the Mainstream
Approach, in whom ”mainstream” emphasizes the common outlook of the crisis delivered
to people, and the less famous and known Monetary Interpretation. I have wanted to deal
with Congdon’s analysis as it offers the reader skills to criticize the common perspectives
make available to clarify why OECD, developing, and emerging countries are even now
suffering the severe damages of such a negative growth.
The Mainstream Approach crux rotates around the banking crisis begun when the
international interbank market stopped in August 2007, implicating a credit crunch for
financial institutions and the borne of insolvency problem which hit banks. The frame of
the theory thus relies on insolvency which was fostered by Lehman Brothers default on
September 15, 2008. Lehman Brothers was a big investment bank founded in 1850 as an
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Alabama cotton broker. Its operations were transferred to New York after the Civil War. In
the 1970s, the investment bank almost the bankruptcy after the paperwork crisis. The
merger took place between Lehman Brothers and another investment bank, Kuhn Loeb, in
1977. In 1984, the institution was subjected to a crisis and Shearson/American Express
acquired it for 360 million of dollars, to be spun off in 1994. Liquidity difficulties impaired
the bank in 1998. Rumors about the liquidity crisis concerned large losses from economic
crises occurred in Asia and Russia in that period. Furthermore, impossibility to roll over8
commercial papers and RPs emerged. Yet, Lehman Brothers perked itself up from the bad
scenario, taking advantage of real estate affected by a bubble at the starting of the 2000s as
we have seen in the previous paragraph. In 2003, mortgage-backed holdings amounted to
39 billion of dollars and expanded beyond 111 billion in 2006. Such a prosperous period
for the investment bank did not last for a long time. On March 17, 2008, shares of the firm
dropped significantly, exactly the day after the Bear Stearns breakdown. Having large
short-term assets and liabilities, Lehman Brothers tried to finance them with the aid of
short-run RPs on a daily basis. The risk the investment bank needed to account assumed a
”counterpart form”, to be more precisely, if the short party of repos transaction would have
been refused the obligation performance, the firm should have closed down the business.
The anti-sentiment against Lehman Brothers developed on September 8 of that year being
accused by its counterparties. The following day, JPMorgan Chase, a U.S. multinational
banking and financial services holding company, asked for a collateral to support the credit
line of the distressed bank but results were vanished because of an insufficient amount of
money was raised, leading Lehman Brothers disclosed a loss of $ 3.9 billion in the third
quarter. The crash took place at the fifteenth of such month due to the refusal of Henry M.
Paulson, the CEO of Goldman Sachs at that time, to touch off government funds operation
to help the investment bank. Goldman Sachs is the most likely impressive investment bank
all around the world. In my opinion, a recovery plan was necessary to prevent Lehman
Brothers default and consequently the subprime mortgage crisis.
Going back to the mainstream approach, the bankruptcy of one of the most significant
investment banks muddled entirely the financial environment. Estimated losses were equal
to 600 billion of dollars about. The banking crisis established itself with the backing of an
increasing confidence toward the financial system9 (I have cited Animal Spirits in the
introduction). The overconfidence of traders transposed wholly conception of expected
risks. The upturn of securities arisen at the half of the 2000s was interpreted as a natural
heritage of wide positivism, laying the foundations for behavioral finance analysis. I
maintain the flame which stoked distortions on trading comes under Cognitive Dissonance.
8The expression ”Roll over” regards the act of reinvesting funds from a mature financial instrument into a
new similar instrument. Traders resort to rolling over to make profits (immediate income from day trading),
or for tax savings.
9Financial system embodies financial transactions and the exchange of money between several actors, i.e.
investors, lenders, and borrowers. The framework can be defined in three kinds of level: global, regional, or
firm area.
57
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 2
Leon Festinger was a psychologist who discovered the theory which points out the attitude
of agents to keep in mind solely positive memories to support purchasing choices they
undertake. Doing this supposition, I declare implicitly the presence of brave individuals not
so much risk averse. The common approach exaggerates the role of subprime lending and
correlated real estate breakdown because of the great importance given to banks, in
particular, their assets. Loan-to-value ratio, calculated as the maximum ratio of the size of
loan and real estate value, remained too much high in the Great Recession period, posing
questions about the laxity of regulation to impede banks of leveraging unreasonably. This
ratio secures loans, hence creditors often employed it for risk measure.
The problem of the mainstream theory surrounds the weak robustness of the interpretation
regarding the ascension of the recession. The ”brave heart” of banks looks like to be feeble
for endorsing the cataclysm hurt the U.S.A. at the end of 2007. Furthermore, no financial
institutions fallen down insolvency10 condition during that turbulent phase, leverage did
not be high in the pre-crisis period as well as losses from the resolution of savings and
loans associations date back to the Crisis-Before-The-Crisis era. The Great Recession
placed U.S. investment banks on harder positions than credit institutions.
The monetary theory roots are detached from those of the mainstream view. They assume a
macroeconomics connotation where the income equilibrium of a country is achieved
thanks to the quantity of money. Therefore, a precise value of income creates the amount of
disposable money which reflects money balance holdings. The readjustment of a country’s
economy far away from ideal condition is linked to monetary shocks. To manage this
approach, one must take into account that individuals have got a certain money function
composed by national income and several indicators and this function lets traders choose a
money to income ratio threshold.
Monetary shocks can assume the shape of either money growth alteration or quantity of
money composition modification. What is important concerns the concept that such out of
the blue changes make individuals poorer or richer in case of an upward shift of the current
bulk of the money, for example. I explain, in few words, how to estimate the amount of
money inside an economy. Money is a stock measure which represents values available
immediately for transactions (namely it is computed in a specific moment of time). The
Eurozone officially called the Euro Area, proposes the following monetary aggregates to
calculate the measure. The basic one is M1 which collects overnight deposits and money
into circulation (banknotes plus currencies). The second one, known as M2, is obtained
adding deposits with an agreed maturity up to two years and those redeemable at notice up
to 3 months to M1. M3 is the last one gathering all elements within M2 plus RPs, money
market fund shares, and debt instruments whose term is no more than 2 years. In the UK,
M4 is adopted rather than the indicators just reported because of its similarity with M3.
10It is worth highlighting that at the micro-level, some financial institutions were struck by the banking
crisis, staying afloat to a solvency situation. In aggregate, such losses were negligible.
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The core of the Monetary Interpretation derives from a steel relation amidst monetary
growth and asset prices. As a result, the monetary theory of wealth measuring is
interrelated to the monetary theory of income pinpointing via assets perception like
incomes capitalization. If money growth rapidly, the improvement has implications for
asset prices to go up with the instigation of the so-called Milton Friedman’s ”hot potato”
effect. The idea behind Friedman’s thought is that money in circulation inside an economy
can be intended as an unwanted thing, or better, an unwanted hot potato, whereas traders
are waiting for the establishment of a new equilibrium will probably bring greater prices to
everybody. An important aspect the reader must pay attention lies on the Animal Spirit
sentiment which the monetary approach seems to back up in the short-term as the driver of
asset fluctuations, the ratio of savings institutions’ money and total assets is meaningfully
dependent on overconfidence too. The scenario diverges if one considers the
medium/long-run since the determinant becomes money and that ratio rises slightly with
respect to institutions’ total assets or money holdings. To put it simply, there is a
correlation between the change of money stock and the growth rate of money referred to
fund management area.
The ”hot potato” effect implicates a propensity to pass from a market to another. Such an
effect was one of the official explanations offered to proof the Flash Crash on May 6, 2010,
which we have discussed at the beginning of the thesis.
The quantity of money induces the surge of security prices, other than altering the level of
the output of the total economy. Reporting the philosophy of the monetary approach to the
banking crisis, at every stage of the recession time, money had a strong trend which taken
its growth up. Not only money leaped, inter alia, considering the high increase of leveraged
financial organizations such as subsidiaries of companies that govern a set of banks. These
new institutions portrayed the more frequently tapping into wholesale finances, not from
retail depositors. I anticipate that money growth rates were fast and great in the UK and the
Euro Area. This consequence of the recession will be tackled afterward.
While the common idea of the Great Recession develop relapses on the excess of lending
banks effectuated, leading to bank insolvency, the money approach claims instead that
illiquidity was the main challenge for the banking system to avoid the dissemination of the
crisis. The traditional banking framework was overall strong after the borne of the real
estate collapse. Investment banks and shadow banking system were again responsible for
having contributed to furthermore heighten the disastrous economic-financial scenario the
world were living. The lens is to catch the halt the banking system experimented in the
crisis period from a purely monetary point outlook. Mainstream philosophy points fingers
to banks and investment banks for having granted mortgages without doing any
creditworthiness analyses and letting insolvency threat to almost become real as a whole.
The monetary school instead blames central banks and officialdoms for the bank regulation
restriction which was imposed on October 2008 influencing money growth rates negatively.
In August 2007, banks, investment banks, and other financial organizations, such as
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shadow banks, had troubles to expand their assets due to a large ban within the interbank
market, at the global level, so that the institutions felt the difficulty to grow as fast as
before. The freezing was terrible, so much so that the quantity of money and its growth
bore a radical tumble. Illiquidity arisen properly due to fundings stop imposed. Central
banks did not After Lehman Brothers default, G7 finance ministers and central banks
achieved a pact on October 10, 2008, to assure that financial organizations, banks included,
could have the guarantee to sustain their assets and other practices from fundings made
available by central banks and governments. A next meeting was organized on November
14 at the same year to amend new rules concerning banks’ capital to asset ratios rise. The
results were far from work well focusing on banks were recapitalized from private
resources with the impairment of deposits. Credits and the quantity of money worsening
happened for the previous ratio upturn. The only action that banks saw to implement was
to sale off securities and loans in the aftermath of bank stock prices downturn. The slump
of money growth made rates closed to 0% for some months over the U.S. crisis (both the
U.S.A. and the Eurozone). Families were adverse to tighten their belts for preventive
purposes maybe, while financial instruments prices were going down, despite milder than
securities crash in the Great Depression. Monetary shock knocks real estate and stock
markets pools the two crises, albeit assets were less affected during the Great Recession.
To conclude, if stricter bank bounds inspired monetary growth plunge, every cloud has a
silver lining because central banks incited quantitative easing programs to avoid the
appearance of a more severe calamity in the future (money enhancement was stimulated in
spring 2009).
When a dangerous recession appears, the likelihood of inequality establishment might be
consistent. We then must consider the emergence of swings within social strata level. I
supply to the reader the doctrine of Piketty (2014). The author has committed that a mutual
change of inequality was the foundation of the Great Recession. Wrongly wealth
distribution is too abstract at first glance. What is its proper meaning? How should we
estimate it? Inequality can be imagined under three independent principal conceptions.
Income inequality is the amplest measure of the concentration of poor and rich people
computed by the market gross or net (after tax and transfers from social insurances) Gini
coefficient. Formula 2.2 allows to calculate such a index:
G =
∑ni=1∑
n
j=1 |xi− x j|
2n ∑ni=1 xi
(2.2)
in whom xi is income of a person i in a population of n living beings.
Wealth inequality is affluence concentration on assets owned by the wealthiest people.
Opportunities inequality checks access to services and possibilities such as education,
health. For Piketty’s theory, inequality narrowed families spending and residential
investment. Hence, income inequality can properly fit his thought. Let’s concentrate on
anti-capitalism sentiment expressed by Piketty now. I quote what he states, The global
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financial crisis that began in 2007-2008 is generally described as the most serious of
capitalism since the crash of 1929. The comparison is in some ways justified, but essential
differences remain... the recent crisis has not led to a depression as devastating as the
Great Depression. Remaining bound by that recession sight, the Great Recession must not
be thought more severe than the Great Depression if one compares the declines in
production happened in the developing countries. Over the 1930s, it was wider than in the
first decade of this century. The statement loses importance for the unemployment rate
since surges possessed almost the same amount. The financial system was protected from a
drying-up episode introducing liquidity in order banks, financial intermediaries, and
households to not be swallowed up into it. These facts participated to the noun Great
Recession as to milder negative features that current crisis delivered concerning the Great
Depression. To summarize the Piketty’s vision, inequality was the major cause of financial
turbulence which driven the U.S. and the remain countries towards the recession.
This vision of the banking crisis is interesting, well-appreciated and accepted in literature,
albeit there are no sturdy empirical studies which favor the validation in reality. Congdon
(2015) underlines in his paper the impossibility to cry out a causality between increasing
inequality up to the Great Recession and its disadvantages. A weakness of Piketty’s
proposal is based on no proof for the free-market capitalism guilt (the 1930s and the
starting of the twenty-first century are the only periods taken into account). Along these
lines, I state that inequality can always be pinpointed for any economies analyzed, it
requires long time to activate a ”cleansing mechanism”. Recessions are vicious cycles
which generally protracted themselves for quarters, not years. Imbalances, instability, or
wellness are by no means correlated with income inequality merely for different paths
(relative to output or demand). I share the Congdon idea to point an accusing finger at
regulatory lax to eliminate bank illiquidity. Inequality and money growth are certainly
gears of the economy, yet the quantity of money does perform a significant active function
on the U.S. banking crisis. I conclude Causes paragraph providing a graph about U.S.
economy from 2001 (housing bubble deflation) to 2015.
Real GDP declined of −8.20% during the Q4 2008 joined with a hesitant recovery started
in Q3 of the following year. The first feature of this chart which stands out is variability of
Real GDP from the beginning to the end of the banking crisis, showing our supposition
according to the Crisis-Before-The-Crisis era holds, along with an abruptly shock of M3
growth is translated in a huge real output modification, the monetary view is reasonable.
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Figure 2.5: U.S. Real GDP change and M3 Growth Rate Seasonally Adjusted.
Author’s elaboration. Data Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and OECD Stat.
2.2.4 Consequences
U.S. banking system failed absolutely over the recent recession due to the excess of
subprime mortgages and illiquidity which conducted the financial recession to be
transmuted into the worst banking crisis in the history. The behavior of banks and
investment banks to adopt the same actions within a specific environment calls to mind a
manner organizations frequently resorts to survive inside it. There was not a single bank or
investment bank which prevented retail clients, firms, or other financial institutions to
easily borrow money either encouraging acquisition of immovable properties or
undertaking business investments. Examining corporate organization literature,
Neo-institutionalism theory might explain why credit and investment firms decided to not
take new lending directions until the recession. Meyer and Rowan created Isomorphism
concept in 1977 where organizations work in extremely institutionalized environments
which establish rational criteria for institutions. As an alternative, organizations have got
criteria at their own diverse from those outside them. The authors investigated the
relationship which ties systems (organizational entities where the shape is never unaltered)
to an institution. They highlighted institutions which absorbs external methods to evaluate
efficiency are e.g. schools, churches, whereas firms own internal methods to do that. Since
the criteria decide survival of organizations, they must be respected to avoid possible
conflicts among exogenous pressures and firm efficiency evaluation models. Powel and
DiMaggio developed Neo-institutionalism doctrine in 1983 carried Isomorphism at the
corporate level. Their theory acknowledges the presence of a process leads organizations to
resemble each other on a given contest. Accentuation mirrors social aspects, together with
inter-organizational relations, among other things, institutions incorporate cognitive,
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regulatory, regulative structures. Processes are not close to empirical rules, they prefer to
anchor to efficiency.
I have considered Powel and DiMaggio theory since banks did not make decisions to stop
subprime mortgage phenomena during the economic boom or to respond to calamitous
bank regulations which officialdom enacted on October 2008. Isomorphism well
accompanied the economy pre and post-crisis. On the other hand, this could have entered a
selection mechanism within financial markets. The rescue of big firms e.g. AIG, Goldman
Sachs, GSEs Fanny and Freddy is interpretable as a consequence of Population Ecology
theory of Hannan and Freeman, i.e. organization of populations11 selects the most capable
institutions wiping out the less suitable ones.
Passing to the economical range, vacillating effects come to light. Australia, China, and
India, powerful world nations, experimented a petty GDP deterioration. Ethiopia and
Uganda grew up and this was a surprise if one compares the two emerging countries with
OECD and developing nations output. Statistics, whatever the source that releases them,
communicate the magnitude negative episode of the crisis delivered to middle-income
countries. To understand it, competent skills are not necessary, data speaks for themselves.
Central and Eastern Europe which include Lithuania, Armenia, Ukraine, Latvia were
territories mainly rocketed. GDP shrinking jumped out from −10% to −20%, frightful
slides nobody would have expected come true. U.S. recession is extended at the general
American territory, Mexico was really damaged. Impoverished countries endured to the
banking crisis attack, in contrast, negative growth struggled acutely, diversifying states
upon degrees. Open economies suffered a lot, the same is not true for China, India, or
larger states dodged the growth interruption keeping improving net worth.
Labor markets status revealed big transformations being connected to the economic trend
of nations. This supposition holds looking at unemployment rates of certain advanced
countries which advised a negative inclination. Estonia, Ireland, the U.S.A., Turkey
exhibited out of the blue downfall of employees from 2007 to 2009.
Japan was a particular case due to internal devaluation policy which reduced unit labor
costs and mitigated high-skilled workforce firing, albeit the country experimented a large
GDP crash when the recession surfaced. Greece unemployment upward trend emerged
considering the global financial crisis placed the nation in a more difficult situation. We
will discover Greece was damaged after its introduction of the Eurozone in the following
section dedicated to the Euro Area crisis.
The way to rescue labor at the normal situations is articulated in three channels: working
time, the number of workers, and wage/non-wage benefits. Modify the number of hours
worked is more convenient and easier for firms according to Employment Protection
Legislation (EPL), a host of norms and procedures which protect permanent workers if
early termination of contract will be triggered. EPL acts as a sort of ”deterrent” for
permanent employees. Disadvantages are distributed to unemployed or temporary workers
11In the organization field, a population contains homogeneous organizations beside foundations such as
technology, internal governance, model activities.
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because of engagement in long-term unemployment circles and secondary labor markets
specifically.
Wages reduction and work benefits lead not to achieve social improvements but dismissals,
plant decommissioning, or sustaining unemployment rates upturn. Labor policies carried
out to defeat U.S. crisis shocks varied considerably in function of internal economy
objectives, government constraints on responses to overcome the Great Recession
hurricane, and the type of labor institutions (for instance, how much the wage is rigid,
dismissal protection). What is common regards categories of people who sustained more
costs to survive to the negative growth. Advanced countries saw young men hit tougher, as
opposite to East Asia where young females were mostly hurt. The reason behind the
preference of the Great Recession to blown youth might reside in working positions such
groups occupied. Many studies concluded manufacturing sector gathers principally young
people.
Less educated workers, migrants, and the form of contracts are meaningful variables to be
taken into consideration for severe manners exploited to help states to go out from the
abrupt spiral that the U.S.A. brought all around the world. The aversion of a lot of
employers to cut off high-skilled workers seems plausible for a smaller demand of
low-skilled people. Project workers augmented after the settlement of the subprime
meltdown. Temporary working meets up immigration which implicates a causality of the
phenomena. Analyses run on employment and migration displayed an obvious consensus
from no native people to sign up for heavier jobs. Moreover, the crisis contributed to raise
real salaries succeeding either a decline in inflation or a rapid fall of good prices. Real
wages went up above all in the U.S.A. as an outcome of real hourly wage enhancement.
Figure 2.6: Unemployment Rate Aged 15-64, Males and Females.
Author’s elaboration. Data source: OECD Stat.
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Financial dimension perceived the upset of the Great Recession. I have beforehand
mentioned the loss of confidence disclosed by household and firms for consumer goods and
investment. This must be connected to the stack of toxic assets12 contained on bank books
and financial institutions participating in financial markets. I believe the ”bad taste” of the
securities run agents to execute flight-to-quality13. Certainly, no one would have selected
CDOs, MBS, namely every instrument developed with the aid of securitization afterwards
the subprime meltdown. A wide range of banks undergone, once predatory lending linked
to subprime loans flooded their balance sheets, provoking enormous deficits and the search
of capital. Unstable financial markets did not favor borrowing, lending, and all practices
made under unstressed conditions. The lack of liquidity did not let banks to meet their
duties. Was run bank the proxy for illiquidity? We do not know for sure, despite the fact
that jittery depositors might have twisted businesses of credit institutions. Withdrawing of
deposits effectuated by banks’ retail clients, or better, depositors, if they are worried about
insolvency is noted as Bank run. When the recent Greek crisis have raised interventions,
criticisms which has many times stemmed from impatient retail clients who have run down
banks’ liquidity.
2.2.5 Responses
We cannot stay unperturbed over against the awful impact the worst financial recession left
to states, whatever one concentrates on rich, middle-income, developing and/or BRIC
countries. All public and private entities have attempted since the fit of the U.S. negative
growth to conceive state-of-the-art tools addressed to defeat the Great Recession
”monster”. Bear in mind that it is never straightforward to erase wounds made by a banking
crisis, they remain for a long time, the strange feature of recessions lies on the already cited
”cleansing” mechanism embeds inside negative periods which permits economies to restart
ridding of errors done in the past. I am not claiming that recessions are good, I would be
crazy to assert such an oppressive judge, though we have to be as critique as possible when
an argument so thorny as the Great Recession is singled out. Indeed, economics teaches us
that the opportunity cost of a recession appears too wide. As a result, governments,
policymakers, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of the biggest institutions felt the duty to
collaborate in order markets, trade, society at large to become healthy climates again.
OECD countries fired up expansive monetary policies such as collateralized deposits,
quantitative easing, interest rates downturn. They do not correspond to prevalent actions
belong to the monetary field, excluded the third one. Many states chose fiscal solutions like
encouraging public investment infrastructure, cutting taxes. Even trading regulations,
12The appellation was coined while U.S. negative growth was proceeding to list assets deeply illiquid, that
is to say not easily convertible into cash at low costs, whereby their secondary markets cease to exist.
13The jargon refers to the mechanism which pushes traders to move on to the safest securities, not esteem
riskier financial instruments.
65
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 2
employment clauses, further norms/initiatives donated a bit contribute for overcoming
recession. Table 2.1 displays the excellent work Verick and Islam (2010) have conducted to
delimit the circle of responses to the Great Recession. The sample gathers twenty
medium/low-income states e.g. China, Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, South Africa.
Governments paid attention to cure banks from their ”sick” balances pulling out junk, i.e.
toxic, assets destined for special entities, both real and abstract, which manage them.
Ring-fencing is the junk assets virtual incubator backed by the government which provides
collaterals for this category of unwanted securities. Bad bank instead relies on a physical
financial organization which purchases such instruments which are deleted from banks’
balance sheets and letting credit institutions to make their habit businesses. I stress
commercial banking operates across a collection of money from the public (savings)
exploiting bank accounts or issuing debt assets, together with granting of loans. Gathering
money is crucial for commercial banks. If we open a deposit, property does not change and
savings are not touched.
Nationalization closes government counterattacks. Flight-to-quality discards international
markets. Thus, the nationalized banks idea became reality in some states, with the
drawback to not fully resolved junk instruments management.
Allen and Carletti (2010) point out ”the most practical solution to the global imbalance
problem”, to wit the Chinese Renminbi (RMB)14 should become fully convertible and
joins the U.S. dollar and the euro as the third major reserves currency. The IMF relayed the
notice that the Chinese Currency did not be undervalued upon the U.S. dollar during the
summer of 2015. The authors also suggested polices that have been beaten the banking
crisis. I report some of them e.g. Limited government debt guarantees for financial
institution. Imposing drops on bondholders who retain their bonds in the long-run, market
discipline incentives may spring. Bank bondholders were protected in a certain sense by
the virtue of ”government shield” which functions as a collateral. Putting a ceiling on
leverage due to indebtedness levels of firms before the banking crisis as well. Removal of
tax subsidies for debt should carry the employment of equities rather than debt stimulus.
Interests of debt instruments are often deductible at the corporate level. The reduction of it
might let markets to travel upswing road. A role for public sector banks in a mixed system
spurs the training of public expertises whose goal consists of common banking system
handling admission given to governments.
Carmassi et al. (2009) indicate the reject of Basel capital rules for risky securities. Basel III
introduced an encouragement toward securitization process.
14The expression indicates the currency adopted in China, actually there were debates against if RMB or
Yuan must be treated as the national currency. ECR Research affirms the RMB is the official currency, the
Yuan the unit of account.
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I want to emphasize that central banks should have assisted banking framework at the
starting of the century, putting more funds inside the traditional system so that the misdeed
would not be borne. My interpretation of the crisis embraces the pivotal task of the
quantity of money, although the Monetary Interpretation does not adapt sufficiently to
Japan where the ”yen carry trade” in foreign exchange reserves increased money amount in
2007-2008 period. However, money growth improvement is a good response to the
recession, it permits economic output to restart to grow, banks recapitalization occurs by
means of central banks financings, then monetary growth slows and a more placid
environment returns. Recapitalization was carried out, the problem surrounded the capital
to asset ratio escalation resulted in the quantity of money slumped.
Such a recession arrived until The Euro Area countries and shaped the European crisis.
”Sovereign” was the appellative charged on it. We will find out that the EU recession is not
very sovereign as additional interpretations convince us to reject this hypothesis.
Table 2.1: Policy Responses to the Banking Crisis
Source: Verick and Islam (2010)
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2.3 The EU Crisis
2.3.1 Introduction
Tackle extensively the Great Recession allow us to pass to another wide episode that
European countries are still defeating, i.e. the European Crisis.
Reading newspapers, listening to newscasts, and scrutinizing articles on the Internet, we
grasp such a crisis, stemmed from the U.S.A. recession, seems to connote a Sovereign debt
perspective in the first place. One cannot deny that states within the Eurozone did not store
terrible debt levels in the aftermath of the crisis. Despite, the sovereign event must not be
selected to delineate boards of the current negative period. I will expound the real
constitution of the crisis which contributes to formulating the right perception that
policymakers and media divulged information aimed to bias people understanding about its
broadcast.
The mostly shared theory condemns our financial system to have done an insignificant task
to rock the monetary union in order it did not perform principal and fiscal rules. Complex
management networks were designed to alleviate the painful imbalances. Their outcomes
were not very impressive and all EU states had to face the music.
Lane R. (2012) argues that The origin and propagation of the European sovereign debt
crisis can be attributed to the flawed original design of the euro. To sum up, the euro is
imperfect as it was conceived. The monetary union amplified its weaknesses over the crisis
contamination, nurtured through the missing of buffers and solid banking systems at the
European level. Storm and Naastepad (2016) do not share the same point of view. They
indicated that the private sector should be mentioned due to its role in the crisis, namely the
fundamental actor both on formation and propagation. Fiscal austerity did not work well
from their insight.
Armingeon and Baccaro (2012) underline the inefficacy of internal devaluation policy that
some poor Euro Area countries e.g. Greece, Italy were obligated to apply considering it
intensified growth aggravation on them.
Pereira B. and Rossi (2015) lay the groundwork for the return to national currencies
because the euro is the ”evil” made the internal real exchange rate to plug any prosperous
positions. This balance-of-payment imbalance method of devising the crisis questions the
deep-rooted opinion of the financial root for this turbulent period.
The final approach as a proxy for the nature of the crisis lies on Engel (2016) outlook
where the ”sovereign debt market” institution endorses the borne of EU catastrophe, in
fact, country rudiments bound from herd to mimetic behavior, representing normality and
crisis scenarios which can show themselves either observable exogenous or operationalized
fundamentals (these latter tied to market movements).
In the upcoming paragraph, my assignment will be to effectuate literature reviews on the
aforementioned doctrines, expressing whether they deliver congruent views about the EU
crisis reality.
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2.3.2 A Tale of the Facts preceding the Crisis
The bill the European Crisis posed elicits member states in trouble given the rapidity,
instability, and sharp whereby such straits manifested. This section will go to discuss the
European panorama before the Great Recession signals arrived at our homes.
Public debt is correlated with crises, the occurrence of a deficit on government accounts
amplifies when the adverse onset accomplishes a given country. The first ten years of the
actual century were not perceived arduous hearkening the economic-financial system all
told. A spurious interpretation may be picked up on the credit boom which surrounds the
U.S. above all, or the euro currency which unified a lot of Eurozone states in 2002
convincing citizens to pay attention to benefits introduced with the new currency. I am
cynical regarding the adoption of a sole money for the purpose of controlling monetary
policies and problems of too diverse states one from each other. However, the subprime
meltdown phase not only corroded the most powerful state in the world, but it also plagued
Europe which found oneself in an uncontrollable financial process. The debt-to-GDP ratio
restarted to go up for each government at the end of the 1990s (the ratio is a good indicator
for the level of debt). Lane (2012) has calculated that U.S. public debt was equal to 60% in
terms of GDP in 1995, whereas the ratio was estimated to 70% for states that created the
EEA later. He indicated the propensity of U.S. and euro public deficit to shorten before the
Lost Decades era, regardless of convergence to mid-1990s thresholds at the half of the
economic boom. Debt values enlarged precisely with the arrival of the Great Recession.
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Spain 41.7 47.2 61.8 66.6 77.7 92.5
Portugal 78.1 82.8 96.1 104.1 107.8 137.1
Italy 110.7 113.0 126.0 124.9 117.9 136.2
Ireland 27.4 47.4 67.7 84.1 109.7 129.2
Greece 112.8 117.5 135.0 127.1 109.2 164.5
Germany 64.2 68.1 75.5 84.5 84.3 87.0
France 75.6 81.5 93.2 96.8 100.7 110.4
Finland 39.1 38.3 49.2 55.1 57.5 64.3
Belgium 93.8 101.1 109.5 107.8 110.4 120.4
Austria 68.7 74.0 86.3 90.3 91.3 97.6
Table 2.2: Public Debt for some Euro Area Countries (% GDP).
Author’s elaboration. Data Source: OECD Stat.
GIIPS countries that is Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, achieved considerable public
debt levels pre or post-recession periods. They belong to the renown Southern EU
countries, a locution which calls to mind the collocation of them inside Europe territory but
what I argue to be essential is not the geographical position which they occupy, but rather
their reputations against Northern states, the most powerful countries inside the Eurozone
too. For instance, opinions that Germany has on Italy are unmistakable; it rates our country
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mishandled, leveraged, and not able to many times obey rules levied by European
Commission. The fact that Italy keeps being in an indebtedness status is true, and I have
shown public debt evolution in the previous chapter of the thesis which touched 99.8% of
GDP (i.e. below 100% lower limit) only in the year before Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
Italian government resulted unstable over the last 25 years because it changed every 5 years
on average, without taking into consideration political scandals (e.g. ”Tangentopoli”, a
term indicates one of the biggest scandal in Italy accompanied by judicial inquiries, ”Mani
Pulite”, in 1992), corruption, and other facts put our beloved country in a bad light and
nearly reached the default (see Monti’s technical government supplanted Berlusconi’s one
in 2011). The salient feature of GIIPS inhabits to devote too much and to earn too less.
Borrowing attitude brought forth public bonds’ prices by markets since there was necessary
upturn interest rates reflecting debt which hesitated to slide. I did not explain how to price a
bond yet. Let’s consider cash flows associated with a bond, to wit coupons and principal
until the maturity date. Bond’s price will be equal to the sum of each single cash flow
discounted at the appropriate interest rate. The succeeding equation demonstrates the
statement in mathematical terms:
P0 =
T
∑
t=1
CFt
(1+ r)t
(2.3)
P0 stands for the price at time 0 (i.e. at the present period), CF indicates the cash flow at
time t, r is the interest rate which forms a part of the discount factor and T the expiration
date. The formula 2.3 draws attention to the relation amid price and interest rate: when
bond’s yield rises, its price goes down and vice versa. The connection roughs out
illumination for cheap bonds issued by troubled governments which lie on a razor’s edge.
Greek sovereign bonds are not expensive given that high promised yields. Buying such
securities is dangerous, one must remind that trading junk bonds is like a gamble.
The operation to estimate a price of a debt instrument can be difficult due to lacking interest
rates in specific time frames. Statistical methodologies create term structure of interest
rates for pinpointing their stock measures when not instantly usable (non-parametric
regressions are chiefly adopted, see Appendix for details). Analysts deploy the structure
additionally to formulate performance of spot rates in relation to the term to maturity.
When one refers to European states, the history behind the concept of integration could not
be completely well-known. I offer an abstract. European Union (EU), a political, economic
union contains 28 states nowadays, was enforced with the Paris Treat in 1951 and the
Rome Treaty in 1957, settled by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the
European Economic Community (EEC) in whom Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, and Germany, six Western EU countries symbolized the pioneers of the
tardive Eurozone. The integration should safeguard peace and prosperity, avoiding fierce
struggles that demolished the earth in the past century as the two World Wars did, trusted
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on the principle of delegating a comfort level of sovereignty all around the Union. That
implicates advantages or to attract other states to come to ”restyle” Europe with an
extensive venerated agreement. Unfortunately, the covenant was not feasible examining its
complexity. Hence, a step-by-step mechanism permitted the advancement of the
integration. To promote fairness, exterior concessions were guaranteed taking the structure
of dissociations or exceptions, which proves my insight of the inconsistent strategy
member states designed for the Europe unification project. The EU represents a hybrid
construction with many institutional asymmetries. It does not fall under any simple
definition such as a federation, confederation or international organization (Dabrowski,
2010). A trade-off appeared because gradually integration breakthrough manifested at the
common trade policy level, not in the political environment if countries could forgo to seep
financial fundings to all EU member states.
Resuming the sovereign debt issue, in table 2.2, Ireland debt boosted steeply contrast to the
others focus states. Italy deficit is always above the 100% GDP bound according to OECD
survey, while we have declared that debt-to-GDP ratio was strictly below 1 in 2007 if one
takes care to Istat data. Such deviation is negligible; our country debt stayed high overall.
On the other hand, the table allows two particular aspects to emerge. First of all, distressed
or close to default countries were those displayed the highest leverages when the outset of
the crisis was coming. In addition, relevant discrepancies between Northern and Southern
EU states influenced both reputation and financial sight. The odd characteristics of a
country’s ability to repay its debt, indexed to the debt-to-GDP ratio, involves in the
tendency to fall when 100% GDP limit is crossed, even though this requires a consistent
portion of time to see some effects. Onerous public debt amounts are not advised due to
sovereign debt risk will happen with an elevated probability, namely the difficulty to obtain
loans in future and to pay back those already received, putting a government in a trap,
better known as the diabolic loop.
Figure 2.7: Relation between Sovereign Debt Risk and Banking System.
Source: Brunnermeier et al. (2011)
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From the figure, one detects banks sustain sovereign risk approached by a country sending
supportive signals under bailout15, while they decline loans and equity, debt risks raise,
worsening banks’ solvency. The credit crunch means tax revenues go down, weakening
government solvency which erodes market value of sovereign bonds held by financial
institutions.
Banking crisis often precedes or contributes to sovereign default, therefore a bidirectional
link springs. From the advent of the EU crisis, Storm and Naastepad (2016) report it for the
first quarter of 2008, and the European Union has tried to uncover its proper driver. The
same union has set up a risk management framework since 2009 for enhancing the
Maastricht Treaty’s principles and institutions joined with resolving the numerous
shortages affect Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), creating the Outright Monetary
Transaction (OMT), a program aimed for purchasing sovereign bonds issued by the
Eurozone countries under predetermined conditions. The European Central Bank
effectuated it trading virtually eligible assets outright on markets, along with the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM), an organization which acts as a ”watchdog” for the Euro Area
which replaced the European Financial Stability Facility (ESFS) on September 27, 2012. I
have mentioned Maastricht Treaty being the founding father of the European Union, signed
on February 7, 1992. SGP signified the covenant, stipulated in 1997, thanks to whom the
common currency was minted and released in the Eurozone.
Acknowledge a banking crisis may be misleading, its origins collect a medley of economic,
financial, socio-political, and trade peculiarities. Thus, causalities must be inspected make
us less hesitant towards whether marking the crisis with a sovereign debt connotation or
not. Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) suppose the banking crisis would be originated by two
significant events. To quote them, (i) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or
takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions; or (ii) if there are no
runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important
financial institution (or group of institutions) that marks the start of a string of similar
outcomes for other financial institutions. Their key factors must be carefully examined as
the authors run analyses on a small sample. Moreover, these proxies convey the impression
to sound good, a liquidity crisis whose trigger coincides with a bank run might flow into a
solvency crisis. Grauwe (2013) highlights the importance of a lender of last resort to
bypass bank run action and then an imminent sovereign crisis.
A different technique for the banking crisis capture refers to the credit-to-GDP ratio, i.e.
loans that banks allow private sector estimated as a percentage of GDP. Databases
regarding such a circumstance list the Euro Area lived a good credit period over the
previous and the actual centuries generated by the skill banks assimilated to gather money
in their sole currency (the euro), other than narrower interest rates and disposable credit
upward than multiple currencies circulated into the European economic system.
15The action that entities such as government, enterprises, individuals supply fundings to a troubled
institution in order it will not default.
72
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 2
Nevertheless, current account balances have exacerbated since the last decade of the 1990s
with GIIPS recorded deficits touched a negative peak of -11.1% about during the EU
recession conform with the IMF estimates. Current account inserts transaction of assets
(goods and services) and unilateral transfers in the balance of payment (BoP) which
expresses a summary statement of economic transactions that residents of a country do and
rest of the world residents accomplish during a specific time frame (the procedure hints
quarterly or annually flows). GIIPS countries obtained wide wage upturns besides
productivity growth, an unhealthy improvement let unit labor costs and inflation boost, real
interest rates cropped, lenders received a smaller amount of loan benefits, and interest rates
of public bonds diminished, pushing bonds’ price up. The residual Euro Area did not
experiment this frustration. I maintain beholden governments relied exaggeratedly on
borrowing to retrieve economic growth, they issued a vast quantity of bonds to finance the
debt with very high-interest rates as a matter of fact. These governments sold debt
instruments at low prices, so that aspired to promote traders for buying them (who bought
or sold in markets might have been extremely optimist, a behavior similar to the Animal
Spirit seen in the U.S.A. at that time). The volatile global financial system contributed to
expanding worries, disparities, and confusion as individuals could not become aware the
recession which experienced, we are still living its influences today. Private area was
relevant and unexpectedly neglected, the sovereign risk obscured households indebtedness,
a big mistake which might have helped the Eurozone states to move correctly against the
crisis dissemination.
The mild fiscal policy is the final aspect which comes full circle on the antecedent period of
the EU crisis. The euro foundation had the effect of attenuating the countercyclical feature
of fiscal policy. Governments discarded the fiscal policy contraction hypothesis in the
middle of the credit boom. To explain this dereliction, methods for tightening fiscal policy
valuation were poor. Concentrating excessively on the output gap, such models performed
a bad analysis of fiscal positions without considering financial, fiscal, and macroeconomic
risks which can drive to exogenous imbalances shocks.
The European Central Bank did not much aid during the debt crisis. I criticize its
stop-and-go policy pursued as European government bond markets needed a huge quantity
of liquidity that did not arrive from the Central Bank, engaged to maintain inflation at the
target of 2%.
Causes of the Euro Area crisis will be explained in the following paragraph. I will show to
the reader that sovereign debt was not the plague the U.S. recession delivered, fiscal
austerity was the main mistake member states made to cheer up them, BoP imbalances
played a very important part albeit almost nobody took them into consideration. The
private sector was also meaningful since it covered an important field of the EU crisis
determinants.
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2.3.3 Causes - Was Sovereign Debt the Cradle of the Crisis?
Whatever tools, theories, or approaches cohesive for studying the crisis imputed to Europe,
the Great Recession has to be understood as the fulcrum of the Euro Area crisis. Sovereign
debt must not be meant able to unfold a crisis of huge magnitude; rather the private sector
could explain a large piece of drivers arisen over the last decade. Dobra (2014) argues the
Eurozone recession is an overlap of banking crisis originated from tremendous credit
growth and/or asset bubbles, sovereign debt problem subsequent to fiscal imbalances, and
BoP crisis formed in consequence of current account deficits or sudden stops. I agree with
her that BoP gaps donated a suitable contribution to the crisis spread. Nevertheless, I reject
the importance that sovereign debt owned by the establishment of the European recession
vicious circle, the private sector was disclosed much more crucial.
Deliberations of authors hinted in the introduction will be unfolded bar none, accentuating
their strengths and faintnesses.
Let’s start with the hottest mindset concerning the European Crisis, Sovereign risk. The
Monetary Union did not stick out for its good management. GDP of all countries belong to
the Europe are not rescuing values previously the recession. Armingeon and Baccaro
(2012) communicate that output growth was inclined to jump out from positive to negative
appraises 2007 to 2010, in other words, over the crisis top. The disconcerting thing ensued
after the evidence people did not fix the attention on the diabolic loop, instead of the
European Central Bank operations for equilibrating the global financial system and maybe
rescue it to the normal situations before the catastrophic turbulence. Short-term interest
rate haircuts, currency swap agreements, and liquidity providing service should have been
assured the proper cure with which replied to the U.S. banking breakdown arrived in 2008.
I bring out that currency swap instruments negotiation takes place when cheaper debt is
needed (it transpires borrowing at the best available rate in any currency and then
interchange with debt in target currency using a mortgage where two entities borrow
offsetting amounts each other respect to the other’s currency), hedging against (i.e.
exposure reduction to) forward exchange rate fluctuations, or beating off financial shocks,
in particular, a country agonized by a liquidity crisis to let it borrow money with its
currency. The Central Bank run by Mario Draghi should have been considered that a
unique currency connects strong heterogeneous nations result to not be the ideal solution in
the event of a crisis, underscoring already evident inequalities between Southern and
Northern EU states. Feeble monetary union favored negative externalities. Indeed, interest
rates increased, and agents lost the faith on the fulfilling regards public debt on constraints
during the time. European sovereign debt markets worsened dramatically in late 2009,
notwithstanding the stability of banking system weighted over 2008 and Q3 2009 which
stopped the country-specific fiscal risks materialization. Primary balance deficit jumped
and surpassed national wealth, European countries were not ready for a similar breakdown.
Such a deficit lists governments were spending more than inflows (e.g. from taxes) proper
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to underline the surplus of borrowing actioned by countries as a whole. The problem
originated from the underpricing of sovereign debt, namely ongoing governments were
placed on the same level as higher leveraged ones when the monetary union made interest
rate values close to each other. This is a serious mistake, it is unimaginable Germany or
France had got an equal risk to Greece, Portugal, or Spain, the nations are diverse below
various profiles such as culture, working policy, commerce, financial. Take for example the
spread among Germany government bonds and Greece public debt. Before the settlement
of the recession, it seemed to converge to 0 due to the interest rate alignment, the criteria
have disappeared at Q4 2009 as to the Global Financial Crisis pushed Europe to review
sovereign debt right values (the debt was considered risk-free), reclaiming credit risks and
volatility were modifying. Here, private sector stepped in, the abrupt credit growth joined
current account deficits culminated into wide capital outflows from the private sector, that
is to say, undesirable flows being a message of economic and political instability which
characterizes the movement of assets outside a nation, reflecting foreign and domestic
investors sell off holdings of a given state due to perceived deterioration of such a
economy. In the subsequent table, I present private sector credit flows (% GDP) on a
consolidated basis, transactions within the same sector are expunged. The net amount of
liabilities accommodates sectors Non-Financial corporations and Households and
Non-Profit institutions serving families have incurred over the year. Eurostat claims that
the indicative threshold of private sector credit flow is 14%.
Country 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Spain 26.4 11.7 -1.2 0.9 -3.7 -11.2 -10.3
Greece 16.2 15.5 2.2 5.5 -6.5 -5.9 -6.4
Italy 12 6.6 0.8 5 3.1 -0.8 -3
France 11.2 9.8 3.3 4.6 6.4 4.4 2.1
Germany 2.2 0.5 -0.8 0 1.6 1.3 1.7
Netherlands 12.9 9.7 8.6 1.7 4.2 2 1.5
Belgium 16.8 16.6 6 2.6 21.4 15.7 8.5
Croatia 16.8 16.1 2.6 4.9 -2.3 -3 -0.6
Table 2.3: Consolidated Private Sector Credit Flows (% GDP).
Author’s elaboration. Data Source: Eurostat.
The global crisis transformed private capital flows; they passed from positive to negative in
many countries, well investments leaving a country for foreign sources exceed investments
coming into a nation from not domestic resources, following a national currency’s
contraction since investors swap their local currency for purchasing foreign one.
Investments became low, so that loans and real estate were frozen (loan losses entailed
huge costs).
Looking at ten years government bond yields, Greece moved away against other GIIPS, it
entered in a plummeting spiral and asked support to the European Union on May 2010
which arrived via the EFSF and the ESM. Naturally, GIIPS had greater borrowing costs
consequently the recession, the banking crisis and the tight of households expenditure
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aggravated their sovereign debt conditions. Banks joined the crisis immediately after real
estate stopped, firms did not invest money for construction, and member nations of the
economy were unchanged. Immovable property’s prices fallen which led banks did not
longer recover the amount of cash allowed in the form of property-backed loans. Sovereign
debt issue and banking system constituted an ”explosive cocktail” for member nations. The
former component of that hodgepodge was not much serious under confederation or
federation network. The motivation must be searched in government bond markets
considering bonds the Eurozone governments issued are not controlled by fiat currency
(which does not possess intrinsic value), inducing the collateral nonexistence (governments
cannot have the liquidity to hack repayment duties). Where public bonds are issued by
states which express them in their currency, the problem does not either demonstrate. The
failure of bonds guarantees taken European sovereign bond markets prone to liquidity
crisis and insolvency drama. I cry out a lender of last resort had to be essential for states
with liquidity hurdles; the benefits would have been greater than detriments e.g. inflation
risk, fiscal losses, or opportunism by governments which were inclined to borrow and issue
debt obligations too much. At this point, one must lay claim CDS introduction would be
suitable due to the chance they offer for reassuring the holder in case of debtor’s credit
default though no traders should confide bitter in this kind of ABS. Let’s think of a CDS
written on a treasury bond, the creditor is an agent and the debtor corresponds to a
government. The derivative contract explicits that the borrower will pay the amount
received, the interest rate is calculated beside its financial capability. Who lends money
purchasing the derivative hoping the issuer will not have troubles and he or she will go to
any length for assisting the debtor’s ongoing business. If the government will disclose the
default, the long party will exercise the repayment right, being not interested to support the
debtor (counterparties are on opposite sides now).
Selvaraj (2015) lists the factors incited Europe crisis. Member states of the Eurozone failed
to comply with SGP rules, France and Germany were the first, a penalty until 0.5% of GDP
was attached to states transgressed them. Budget deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios
were violated before and after the crisis (the author focused from 2005 to 2012). Greece
and France disrupted both ratios, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain the deficit ratio,
Germany the debt one. Greek government exhibited the largest values if compared with
other EU governments. The European Council began to move in the opposite direction
with SGP reforms in order governments broke down the deficit bound and motivated
economic growth. Public debt sharply arose, missing of debt management as well pushed
the states towards the economic downturn.
The euro currency persuaded traders for adopting trust on markets considered efficient and
competitive. As inflation remained low during the economic boom period, that is closed to
the European Central Bank price stability target, interest rates were narrow too, developed
households and firms over borrowing which promoted a debt surge.
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Wages increased during the 2002-2007 period, the concentration was in Italy, Spain,
France, according to the author, making the costs of production of goods and services to
rise, net exports deteriorated followed by manufacturing and production sectors. Labor
costs augmented a lot for the aforementioned countries, France excluded. Germany is an
outlier because of its working policies not oriented to reduce workforce and exports. Labor
hoarding and internal flexibility16 permitted it to exit from the crisis hurricane earlier than
the others, the bill to pay might be very steep for the recourse to those short-term stabilizer
tools.
The financial deregulation and liberalization did not prevent banks leverage. Capital
inflows were huge, they leaked a real estate and consumption surge. GIIPS received
numerous funds from the richest EU states. Bad loans caused banks to face balance sheet
imbalances and the borne of the crisis.
Eurozone markets were further unstable due to the Great Recession which brought market
confidence loss and capital flows reversion. European states lived financial field recession
with the fiscal stimulus package response to it, which provoked more damages than
benefits.
The author stressed finally that the Eurozone conception alimented the EU crisis since the
Euro Area can have the monetary union but not the common fiscal policy, letting states to
implement excessive public spending as no institutions appear to exist for entailing tax and
expenditure caps.
The banking system has initiated to be fragile since Q3 2007 and it gone ahead for all the
recession. Bear Sterns extrication on March 2008 signed the EU banking crisis which
embraced the sovereign default situation of GIIPS and other member states. The recovered
signal investment bank looked like an initiative turn to rid out the most relevant financial
institutions from their default. In fact, the Eurozone conceived government bailouts
ignoring the impacts on fiscal deficits which aggravated the banking field on July 2011.
Interbank markets experienced aggravations as well, spread among EURIBOR and
Overnight Index Swap (OIS)17 enlarged enormously in the same month of Lehman
Brothers default.
This vision of European recession accentuates interdependencies centrally located
sovereign credit and banking aggravation. Along these lines, the crisis magnified intra
dependencies within Northern and Southern states. The following hard to break circle
exasperates the sovereign default risk and quality of financial institutions, maybe leaving
non performing loans (NPL) into their balance sheets.
16Germany preferred to not fire labor force; it reduced the working hours per employee.
17The index establishes an interest rate swap whose function coincides with exchanging the overnight rate
for a fixed interest rate.
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Having completed the Sovereign credit risk outlook, I will discuss the second point of view
where private sector holds a prominent part of the story.
The classical opinion encircles fiscal imbalances and a lack of discipline must not be
treated as truthful. I cite fiscal austerity lots of times in this chapter, I did not explain either
what it is nor its weaknesses against the crisis. In the political environment, Austerity often
refers to economy policies governments implement for controlling public debt and adopted
when default is prominent. For that reason, austerity became a powerful instrument in
governments’ eyes and abuse of it. There exist three kind of methods to introduce such a
stimulus package into the economy. One of them is dependent on higher taxes, with the
likely consequence of more government expenditures, called Taxes and Austerity, the
second one has the effect of raising taxes and cutting redundant government practices,
better knows as Angela Merkel model, the last one narrows taxes and public spending. The
corrective mechanism does not entangle a slide of government public spending which is
similar to austerity, the tool is activated solely in the presence of a shrivel regarding
government receipts and expenditures.
Keep in mind this conceit, if European crisis was truly correlated with Sovereign debt risk,
apart from the fact the Eurozone contained a fiscal discipline omission, fiscal austerity
would be the solution. Therefore, fiscal overspending does not instigate a bad economic
scenario in Europe. We can hold the statement for Greece, fiscal profligacy sums perfectly
up the origin of its internal crisis. In my opinion, Greece would have been better not to
choose the euro currency because Greek government condition initiated a downward path
on January 2001, with the entrance of such a state in the Euro Area. Once Greece decided
to join the member states, it gave up public finances and deficit was the worst of all Europe
in 2007. I underline Greece should always be considered carefully due to its fragility and
intricate conditions which are persisting today.
Obviously, when a government accumulates a significant bulk of debt, and fiscal
indiscipline hesitates to drop out of sight, then there is impossible to continue of spending
with any restriction for the future outcomes, also on the sole ground that borrowing could
require high costs for countries fail to slash deficits (the most powerful Eurozone states
forced budget cuts the so-called crisis countries, nations really pained by the global
financial agitation, e.g., Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Greece). Fiscal profligacy was not the
same for the GIIPS, fiscal positions diverge considerably, and those states have endured a
buckling competitiveness since the start of the actual century. This transmuted into current
account deficits for the poorest nations (GIIPS with the Ireland exclusion) and a surplus in
that BoP component for Germany. Fiscal austerity expansion measures have the target of
public expenditures reduction in all circumstances, the high level of unemployment
included, driven by a plausible upsurge of future disposable income, consumption, and
investment. In contrast, data supply an antithetic interpretation in whom fiscal
irresponsibility did not anticipate the EU crisis bedrocks. Theatrical austerity consensus
encouraged Southern states for internal correction mechanisms design, although it is
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inconceivable such nations would have resources to do that. SGP was enforced just for
preventing these terrible ideas will not be ever repeated. Indebtedness variations inside the
Eurozone from 2000 to 2007 are illustrated in the below table.
Table 2.4: Eurozone Indebtedness Increasing (% GDP)
Source: Storm and Naastepad (2016)
Values in brackets explain the portion of real GDP that households contributed through
their debt improvement. Table 2.4 captures a reduction of 7 percentage points in
government debt on average, in other words, it is like every country of Europe would have
squeeze public spending by 7%. Three of the GIIPS undergone a public debt reduction, the
remain ones were characterized by negligible positive increments (up to 13% for Portugal),
reflecting no worries of bond markets concerning sovereign credit risk for entire Europe.
Asserting EU leverage turn up sharply before the turmoil does not have sense according to
data reported here, inter alia, debt augmented ex-post the borne of crisis threat. A curious
outcome that wipes out Sovereign debt risk seed lies on the private area, the fundamental of
the recession in the Eurozone on average. OECD expresses the financial corporation sector
as all private and public entities engaged in financial activities such as monetary
institutions (including central banks), financial intermediaries, insurance companies and
pension funds. What transpires is a tight financial corporation-private sector connection.
Looking at the data, such a sector pushed the debt-to-GDP ratio until 1.45 on average, and
1.32 for the Eurozone states (the peak was achieved in Ireland with a 612% of raising),
government debt numbers are tiny in comparison. There was a ”reverse crowding out” as to
private expenditure dominated public spending, in particular, bad performer nations such as
Greece (32% of households debt increase), Ireland (54%), Spain (34%), Netherlands
(32%). One must infer a correlation amid debt and economic growth, that is to say when
indebtedness jumps up, output plummets. Authors of the table above do not have found out
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causality between two variables for all kind of fields explored: household, financial and
non-financial corporations, so they stressed that there is no (statistically significant)
association between higher indebtedness and economic growth, defined here as the
percentage increase in real GDP over the period 2000–2007... we cannot attribute higher
growth in the Eurozone periphery to excessive state spending, and hence cannot logically
attribute higher real wage growth, loss of cost competitiveness, higher imports and
growing current-account deficits to a supposed lack of fiscal discipline in Southern Europe.
Nonetheless, families debt affects directly and not economic development: direct impact
interrupts households liquidity constraints, indirect influence arrives from home asset
prices positive trends. The outlier was Germany in this case thanks to converse leverage
households climb which took place due to past events, including unification boom. To
revive the terminology employed while we were describing the Great Recession, the
”mainstream” view of sovereign risk to be the ”evil” of Europe is misleading. I have
demonstrated the surprising relevance of families, in wide terms, private field, for recession
generating process. I state austerity alters cognitive systems, just think cut government
spending, augment taxes, and lift salaries is seen the manner of mitigating debt issue when
a country is falling or is already fallen into recession black hole. Yet, fiscal stimulus helped
unluckily GDP negative pattern over the hearth of the crisis. The package produces bias
estimations and spurious correlations with output growth, so it must be handled
scrupulously given its uncertain nature (debt levels tend to not lower, and explanation of
GDP narrow manifests itself in the presence of public debt overhang).
The emphasis can be fixed at capital flow environment. Doing this, almost each nation
displayed current account negative values, debt over 60% GDP threshold, consistent
unemployment rate, and a reluctant inner income upswing. Germany surpluses
accompanied security acquisition programs of low/middle-income countries, with current
account shortfalls brought speculative capital which begotten real-estate bubbles in crisis
countries, whereas prices rose elsewhere. Let’s elucidate mainly commercial transactions
at the core crisis. Table 2.5 stands out difficulties GIIPS met during the last years of the
previous decade: capital outflows, government debt crossed tolerable degrees,
unemployment rate moves away from natural rate whose estimate oscillates 4.7 to 5.8%
based on Federal Reserve calculation18, and an output departure more often than not
negative. The adjective ”natural” refers to the equilibrium level of unemployment
surrounds a country’s economy that labor market imperfections make it possible.
Non-accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU) is the new terminology for the
long-term unemployment rate, albeit some economists distinguish it from the common
concept being composed of both frictional and structural unemployment, other than no
occurrence of non-competitive markets.
18For further details, please see Natural Rate of Unemployment (Long-Term), St. Louis Federal Reserve
80
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 2
Table 2.5: Main Indicators for France, Germany and GIIPS
Source: Armigeon and Baccaro (2012)
Exchange rate devaluation instrument is the immediate technical solution to alleviate
competitiveness erosion. In this way, net exports intensify, salaries dwindle (real wages
because of stickiness), inflation upturns when exchange rate declines as real domestic
interest rate lows respect to foreign one for a depreciation of domestic currency,
considering there are capital outflows (recall moreover Fisher equation, if real interest rate
goes down, inflation lifts). GIIPS did not be able to implement internal devaluations for
impediments that the Eurozone members impose on them. Another time, the European
Central Bank should have been the lender of last resort for troubled countries, it perhaps
aided that devaluation to mild favor GDP growth and provided liquidity for staying afloat
regardless challenges the recession placed. However, such a mechanism must not be
employed.
D’Erasmo et al. (2015) indicate a simplified version of Mendoza and Oviedo debt
sustainability model where primary balance gets involved (I have changed some symbols
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only). The model assumes the government must repay debt, output growth rate is
exogenous (γ), the real interest rate r is constant, and expenditures are unaltered unless
they are cut up to minimum tolerable levels (this happens if the government borrows
money). The lower bound of debt assures the government will not retain more debt than the
amount received under the worst possible scenario, that is primary balance with the lowest
revenues, τmin, public outlays at the minimum acceptable limit, gmin, in which a country is
clearly in crisis. The situation might reveal feasible with a probability. The negative
episode makes up an upper bound called Natural Public Debt Limit (NPDL) computed
trough growth-adjusted value of public balance per year. The resultant debt limit will be:
bt ≤ τ
min−gmin
rt− γ = NPDL (2.4)
bt stock of debt at time t.
Blending 2.4 with government budget constraint: bt − (1+ βt)bt−1 = −pbt , in whom
βt =
1+ rt
1+ γt
−1 and pbt = τt − gt the primary balance, the optimal level of debt will be
equal to:
bt = max(NPDL,1+βtbt−1 − pbt) (2.5)
Equation 2.5 tells us that a surplus of government balance will probably contribute to
curbing the amount of debt, facilitating loans refund. The model supposes the government
will pay back the debt, this might not be held if default is cheaper than repayment, other
than it illustrates a trade-off between public debt and primary balance: when the second
one goes through an increment financed with expenditures tightening and/or taxes raising,
GDP development deteriorates, the government is utilizing restrictive fiscal policies. On
the other hand, interest rates are set to zero or actually negative nowadays, so relying on
monetary policy for rising economic growth may produce small effects because it tends to
be weaker due to macro-financial “headwinds” may blow more strongly when interest rates
are so low or the impact of a change in interest rates on aggregate demand and output may
be smaller at very low rates, i.e. non-linearities are present (Borio and Hoffman, 2017).
A endless loop which debt upturn builds is presented as follows:
Figure 2.8: Debt Increasing Never-Ending Loop.
Author’s elaboration.
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I have decided the inclusion of figure 2.8 to elucidate outcomes of debt increasing,
although it was not a real driver of the current crisis for motives previously expounded.
Pereira and Rossi (2015) vision about the cradle of European dilemma pivots on the
internal exchange rate and making this, they accentuate asymmetries, imbalances, and
problems of the euro currency which may be overcome pass to a new coin which does not
contain the above drawbacks. The reader foresees that proceeding such philosophy, fiscal
irresponsibility did not consign our continent a public trait. Current account deficits spread
out the base of the misdeed, collecting households and enterprises debt. Eurozone
government bond markets collapse were partially suspended in December 2012 by the
European Central Bank which did not symbolize the lender of last resort; otherwise, the
central bank would have immediately place liquidity for establishing internal devaluation.
Buying of sovereign bonds in secondary markets assigned a faint weigh on sovereign credit
risk. That undertaken action was not captured because of fiscal austerity and internal
exchange rate biases which positioned hurdles for the euro reform resolutive tool. The
economic unification project sounds good if states are very similar. In contrast, the Euro
Area does not incorporate nations structured in this way. We have seen Germany responded
faster to the turmoil than whatever EU nations with adequate working policies whereby
unit labor costs did not explode as crisis countries. Our currency did not eliminate foreign
exchange operations, instead, it promoted the formation of mutual exchange rates
mismatched ex-post the currency unification in January 2002, which deprived members to
control their monetary policy, fiscal power was retained at the country level. The
Mundell-Flemming Trilemma, also called the Impossible Trinity or the Trilemma is a
concept economists Robert Mundell and Marcus Flemming elaborated to show limited
options nations own to set monetary policy. The Trilemma is presented in Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9: The Mundell-Flemming Trilemma
Source: Author’s elaboration
The Eurozone chose to pursue Option 2. Therefore, the exchange rate must fluctuate to
preserve market equilibrium, but they did not react in right ways so that imbalances
strengthened. Pereira and Rossi are convinced that fiscal indiscipline could never detect the
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seeds of the European recession dawn. They maintain that fiscal data manipulation of
Greece fueled sovereign credit risk understanding. I agree partially with them because
Greek government performed badly when the state joined the euro coin (fiscal pressure
continued to persist), I consider it the stress of infinite problems Greece lived asking
several subsidiaries. Conversely, the authors ranked target realities reflect fiscal profligacy
misleading: internal exchange deficits and masked outcomes of crisis states perhaps
persuaded high-income nations not to carry out adjustments, internal devaluation does not
work well whether salaries downturn occurs, while capital returns are unchanged, marking
our crisis as fiscal puts aside public sector tasks brings welfare ruin.
Blending all these ingredients, what surfaces is a foreign exchange crisis as real exchange
rates mismatched for each country inside the Eurozone diluted with banks bail out during
the global financial crisis (public debt anxiety emerged after 2012, i.e. when the sovereign
risk was almost completely rid out by means of Mario Draghi measures). Private leverage
and current account shortfall are anchored to real exchange rate. At all stages of the
section, I have reported the expression internal exchange rate which refers to the implied
exchange rate of countries measures competitiveness estimated via unit labor cost for a
focus country relative to remaining ones. Those rates arose by the Euro Area network
considering unique monetary policy and auto-managed real exchange rates at country
bound, an evident imbalance effect of the euro. Labor production costs revision twist such
a rate responsible for Germany speculation against GIIPS debt instruments and crisis
countries depletion. Asymmetries would not manifest themselves under separate currencies
nations detained. The authors highlighted that competitiveness does not notch monetary
field (reflection goes to BoP), and mutual adjustment catches on Balassa-Samuelson effect.
Be´la Balassa and Paul Samuelson found out in 1963 the inclination countries with high
productivity have got to associate this latter to strong growth regarding salary, making real
exchange rate boost. Besides, wages improve in tradable goods sector flows into
non-tradable services environment in emerging countries, with an increasingly fast trend
for inflation. Emerging and developing nations own greater inflation rates than developed
states.
Supplementary shortages of the euro may be disclosed as to no build of adjustment
mechanisms by interest rates (the European Central Bank must satisfy the inflation target),
and private range deficit carelessness until the Euro Union deals with it like an ease debt
expense; negative current accounts shape consumption, price raising, internal exchange
rate perception biases, families and enterprises deficits augment, there were foreign deficit
fundings too. Southern and Northern EU states diverge more and more thanks to the
impediment that firms belong to the first ones suffer versus domestic and foreign demand.
I conclude this sight of the recession declaring it was conceived from our currency which
erroneously met interest rates, consumption inundated prices and wages to hike up,
mismatching of real interest rates of nations occurred, and the private sector deficit
projected the BoP disorder.
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Engel (2016) concentrates on an uncommon aspect of the crisis. He infers the kernel of it
should not be research in sovereignty, bailout, or over-confidence governments had to
repay what they borrowed, sovereign debt markets functionality breathes life into the
juncture. Once again, the euro robustness degenerated due to the tendency to obscure
policymakers activities. The author underlined European institution was frail 2010 to 2013
when confused policies were signed for rescuing Europe. Germany leadership drew on
rigid political tools (we have unfolded internal flexibility exploited in labor market), so
chase after European economic architecture. That Institutional Economics19 approach for
the current recession is prudent to label such awful episode with a fiscal stigma, there
seems a too strong assumption for the complicated crisis bears market malfunctions. Risk
management techniques are essential to figure out the extent that traders run risks
prudentially, correctly, and efficiently in financial market institutions where emergent
traces their indelible stamp. The activity of describing fundamental definition by way of
theoretical definitions steer risks valuation, along with to reproduce a characteristic of
financial markets foundation.
The reader will be wonder how was it possible the EU meltdown overflowed from an
embedded function of financial markets, not harmful borrowing, fiscal austerity, or any
economic-financial supportive instruments. The answer inhabits on a distinction which
separates what Engel calls herd behavior20, from isomorphic behavior. He wants to leave a
mark on the passage from a peaceful to a fright mindset. As a result, the crisis entangles
emergence of institutions whose mission is not sole efficiency and transnational markets;
economic behavior also covers the target. I believe stakeholders outlook of firms fits that
mentality utilizing companies organize strategy around relations accommodating social
interlocutors. Markets are generated by enterprises offerings which meet customers needs
and dreams across cross-price elasticity. Markets features, structures, preferences, and
customer types are emergent qualities, the product of actors observation respect to others in
an isomorphic way, and Institutional intelligibility shapes forms of actors and trading
venues. As traders observe each other mutually, the intelligibility creation entails
observation and expression of theoretical customer tastes.
The methodology does not rid out the sovereign adjective. Indeed, sovereign Eurobond
markets fundamentals are translated in macroeconomics indicators which lead riskier
governments to fulfill consistent public bond interest rate payments being closer to
sovereign default.
19Institutionalism, or Institutional Economics, is a school of economics borne during the 1920s and 1930s in
the U.S. which perceives institutions to be meaningful in order economic behavior process develops. Thorstein
Veblen was the founder of the theory, he criticized classical economy for its people’s economic decision-
making view, concentrating himself to a different vision under living beings continuously rotate customs and
institutions.
20The expression is usually intended as the typical individuals’ manner to replicate attitudes accepts by a
host of people in Behavioral Finance.
85
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 2
Reveal government behavior and market evaluation does not appear straightforward.
Wrapping up the section, fundamental analysis of securities can be conducted via customer
preferences examination, crucial to distinguish mimetic behavior from herd behavior which
means from crisis to normality. We trade into not-turbulent markets just because of the
normality-crisis bridge which emergent market intelligibility perfectly explains. The surge
of our crisis thus starts inside. There is no chance to have a given fundamental that supplies
a convergence for market behavior, useful for herd-isomorphic attitude detach. Sovereign
bonds transform debt roll over and financial flows of sovereign countries. The crisis is
similar to an ”actor” which fills the absence of separation between the ideal equilibrium
and insalubrious scenario. Engel’s theory implications consist of reinforcement between
national economy definition as the fundamental by sovereign debt markets and the crisis
denotation discussed above which pins it on herd behavior, so that one can affirm sovereign
markets sound good.
The Eurozone did not be attacked by lost of competitiveness attached with fiscal
indiscipline, the statement proves not to be true as countries lived competitiveness
downturn prior to the crisis did not growth less afterwards. Misleading is built around
importance given to unit labor costs considered the primary variable for competitiveness.
In the next paragraph, I will recap the key consequences of the meltdown.
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2.3.4 Consequences and Responses
Tools to well understand the financial disaster will be provided to the reader. Outcomes are
quite intuitive. Moreover, I claim the main consequences and responses must be reported in
a synthetic manner.
The public deficit condition of governments surfaced successive the crisis origination when
the member states were obliged to bail out banks to avoid their default in some cases.
Families debt leap augmented borrowing which supplied home prices increase and a
private sector indebtedness boom, Spain and Ireland were the most blown. Nowadays,
economics sectors leverage reverse process is adversely impacting economic activity, and
the problem begins to transpose at balance sheets deterioration. Fiscal austerity decreased
GDP and any performance indicators, not sovereign debt, it made the fiscal irresponsibility
endless circle attainable (clarified in 2.8). This retort turns out to be very dangerous if one
looks at the potential recession which may happen according to every form of austerity
exacerbates economy as a whole. Greece troubles were induced by austerity after the borne
of the European crisis, the single episode where public spending was high before 2008.
Wages cut and labor markets deregulation were amends used for mitigating bad
performances though this ”medicine” gathers more disadvantages than improvements. Real
GDP studies demonstrated how salaries cutting, precisely, internal devaluation, curbs real
output growth, while unemployment enhances. Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece
recorded the greatest estimates for having slash wages and strengthen unemployment rates.
Once again, Germany has seen the best country vis-a`-vis Southern states for its working
policies. The sight is inconsistent in my opinion due to there is need to establish how much
the opportunity cost will be for German society in long-term, we should think those actions
pertain to the short-run. Naturally, BoP worsened over the crisis, and no exchange rate
alterations were practicable since the euro is a foreign currency for the Eurozone nations,
devaluations would be the unique source though not the right way for recover (high costs
for economic development and wealth). Deflation is obstructing upswing but even in that
circumstance, experience teaches us everything is possible, e.g. the UK was substantially
affected at the beginning of the global financial crisis, even if it done Sterling devaluation
and it is recovering quite good now. I put ”quite” adjective because Brexit might provide
the UK problems such as no longer subsidies from Europe. However the topic is not
inherent for the aim of the thesis. States focused excessively on fiscal and debt responses.
We have learned the euro is not health for Europe. Nobody takes care of return to control
their monetary policy, maybe excessive costs in the long-run would discourage
implementation of methods with serial currency mismatches would take place attached to
larger deficits, yet competitiveness increasingly rescue, especially for GIIPS countries,
Northern nations appreciate currencies and Mario Draghi would equilibrate the
environment acting on national banks supervision, with positive benefits on sovereignty.
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Common currency adoption is never much taken into account in whom the euro would not
disappear and it would back up national currencies within the Eurozone. This idea comes
from Fre´de´ric Lordon, a French economist and I appreciate his proposal which points out
the European Central Bank would be a sort of intermediary for converting state currencies
at the overall central bank level, eliminating entirely exchange markets among EU
members.
Lane (2012) expresses risks of multiple equilibria when sovereign debt achieved junk
degrees during the crisis. The weakest countries are exposed to speculation for the
sovereign debt which inflates public bond interest rates considering default probability
climbs, the contrary for the strongest states. Discrepancies are more problematic under a
single currency as flight-to-quality traders make in EU sovereign markets. The author
indicates some methods to cherry-pick right equilibrium. A firewall fund via the
availability of an official safety net which attenuates change governments could fall into the
sudden sovereign debt spiral, or sovereign bonds purchasing programs carried out by Mario
Draghi, imposing an upper limit of interest rates with respect to some states nominated
beside fiscal criteria. On the other hand, he suggested some responses being careful to
sovereignty view of the turmoil. A more solid fiscal union to share tax streams or
expenditure programs in order to drop bridges between national output variations.
Enhanced coordination of internal fiscal amends would favor the convergence of the Euro
Union fiscal situation to macroeconomic levels. Eurobonds enter into European markets
would impede speculation activities by powerful states against, say, Greece, Italy, Spain,
then the new form of bonds would include restrictions for over-borrowing such as short
maturities.
Theoretical frameworks helpful to go beyond an arduous crisis will be described in the
final part of the elaborate. The next chapter will be the core of the thesis: I will prove why
banks bought public bonds of crisis countries during the global financial disastrous. That
looks crazy at first glance, I will show that robust evidences are hidden behind the holding
of the bonds.
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Why Banks Purchased More Public
Bonds During The Financial Crisis?
3.1 A Brief Overview
The Global Financial Crisis evidenced governments were not anymore safe. We have
learned this lesson very well in Chapter 2. The out of the blue turbulence was more
hazardous than inflation recessions since such a crisis made noxious both the worldwide
interbank market and banking system, acting into sovereign bond markets where states
were trying to raise funds by public bonds issuances. The operation acted as an alarm bell
for banks and investment banks; they formulated hypotheses that distressed governments
would have had poor performance in the forthcoming future. Nonetheless, financial
institutions were not discouraged from purchasing, hence holding, a vast number of
sovereign bonds when the wind recession announcement was sprouting prominent. The
reader could feel confused. Economic agents are risk adverse on average that makes them
reluctant to invest in debt securities considered thoroughly dangerous, these assets are
known as junk financial instruments. The evidence of my analysis has drawn attention to
banks acquisition propensity towards buying even more public bonds in the wake of and
during crisis episode. My insight touch banks businesses due to public bond yields of crisis
countries taken off extremely high levels up to the middle of the 2008 meltdown,
encouraging banks to buy a lot of such bonds. The jump of yields sank prices and banks
gained plenty of money. In the lead-up of recession infancy, national financial institutions
retained a percentage of public bonds which spaced from 15.4% in GIIPS to 37.7% in
Germany, passing to 1.9% in the U.S. and -1.3% in the UK. The banking crisis converted
banks business as the treasury bondholding incremented by 5.23% on average, the holding
changed to 21.2% in GIIPS, 6.2% in the UK, 1.9% in the founding father of the downturn,
only Germany displayed a contraction but it was prompted by a r rising of foreign traders
looking at the data. Private sector helped to swell banks balance sheets with a larger bulk of
government debt. One must remind that public bonds depict a consistent part of banks’
assets, mostly in emerging or developing states wherein finance is frail.
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3.2 Banks, The Global Financial Crisis, and Public Bonds.
An Empirical Study
3.2.1 By Way of Introduction
We will put much effort to investigate how banking sector reacted versus the financial
crisis. There are no doubts concerning banks were influenced by the recent clash. The
”ghost” U.S. created at the end of 2007 is still echoing in Europe, our country has started
just now to see a bit retrieval, after all who would have suspected the magnitude of the
crash was huge and resistant for almost a decade. As we have ascertained, top investment
banks such as Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs were caught off guard (the former one
defaulted), indicating the complex and unforeseeable propagation of a crisis anchored to
banking system. Logically, when banks suffer, everyone agonizes as a matter of fact for the
simple reason that financings scarce and bank run phenomenon could become reality. The
Eurozone displayed sovereign default risk afterwards bail out was vital in order financial
firms lighten a little businesses. The surprising evidence was that those institutions did not
contract public bonds exposition when states became distressed due to a recession ensued
from banking network, as opposed to the natural outlook whereby sovereign spread upturn
accompanies commercial and investment banks decline gradually the holding of treasury
bonds. This chapter of the thesis will be hinged on cover misinformation which takes us to
think sovereign debt acquisition reduces when the government signals sound dangerous in
reference to primary balance, private sector instability, and debt repayment capability.
Likewise, learn the climb of debt securities banks done in the meantime of the Global
Financial Crisis. The connotation transpires to not only be present in Europe and the U.S.
Ogawa and Imai (2014) carried out an analysis on a sample of Japanese commercial banks
from the end of the 1990s to 2010. They reported, assuming activities are made up of loans
and government bonds, that credit institutions were changing habit as the focus passed to
bonds the government issued, this passage was alimented due to a drop of the ratio
computed dividing loan rate on unit lending costs, that means commercial banks bought
Japanese government bonds (JGBs) to grant loans if price-cost margin resulted low relative
to lending. The margin is calculated via the formula Ogawa and Imai represented in the
paper and I report it here (2003 was selected as basis)1:
α(logMARGIN2010 − logMARGIN2003)
logG2010 − logG2003 × 100
in whom MARGIN is the ratio between the interest on loans and discount (what they
labeled as LOANINT ) and the total operating costs and expenditures for increasing funds
(TOTALCOST ), α the elasticity of JGBs respect to price-cost margin, G the demand of
1For more accurate details regard the computation of all variables reported, please see the original work
listed in the references.
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sovereign bonds equals to loans minus total assets of the ideal portfolio constructed by the
authors. Looking at values of the margin, all commercial banks analyzed explains 58% of
JGBs holding during the first ten years of the current century, second regional banks2
contribution jumps to 158%. Yields stayed intact, while balance sheets status settles the
high demand of the bonds.
In my empirical study, the focus has been given on economical and financial market aspects
of countries because the aim is to uncover weight of internal changes induced by the crisis
which were reflected on normal banking activities translated into an inclination to go long
on many public obligations. We should not be impressed from percentages considerable,
public bonds are very liquid debt securities which permits banks to store liquidity cheaper,
faster, and safer. All banks’ assets must be satisfied with future investments, so what better
method to make sure this will become reality if nothing buying bonds issued by the
government, i.e. debt instruments which are virtually reputed risk-free. Banks do not act in
the same way of uniformed or pseudo-informed traders, they are unaware the government
will repay with a higher probability the loan in case of good news about the investment.
Here initial complications come to light: let’s take into consideration the government
choses to default, country’s resources for consumption go up since they are incited to
improve. The drawback erodes liquidity, banks end up with insufficient cash flows
indispensable for any practices management e.g. lending, asset, and output reinforcement.
In advanced economies, this latter implication dominates the former one, so much so that
the government resolves the issue claiming it will be engaged with the repayment without
exacerbate bank sector and provoke a banking crisis. On the other hand, evolved financial
markets is a positive warning for traders as well as institutions given that banks might exert
pressure on the government less prone to use default option which might show onerous for
the state. My clarification behind these statements is founded on BoP equilibria: a solid
state does not mean leverage nonexistence rather an affordable public debt level may attract
foreign traders to invest in national economy and give a current account surplus which
serves as a watershed between the amount of government bonds kept by domestic banks
and the quantity of them foreigners want to purchase. The national demand of such debt
expands inside the territory because of the rest of the world capital inflows, the quota of
debt owned by foreigners diminishes and default becomes more expensive.
Gennaioli et al. (April 2014) moved on these steps, they offered a well-designed model
whose assumption surrounds the expensive cost of default the government bears,
deteriorating balance sheets of national financial institutions. Beside these fundamentals,
the authors unveiled the key task banks own for public borrowing and private sector debt.
Sturdy financial firms permits leverage raising fueled by dint of national and overseas
borrow sources, along with the unfortunately weakness of fragile banks which drop credit,
GDP, and leap default risk, thereby country’s default corrodes banks’ balance sheets,
sovereign bond markets might become more volatile, thus agents lost a certain degree of
2A regional bank is a financial institution wider than a common bank and smaller than a money center bank
considering its international operations.
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confidence on them (it is worth highlighting the relevant part plays by the prior banking
crisis which places the defaulting government in a tougher condition).
Their model formulates forecasts on domestic economy helpful to integrate my analysis on
banks, government bonds, and the worldwide crisis considering Greece has been integrated
in the analysis whose default happened in 2012, covered by the time frame of the dataset I
have built. Private sector shrinking ex-post default tends to strengthen whether those
institutions keep a large amount of treasury bonds. Furthermore, credit concession cuts off
in states which have received more foreign funds and banks are mostly developed, making
sovereign credit default to fall also thanks to wider capital inflows.
The quantity of sovereign bonds considerably vary across countries. Database used for an
initial comprehension of sovereign bonds comes from Bruegel dataset which is a
mainstreaming of the work reported in Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012). The sample
incorporates twelve nations, the authors collected the holding of such bonds in five
categories due to the various characteristics of national authorities. The rated institutions
are Resident Banks, Central Banks, Other Public Institutions, Other Resident Sectors and
Non-Residents Banks. The following graphs polarize on the percentage sum of government
bonds bought by residential and non-residential banks on the total quantity of treasury
bonds issued by nations from the starting of the economic boom to the year of the
beginning of faint sovereign credit risk issue.
Figure 3.1: Sovereign Bondholdings by GIIPS Banks.
Author’s elaboration. Data source: Bruegel database.
Portugal is not included in the graphic since the missing of the data pre-Great Recession.
Banks kept a meaningful portion of public bonds which did never hike down 40%
throughout the economic boom and until the deterioration of the Global Financial Crisis. I
have focused on the GIIPS since they really blown by the glut of toxic repercussions the
recession supplied them. Surprisingly, Ireland bond purchasing thresholds were always
above Greece debt, the worst country before and after the meltdown.
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To better figure out this fact, I point out that an exploration of domestic and foreign banks
bondholdings of the two nations is helpful according to the feeling that Irish government
could have experimented a surge of internal purchasing of sovereign bonds. In the
literature, a vast range of researchers noted that before the crisis, foreigners shaped a wide
piece of traders who negotiated government bonds linked to a specific country, in other
words, traders of domestic sovereign bond markets hosted principally foreign agents. The
U.S. recession reverted the process, residents were attracted to national bonds, meanwhile
the second ones reduced investments on them. The subsequent plot delineates this right
perception.
(a) Foreign Banks (b) Domestic Banks
Figure 3.2: Ireland and Greece Sovereign Bondholdings
Author’s elaboration. Source: Bruegel database
The overhead graphs highlight my precedent suspect, namely there was a sharp upward
trend of domestic government bonds in Ireland in the wake of the Great Recession
formation.
Andritzky (2012) worked on investor shares for government securities in the G20 advanced
economies and the Eurozone to find out a relationship which ties government bonds and
the corresponding yields. Econometric model revealed a negative correlation amid
government debt securities and their yields. An improvement of foreigners for domestic
debt instruments equals to 10% is associated to a slide of 32 to 43 basis points of interest
rates, the relationship is more consolidates at the Union Area. Volatility raises when
non-residents augment buying of focus sovereign debt too. Another yields-bond holdings
correlation emerges, that is increasing of regulatory treasury bondholdings coincides with a
10% which exacerbates promised returns until 25 basis points. The author cried out that an
increasing share of non-resident investors is associated with lower yields, and domestic
institutional traders delivered lower yields. He confirmed also that the onset of the crisis
enhanced resident bondholding.
My quantitative analysis is devoted to empirically demonstrate the predisposition national
banks leak about willingness to acquire the largest amount of sovereign bonds marketable
upon a financial crash. Bond returns go down as sovereign spread wides, likely once
banking bailout is triggered, possibility that the government default actualization becomes
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real upsurges. My model will catch and predict all ingredients which plug banks and risky
bonds. Data description will be outlined in the oncoming paragraph.
3.2.2 Data and Elaborations Used to Run the Analysis
I have engineered a database which comprises sovereign bondholdings of national banks as
well as macro variables of states included in the sample. The proxy for public bonds is the
percentage of the holding by banks with respect to the total outstanding amount of
sovereign debt in a given quarter. These information have been extrapolated from Bruegel
dataset which collects data for twelve states, i.e. ten European states (Finland, Belgium,
Netherlands, GIIPS, France, and Germany), the UK and the U.S.A., standardized for
cross-country analysis as the nature of authorities differs radically across nations. The
”normalized” entities that buy government bonds are five. To remember them, National
banks, Central banks, Other Financial Institutions, Other Resident sectors, and
Non-Residents banks. I have concentrated on national banks to explain rigorously how
their acquisition of sovereign debt securities translates contemporaneously with
modification of state status where the core driver of change is the attitude of national
banking system to alter purchasing public bond programs after the country lived the rapid
ascent of the misfit. I do not have selected monetary value of holdings because in my
opinion, percentage variations are better to capture the contribution that explanatory
variables provide to the phenomenon we want to analyze since fluctuations are already in
percentage without taking any scale transformation, other than most of the regressors of the
econometric model are expressed in percentage, and relative changes seem to provide a
more immediate perception of how much government bonds financial institutions placed
into balance sheets immediately after the 2008 contagion.
The control variables for public bondholdings at country level recap the situation of the
Eurozone, the U.S. and the UK both ex-ante and ex-post the worldwide crush. Data are
obtained combining different resources from OECD, Insight.com, and International
Banking Statistics (IBS) dataset. Since the Great Recession repercussions affected labor
markets, trading venues and exchange rates (that is goods and services trade), economy
system must be analyzed in all facets, otherwise bias conclusions will take us to omit key
factors behind our study. Labor market status is well-represented by the harmonized
unemployment growth rate in comparison to the previous quarter. The rate is directly not
available from the source, I have computed it performing a straightforward difference
between consecutive unemployment rates. Economic statistics literature suggests
estimation of tendential or conjunctural variations with absolute changes when variables
are expressed in percentage points. The advantage of this measure lies on the uniform
method to calculate increments or reductions of workforce which is comparable efficiently
between several states (recall that labor markets are heterogeneous, they depend strongly
upon regulatory policies and laws adopted inside the nation).
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The economical panorama is expressed through the real GDP growth rate, whereby GDP
calculated at constant prices (OECD uses 2010 as basis) at time t is compared with its
adjacent value at t−1. I have opted for GDP being a popular and far-reaching indicator for
wellness of states, specifically, the real approximation is inflation-adjusted which provides
a mere tendency of output removing effects not connected to BoP, manufacturing, or
service components. Another justification to prefer real connotation rather than nominal
expression is developed by econometrics due to a correlation which might arise between
GDP at current prices and unemployment rate, leading to endogeneity problem and making
the panel data model which will successively be exploited bias and inaccurate. In the
foregoing chapter, the relationship amid inflation and unemployment was reported thanks
to the classical shape of Phillips curve and considering that the time frequency is set at
quarterly basis, we will run analysis in the short-term, with the consequence that the
spurious effect may originate and the model should be substituted.
Private sector is part of the crisis puzzle, therefore credit-to-GDP ratio represents a good
accuracy for treasury bonds holding, the metric includes lending to non-financial sector
that domestic banks, other sectors of economy and non-residents supply to households, for
example. Dividing private credit to GDP allows us to infer how relevant those aids are on
the overall net worth of a country.
Passing to financial panorama, public debt outstanding illustrates the cumulative issuances
of bonds the government made in a specific period of time. This variable is taken into
account because my feeling is that financial institutions purchase many bonds when the
government or Treasury signals to be in trouble either via sovereign default or banking
crisis.
Bond yields reflects sentiments of traders concerning economic-financial events which
rock markets. My prediction lays the background that during the turmoil, the weakest
states upturned interest rates for attracting national and foreign banks to invest in their debt
assets.
Stages of the database design have required conjunction of multiple sources. I have started
the project filtering out Belgium and Finland from the original Bruegel dataset because of
the correspondent data has been estimated annually, instead central banks of the two
nations have not disseminated government debt data every quarter in their own sites as the
researchers have emphasized. We pay attention on quarters for marking ulteriorly down the
rapid effect the subprime meltdown, Lehman Brother’s default, and the banking calamity
had on the general financial atmosphere. The dataset covers final years of the 1990s and it
protracts the treasury bondholdings until 2016 but I have narrowed length of the sample
from January 2002, the borne of the agents overconfidence and not less important the euro
adoption in the Euro Area, to December 2014, few years following the endowment of U.S.
crisis in Europe. Some data for selected states are missing, a recurrent situation when deal
with longitudinal data insofar as there is impossible to observe all countries for a long
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sequence of periods over time. I have tried to go beyond the problem applying a basic data
mining technique which points out to replace missing values of a variable with the average
of observations for the vector, unfortunately outcomes have not been satisfactory given that
they have tended to falsify the real pattern of bondholdings pre-crisis, introducing large
discrepancies compared with onward time information. The software program used to
analyze the data was R which encompasses processing packages cross-sectional time series
analyses and permits to ignore missing values, labeled with NA symbol. They can be
positioned in macro categories according to their pattern. Missing completely at random
(MCAR) does not imply that the distribution is random, missingness is independent on
observations or missing data which means a strong restriction of NA placement. A weaker
imposition claims that missingness is linked to observed estimates or entries of variable,
and the missing method is referred to Missing at random (MAR). I report the expression,
with a rearrangement, that Little and Rubin (2002) expressed for fixing MAR definition
with the aid of maths :
f (M|Y,φ) = f (M|Yobs,φ) ∀ Ymis,φ
M the missing-data indicator matrix, f (·) the conditional distribution of M given Y , φ an
unknown parameter, Ymiss the observed values and Ymiss the NAs. Whether the distribution
of M depends on Ymiss, we are in the Missing Not at random (MNAR) panorama as the
likelihood of data being absent is calculated with the value of attire and this is the most
difficult scenario to manage. To detect in which class my database falls is not easy because
it requires sophisticated analyses.
According to Luengo J, three issues are interlinked in the domain of missing values: (a)
decrease in efficiency, (b) hurdles in analyzing and managing the data (c) differences
between missing and complete data that impact on the result (Waqas et al. 2016).
Management of information absence becomes important, the research of this topic is still
going ahead.
Public bond yields are provided by Investing.com at daily, weekly, and monthly basis. In
order to reach an appraisal quarterly3, I have aggregated monthly estimations using average
whose property permits to minimize the sum of squared deviations (the total of interest
rates for each month is not the best way to reflect quarterly yield, the result would be
distorted and would contain distortions such as interest rate overestimation). Introducing
bond yields, observations in the database reduces from 480 to 472 as Ireland yield time
series is discontinued for certain years. I want to stress that government bonds own a
long-term maturity equals to ten years. These debt instruments are more volatile than one
or three years bonds due to the principal will be brought back in a longer span of time,
traders have to face more risk and yields are mostly shocked by the financial crisis.
3The estimate which I have computed must be interpreted as an approximation of the real intrinsic yield of
bonds because an aggregation method has been employed.
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To demonstrate the statement, we think in terms of par and duration: a bond with a coupon
rate of 4% and a maturity equals to ten years own a longer duration than another bond with
the same rate and a term to maturity of five years simply for a larger falling of price when
interest rate growths. The principal of long-term bond will be repaid with more uncertainty
and in a wider time, postponing reinvestment of lender.
The crisis effect is controlled building a dummy variable in the model, called
FinancialCrisis, which is set to one whether the country was experiencing the negative
results of the U.S. hurricane: GDP slide, unemployment surge, private sector spending
turn, BoP deterioration, and above all banking crisis using the definition of Laeven and
Valencia (2013) who defined it to be an event that meets two conditions: 1) Significant
signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs,
losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations). 2) Significant banking policy
intervention measures in response to significant losses in the banking system.
Sovereign default is controlled albeit there exists a single episode in the database, Greece
in 2012. The reason is that sovereign credit risk might have induced banks to switch their
holdings during the global turmoil, although it should not be deal with the driver of the
Euro Area crisis consistently to the vision explained in the previous chapter. A dummy
variable is inserted into the panel data, listed sovereign default, according to Gennaioli et
al. (July 2014) who used the definition reported by S&P: Sovereign default as the failure to
meet a principal or interest payment on the due date (or within the specified grace period)
contained in the original terms of the debt issue. In particular, each issuer’s debt is
considered in default in any of the following circumstances: 1) For local and foreign
currency bonds, notes and bills, when either scheduled debt service is not paid on the due
date, or an exchange offer of new debt contains terms less favorable than the original
issue; 2) For central bank currency, when notes are converted into new currency of less
than equivalent face value; 3) For bank loans, when either scheduled debt service is not
paid on the due date, or a rescheduling of principal and/or interest is agreed to by creditors
at less favorable terms than the original loan. Such rescheduling agreements covering
short and long term debt are considered defaults even where, for legal or regulatory
reasons, creditors deem forced rollover of principal to be voluntary.
The variables used in the study are summarized in the next table.
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Variable Definition
Sovereign Bondholdings
Percentage of sovereign bonds holden by national banks.
Source: Bruegel dataset.
Sovereign Default
Dummy variable sets to 1 when a sovereign default takes place.
Source: Gennaioli et al. (July 2014).
Financial Crisis
Dummy variable sets to 1 when the country lives the effects of
the Global financial crisis among whom banking crisis.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2013).
Unemployment Growth
Quarterly percentage change of harmonized unemployment
growth indicating the unemployed as people of working age who
are without work, are available for work, and have taken specific
steps to find work. This indicator is measured in numbers of
unemployed people as a percentage of the labor force and it is
seasonally adjusted. Source: OECD (2017), Harmonised
unemployment rate (HUR) (indicator).
Real GDP Growth
Quarterly percentage change of GDP computed taking 2010 as
basis for prices. Source: OECD.Stat
Private Credit-to-GDP ratio
Total credit to the private non-financial sector, capturing total
borrowing from all domestic and foreign sources. Credit is
provided by domestic banks, all other sectors of the economy and
non-residents and covers the core debt (loans, debt securities and
currency deposits). Source: BIS dataset.
Sovereign Bonds
Total outstanding amount of sovereign bonds issued by the
government of a country expressed in billions of euro.
Source: Bruegel dataset.
Bonds Yield
Quarterly government bonds 10 year yield computed aggregating
monthly returns. Source: Investing.com.
Table 3.1: Definition of Variables used in the Analysis.
Author’s elaboration.
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3.2.3 Preliminary Exploratory Analyses
To perform ad hoc econometric models, there needs to implement a prior descriptive and
graphical analyses for understanding relationships which tie sovereign bonds of banks with
variables able to explain such holdings. I have initiated calculating the percentage
quantities of government bonds during the economic boom and the World Financial
Recession. To investigate forcefully intricate dynamics which was formed inside Europe, I
split the information about the Eurozone weighting the stock amount of bonds in GIIPS
separately from the remain Euro Union members. Table below rates average, standard
deviation and median of debt instruments for the periods and countries gathered.
Banks exhibited an increment of bonds in assets after the crisis. Germany had a contraction
caused by more foreign traders who acquired its debt, a reverse approach respect to that
initial we have tackled in the introduction. UK national banks holden a negative value of
sovereign assets over the economic boom. A reason behind the fact might coincide with a
”shy” raising of interest rates which led banks to short sell government bonds and pass to
ulterior securities e.g. CDOs or MBS, very fashion in the epoch. The U.S. monetary
financial institutions (MFIs) holdings raised by 0.1 percentage because non-residential
investors are a large piece of markets. GIIPS were subjected to a considerable upward
thrust, proving ulteriorly how banks promoted their assets buying increasingly public
bonds in trouble or crisis countries. I have inserted median in the table according to less
sensibility for outliers (a sort of robustness property). A notable change happened in the
UK which transmuted MFIs propensity towards sovereign debt. I do not know the right
determinant a priori, maybe it must be searched in yields once again. Bearing that in mind,
let’s take a look at sovereign holding and interest rates time series to formulate a theory.
From figure 3.3, we note generally yields inclination to go up during the recession, then
bonds’ interest rates shrink generally in 2011 but banks do not stop debt purchasing due to
positive trends in many states of the population. Focusing on UK, yields did really not
oscillate before the crisis, there shows my supposition of why financial institutions sold
treasury obligations in that period. The situation reverted with the crisis, nowhere
downward yield trend discouraged MFIs holdings. As a consequence, thoughts which
emerge are a positive correlation among crisis and the bulk of public bonds in banks’
balance sheets; yields increased in the wake of private sector EU crisis (Greek bond interest
rates jumped at 25% in 2011 being the one with the worst performances in the Eurozone,
the state suffered from sovereign default in the successive year), then they dropped
generally in 2012 when the European Central Bank started to make markets resilient
adopting quantitative easing programs; in statistical jargon, there could be a positive
yield-treasury bonds correlation and an interaction between yields and the crisis.
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Banks Public Bondholding
Mean Std Deviation Median
Economic Boom (Q1 2002 - Q3 2007)
GIIPS∗ 17.144 6.645 14.411
France 11.074 3.999 14
Germany 37.743 3.679 38.033
Netherlands∗∗ 8.217 0.240 8.309
UK -1.269 1.192 -1.079
USA 1.653 0.713 1.619
Financial Crisis (Q4 2007 - Q4 2014)
GIIPS 21.2 10.028 20.042
France 13 3.094 14
Germany 25.162 2.477 24.2
Netherlands 9.187 1.970 9.482
UK 6.196 3.467 7.180
USA 1.9 0.445 1.947
∗Data for Portugal are not available.
∗∗Time series begins from Q4 2005.
Table 3.2: Statistics of Sovereign Bondholdings Pre and Post Crisis.
Author’s elaboration.
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Figure 3.3: Public Bondholdings and Yields.
Author’s elaboration.
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Economical interpretation of the advents is attributed to leverage of non-financial segment
in Europe and overseas: The U.S. subprime granting persuaded citizens to borrow without
restrain, immovable property was unique collateral, the deriving collapse saw the Federal
government binded to make debt as cheap as possible growing yields. An equivalent act
was enforced in our continent when private sector did not cut spending and governments of
the weakest states initiated to be very fragile, the immediate solution was raising interest
rates. It must be a temporary action because a bubble might flourish and the danger of a new
financial recession is not an utopia.
Surely, more distressed a state is, more funds it needs, so returns upsurge and banks will
be attract from suitable profits. This is the kernel of heterogeneous public bonds issuances
and procurement. The best tool to fix the concept is a plot of holdings dynamic for every
nation and evaluate also how they respond somewhere along the line. I have developed
two separate graphics enshrined in 3.4 which contain mean of sovereign holdings for states
and quarters respectively, confidence intervals at 99%, and a zig-zag line connects averages
evidencing heterogeneity. The second path enlarges the ascending pattern after Lehman
Brother’s bankruptcy, the increasing trend observed earlier is right. Differences are even
remarkable when inferred on aggregate bond quantities owned by states. Astonishingly,
German is placed at the top no matter a faint decline which has gone since 2002, confirming
such residential banks kept a strong belief on Dutch economy after the Reunification which
was protracted with high unemployment rate and labor markets problems. The U.S.A. and
the U.K. stayed at the bottom as the recession pushed more foreigner MFIs to trade their
securities. GIIPS bonds quota is high, spacing from 15% to 28% about, in whom Spain is
the first of them.
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Figure 3.4: Government Bonds Heterogeneity.
Author’s elaboration.
103
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 3
Toxic events for economic-financial system can have created an irregular pace on which
bonds were negotiated. To unveil outliers, I offer a graphical instrument where the response
variable is smoothed by a nonparametric regression of polynomial functions with local
fitting. The corresponding lines trace the regular way public obligations follow and all
points outside them are recorded as outliers for the reason that Mahalanobis distances are
computed to detect irregularities. The distance is the metric prompted by a norm4
represented in the following equation: ||a||2 = aTΣ−1a, a ∈ Rn, T stands for transpose, Σ
portrays variance-covariance matrix. Let x and y be realizations of a random vector whose
variance matrix is Σ, hence Mahalanobis distance will be equal to:
dM(x,y)2 = ||x− y||2M = (x− y)TΣ−1(x− y). When Σ = In, i.e. identity matrix, the
distance can be attributed to Euclidean norm. Such a metric enjoys interesting properties
such as symmetry and invariance to scale transformations. I illustrate them briefly:
i) dM(x,y) ≥ 0 (non negativity)
ii) dM(x,y) = 0 ↔ x = y
iii) dM(x,y) = dM(y,x) (symmetry)
iv) dM(x,y) ≤ dM(x,z) + dM(y,z) (triangular inequality)
I do not have deleted outliers from samples otherwise, some holding variability introduced
by the crisis behavior would no be longer available and the study would be incomplete.
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Figure 3.5: Sovereign Bondholdings Across Time and Countries.
Author’s elaboration.
4In mathematics, norm is a function that assigns to each vector inside a vectorial space, zero excluded, a
non-negative length.
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3.2.4 Quantitative Analysis of Bank Bondholdings
3.2.4.1 Why Pooled OLS Regression Does Not Work Well for The Phenomenon
We have leaned that our longitudinal data are heterogeneous besides a remarkable intra and
inter state variability. A pooled OLS regression would not work well because of the inability
to capture variance within and outside entities of the sample, along with it suffers from
abnormal observations, while panel model treats strong heterogeneity during time. Let’s
perform a graphical analysis developing plots which compare the independent variable with
some quantitative explicative (not dummies) variables within which regression lines are
incorporated which stem from a simple linear model.
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Figure 3.6: OLS Regression Limits.
Author’s elaboration.
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OLS regression produces a flat line in almost the boxes, it means that the model does not
gather any information of expected value of yi,t . When banks’ public debt is regressed on
yields, r squared is different from zero though it is insufficient to explain variability of
banks bondholdings phenomena. Great interest rates are typically of crisis countries, Greek
yields ”explosion” were caused by default. We have to change strategy and passed to
econometric techniques which explain why the response variable switches consistently
over nations and in the aftermath of December 2007. Panel data models are reasonable
given their capability to extrapolate unobservable characteristics of sample entities at the
individual level. Advantage means that unobservable confounder correlates with
independent variables is ”pulled out” from the error term, wiping out endogeneity. My
database mirrors the definition of panel data (or longitudinal/cross-sectional time series
data), time series of cross sections where the same individuals are monitored over time.
Panel data are suitable because they allow to isolate the effects of specific actions,
treatments, or general policies, to deal with omitted (unobserved or mis-measured)
variables, and to study a number of important economic questions that cannot be faced
using cross-sectional or time-series data.
Estimators are divided in two areas: Consistent for a fixed number of periods T , whereas
the amount of entities N goes to infinity (a usual situation known as ”fixed T asymptotic) ,
or consistent for T which approaches infinity and N is fixed (common in countries
analysis). An additional category includes that T and N are asymptotic. Large periods and
individuals permit various types of cross-sectional dependence. My study falls in the
second class as I have analyzed contained number of states for a quite large time frame.
Having defined what a panel is and the main consistent estimators achieved thanks to
advanced econometrics skills, we focus on statistical peculiarities of such models. Let’s
recall general linear model:
yi,t = XTi,tβ + εi,t , εi,t ∼ IID(0,σ2) ∀ i = 1, ...,N, t = 1, ...,T
β detects the marginal effect of an unitary increment of Xi,t on the expected value of response
variable conditional of regressors for a certain individual i in period t. The multiple linear
regression model seems too weak when more individuals are observed during time. Let’s
elevate its structure formulating a classical hypothesis that betas results unchanged for every
i and t, constant αi,t excluded. The rearranged model can be written in the ensuing manner:
yi,t = αi,t + XTi,tβ + εi,t
The restyling has introduced differences amid observations because average level can
diverge from entity i to entity k captured by constant. If the error term holds the original
distribution (expected value equals to 0 and variance set to σ2 for every i and t) and αi,t is
the unique part which turns out to not be homogeneous and not follow a probability
distribution, what we reach is a fixed effects model, i.e. a linear regression model where
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constant varies across groups, time, or both within the sample. One thinks immediately to
control individual gaps with dummies but that entails to estimate substantial estimators for
each single entity and computational cost is not indifferent.
In statistical terms, one would go to implement a regression as follows:
yi,t =
N
∑
k=1
Dk,iαk + XTi,tβ + εi,t
Dk,i dummy variable set to 1 when one considers entity i. β is known as Least squares
dummy variables (LSDV) estimator. An efficacy and efficient technique addresses the issue
designing a linear model where the dependent phenomenon corresponds to yi,t minus y¯i, the
average of y for individual i at time t, explanatory variables are Xi,t − X¯i and the erratic
component is εi,t − ε¯i. Averages of y, X , and ε are taken from this OLS model:
y¯i = αi + X¯i
Tβ + ε¯i
Hence:
yi,t − y¯i = (Xi,t − X¯i)Tβ + (εi,t − ε¯i), εi,t ∼ IID(0,σ2) (3.1)
Equation 3.1 shows within transformation from which we obtain OLS β estimator called
within or fixed effect estimator. We label it βˆFE whose formula is provided here:
βˆFE =
[
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(Xi,t − X¯i)(Xi,t − X¯i)T
]−1 N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(Xi,t − X¯i)(yi,t − y¯i) (3.2)
βˆFE is not biased if all Xi,t are independent on εi,t . Exogeneity assumption is strict because
we hypothesize that E[εi,t |Xi,s] = 0 ∀ s, t, in other words, Xi,t do not depend on past,
actual, and future values of error term. I stress ulteriorly that αi,t correlates with regressors
(in the general form of longitudinal model, the error term is composed by an
individual-specific component, ”fixed effect”, and an i.i.d. part uncorrelated with time).
Let’s do a step beyond assuming that constants are diverse across individuals which derive
from the same random distribution with expected value set to 0 and variance which is equal
to σa. The model has the following form:
yi,t = β0+XTi,tβ + (αi + εi,t), εi,t ∼ IID(0,σ2ε ), αi ∼ IID(0,σ2a ) (3.3)
β0 represents the constant in 3.4. The error term owns a fixed-time component, αi and a
residual one, εi,t uncorrelated during time, the two parts are independent one from each
other. Strict exogeneity stays, while time-invariant erratic element does not correlate with
explanatory variables. To derive the β estimator for the above model, let’s start to the
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variance-covariance matrix of the error term which is drawn on:
Var(αiIT + εi) = Ω = σ2a IT I
T
T + σ
2
ε IT
IT identity matrix. Using generalized least squared (GLS), there is possible to build fixed
effects estimator which is represented with the formula below:
βˆRE =
[
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(Xi,t − X¯i)(Xi,t − X¯i)T +ψT
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(Xi,t − X¯i)(Xi,t − X¯i)T
]−1
·
[
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(Xi,t − X¯i)(Xi,t − X¯i)T +ψT
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(Xi,t − X¯i)(yi,t − y¯i)T
] (3.4)
ψ =
σ2ε
Tσ2a + σ2ε
Random effects estimator is more efficient than FE due to inter-variability consideration
across individuals. The proof is provided here:
Var(βˆ )FE = σ2ε
[
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(Xi,t − X¯i)(Xi,t − X¯i)T +
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(Xi,t − X¯i)(Xi,t − X¯i)T
]−1
Var(βˆ )RE = σ2ε
[
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(Xi,t − X¯i)(Xi,t − X¯i)T +ψT
N
∑
i=1
T
∑
t=1
(Xi,t − X¯i)(Xi,t − X¯i)T
]−1
If ψ > 0, RE has got low variance than FE when E[εi,t |Xi,t ] = 0.
The dilemma which arises now is: What kind of estimator we should be directed? Hausman
test can be executed to obtain an answer for replying to the question. The test envisages that
under the null hypothesis H0, E[αi|Xi,t ] = 0, well both FE and RE estimators are consistent
but we would like the one obtained by the random effect model being mostly efficient. On
the contrary, H1 states that E[αi|Xi,t ] 6= 0 ∀ s, t and the second estimator is inconsistent
because of its inability to converge to the real β . The quadratic form of the test is therefore:
H = (βˆFE − βˆRE)T [Var(βˆFE) − Var(βˆRE)]−1(βˆFE − βˆRE) ∼ χ2k (3.5)
The drawback of 3.6 is that Var(βˆFE) − Var(βˆRE) could not be invertible in little
samples. Statistical softwares, amongst them R, resolve the problem reducing the
dimension of the matrix and ignoring a pair of coefficients.
Another way could result what is the scope of the examination. If one thinks that
heterogeneity inside a single group is crucial and serial correlation might occur, fixed panel
should be the choice, otherwise random effect is always a good econometric model.
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3.2.4.2 Methodology
Let SovereignBondholdingi,t represent the percentage of public bonds purchased by
national banks located in country i at time t. Let’s suppose that bank decisions pertains to
how much obligations acquire in a certain quarter has sprung in the previous span of time,
so that bondholdings at time t are a function of bank’s balance sheet and of the state of the
economy at time t − 1 [Gennaioli et al., July 2014]. The authors done this assumption
since, to quote them, The use of lagged independent variables is preferable to the use of
independent variables that are contemporaneous to bondholdings for two reasons. First,
bank-level explanatory variables are determined jointly with bondholdings within each
year... Second, the bank does not observe the aggregate final state of the economy at time t
until the end of period t itself. As a result, the forecast of macro variables performed by the
bank or by the market at time t will depend on the state of the economy at time t−1.
The lagged version of regressors cleanse endogeneity issue which I have tested run
longitudinal data model without lagging Xi,t and check covariances of Σ matrix whence
meaningful correlations have sparked. I have then created a fixed effects cross-sectional
times series data model and not a random effects panel regression because of the focus on
the empirical analysis is to be fluctuations of MFI’s treasury debt securities post-crisis
inside a nation, not a bank holdings confront at country level through the entire decade of
the century and onwards. I have deliberately controlled country-level features in the
regression for ending up with implied movements. The ”within” model will be run where
the articulation is elucidated hereunder:
SovereignBondholdingi,t = βi + β1SovereignDe f aulti,t−1 +β2FinancialCrisisi,t−1 +
+ β3HarmonizedUnemploymentGrowthi,t−1 +
+ β4RealGDPGrowthi,t−1 + β5PrivareCreditToGDPi,t−1 +
+ β6OutstandingBondsi,t−1 + β7BondsYieldi,t−1 +
+ β8FinancialCrisisi,t−1 ·CountryFeaturesi,t−1 + εi,t
(3.6)
in whom SovereignDe f aulti,t−1 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if country i is in default
at time t−1, 0 otherwise, FinancialCrisisi,t−1 is a dummy variable equals to 1 whether the
country i at time t − 1 has experimented the Global financial crisis effects,
CountriesFeatures incorporates country-level controls, namely harmonized unemployment
rate change, real GDP growth, private credit-to-GDP ratio, sovereign debt outstanding, and
yields of the state i at t−1. I have added to the fixed effects specification country dummies,
time dummies and country×year dummies. Interactions between the crisis and state
peculiarities has been inserted for the intuition surrounds the roots the ”freezing” crisis has
established in markets and economy. I have used both dataset which supply similar
estimates and to solve heteroschedasticity, I have replaced standard errors with White
robust correction and clustering them at the country level. Violation of unaltered variance
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for observations has been tested exploiting Breusch-Pagan test whose null hypothesis
claims homoschedasticity while the alternative H1 points out a particular form of
heteroschedasticity, that is Var(εi,t) = σ2g(zTi,tα), zi,t are variables which one supposes
they violate homoschedasticity, g(·) a derivable function whose first derivative is
continuous and g(0) = 1.
Coefficient β2 detects the marginal effect which has scrambled financial institutions’
balance sheets considering the improvement of sovereign bonds they have done when the
world has gone to the crisis spiral, along with some exacerbations of contributions nations
have delivered to holding in the panel regression. β1 captures the effect of a sovereign
default which is reversed to all businesses of MFIs. β3, β4, β5 display how the country
contribute to the buying of bonds carried out by banks. Finally, β6 and β7 reflect direct
effect of bonds characteristics and indirect contribution of markets on bank sentiment for
government bonds. One will expect that β2 will be positive given that the preliminary
graphical exploration, even β6 and β7 as higher yields are, more banks are attracted to
purchase public debt. Private indebtedness should positively influence the response
variable for the simple reason that non-financial sector caused the crisis blast, making
financial institutions more incline towards such obligations. Coefficients concerns
conjoined impact of crisis and state control variables must be significant and those relative
to credit ratio and yields should benefit yi,t .
3.2.4.3 Results
Table 3.3 exhibits outcomes delivered by several estimations of the fixed effects panel data
model in 3.6. Columns (1)-(2) evaluate the behavior of public bondholdings where one
takes into consideration country effect via dummies. The former panel is computed with
the dataset where missingness has not been treated, the second one uses the full sample
where absent values has been replaced with appropriate appraisals. Columns (3)-(4) assess
such holdings with time dummies, i.e. panel includes time effect, not the country level. The
fifth and the sixth models incorporate twoways effects, that is to say both country and time
levels are placed into the panel. These models could not be sufficient to explain the study
since the crisis impaired mutual fields e.g. workforce, trading venues, net worth,
households, and enterprises. Columns (7) and (8) make it by means of financial crisis has
been put in relation with every quantitative regressors. Interactions with the turmoil is
crucial as it permits us to control its diffusion for the national economy. Dummies have the
task to supervise fluctuations of treasury debt securities inside states.
Let’s go ahead looking at results listed. The explanatory variables are accompanied by
coefficients and robust standard errors (SEs) in brackets, alongside significance degree at
1%, 5%, and 10%. Longitudinal econometric models (1) and (2) expound a reduction of
treasury bonds acquired when unemployment rate improves which range from -2.6% to -
1%. An economical clarification might be connected to an abrupt falling of employment
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which causes bonds’ yields narrowing, driving banks to be a little reluctant to buy a wide
quantity of public debt. Thinking in statistical terms, there should be a dependence amid
unemployment rate and yields in the model. However, variance-covariance matrix has not
revealed correlation for the two Xs. Good reaction of output does not mitigate or
strengthen MFIs willing to retain more government bonds, the coefficient is never
meaningful even when twoways control is added and dummies for crisis is put in place.
Private financings plays a principal part of the banks rational conduct, showing the feeling
that non-financial indebtedness influences directly financial institutions’ assets simply
because if leverage of small-medium enterprises (SMEs), families and other residential
sectors increases, the government can be obliged to sustain them sending finances but
resources are scarce for it as well, thus sovereign issues can enlarge to tackle all expenses
accompanied by a surge of interest rates, banks are enticed to purchase the securities with a
future profit. The beta passes from 0.042 to -0.023. Sovereign default coefficient is almost
significant, at 5% or 10%, and states a reduction of holding over Greek default episode
(this is the only event of state default in the dataset) equals to 7.1% about. In contrast,
financial crisis shoots up bank exposition on public bonds by 2.4% and 6.6% according to
the models (yi,t is in percentage points, so every increase of one unit of regressors is
translated automatically in a β percentage variation. I have chosen this strategy to achieve
an elasticity of the dependent variable without transform it in logarithm). Yields are
meaningful with a contribution sets to 0.48% and 0.68%. The number of outstanding
government obligation has a mild effect which is quite vanish. Reactions differs when one
controls for time fixed impact rather than country effect.
Longitudinal models in (3) and (4) list that unemployment reinforcement does not agitate
residential MFIs to resist for purchasing treasury obligations as well as GDP enhancement
benefit disappears. Private credit-to-GDP contribution amounts to 0.066% and 0.070%,
meanwhile Greece crush soars and oscillates between -6.464/-6.543% with a significance
at 10%. Even global banking collapse estimator upsurges at 7.5%. Interest rates are no
longer meaningful and issuances effect are still low. Introduction of country and time
dichotomy remarks harmonized unemployment rate to negatively address bondholdings,
GDP restarts its weight on response variable, credit ratio marginality is positive like at the
beginning, the 2008 recession weight is attenuated in reference to commercial and
investment banks intention of government debt, issuances do not contribute as betas are
vanish. The message which models have sent so far concerns the reality that banks
business shifted radically after the world lived such a catastrophe. The private sector sent a
semi-elasticity of 0.07% on average to incentive financial institutions to retain a lager bulk
of government public debt into their portfolios. Performances of manufacturing and service
providing are unable to catch variations in the data. On the other hand, when employment
slips, the signal they enact sounds not good with respect to propensity on bonds with a
fluctuation around -2/-3.9%, although it is substantial when state control is plugged and
interactive terms are omitted. Time must be taken into account due to a diagnostic analysis
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which I have run provides a relevance of time effect into 3.7. The test has been developed
with comparison of a panel regression in whom state control is added and a model where
time has been placed by virtue of factor variables (per quarter). H0 has been rejected, hence
there needs to include country×quarter dichotomous variable.
Yields raise by 1 percentage growths sovereign exposure of 0.340% averagely and loses
relevance whether time dummies are the ones which display the unaltered country features.
Financial crisis marginal outcome equals to 7.513% in (4), the highest of all regressors and
substantiates the strategic choice of banks to buy as public bonds as feasible because bonds
will not be cheap as over the recession, so yields will go down when banking recession
dying out will initiate, albeit this requires a long period of time.
To understand how to calculate the effects of the model in the last column, credit ratio
increase of 1% is associated to (0.066 + 0.676)% = 0.742% of holdings upward.
Sovereign decreases yi,t by 6 percentage points, outstanding bonds beta is close to 0,
interest rates marginality accounts for (4.280 − 3.963)% = 0.317%. If one supposes that
quantitative explanatory variables increment by 1 unit or 1 percent, financial crisis is
weighed for (12.942 − 2.144 + 0.676 + 0.001 − 3.693 + 0.001)% = 7.513%.
The crisis which we are still living has got a repercussion on interest rates and bond issues
contribution of banks holding according to the last two econometric analyses.
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Dependent variable:
SovereignBondholdingt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HarmonizedUnemploymentGrowtht−1 −2.619∗∗∗ −1.048 −2.002∗∗ 0.003
(0.941) (1.479) (0.778) (1.105)
RealGDPGrowtht−1 0.609 0.427 0.572 0.091
(0.468) (0.575) (0.401) (0.404)
PrivateCreditToGDPt−1 0.042∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.008) (0.015) (0.016)
SovereignDefaultt−1 −3.914 −11.305∗∗ −6.543∗ −6.464∗
(3.179) (4.964) (3.701) (3.732)
FinancialCrisist−1 2.425∗∗∗ 6.555∗∗∗ 4.132∗∗∗ 12.942∗∗∗
(0.802) (1.490) (1.059) (2.911)
BondsYieldt−1 0.481∗∗∗ 0.264 0.362∗ 4.280∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.269) (0.192) (0.592)
OutstandingBondst−1 0.0003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0003∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
FinancialCrisist−1 ∗HarmonizedUnemploymentGrowtht−1 −2.144
(1.384)
FinancialCrisist−1 ∗RealGDPGrowtht−1 0.676
(0.755)
FinancialCrisist−1 ∗PrivateCreditToGDPt−1 0.001
(0.011)
FinancialCrisist−1 ∗BondsYieldt−1 −3.963∗∗∗
(0.623)
FinancialCrisist−1 ∗OutstandingBondst−1 0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Other Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies? Yes Yes No No
Quarter Dummies? No No Yes Yes
Country ∗ Quarter Dummies? No No Yes Yes
No Observations 462 462 462 462
R2 0.118 0.205 0.182 0.251
Adjusted R2 0.086 0.093 0.045 0.115
F Statistic 8.475∗∗∗ (df = 7; 445) 14.867∗∗∗ (df = 7; 404) 12.551∗∗∗ (df = 7; 395) 10.900∗∗∗ (df = 12; 390)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.3: Factor Explaining Banks’ Sovereign Bondholding
Author’s elaboration.
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To investigate scrupulously in which manner the 2008 banking freezing swayed the quantity
of government instruments traded into financial markets, I have constructed a separate cross-
sectional time series model where the response variable is the logarithm of sovereign debt
which has been issued from Q1 2002 to Q4 2014 under the full observations database. I
have opted for this transformation as outstanding metric is expressed in euro, therefore to
place the variable without any scales gives us marginal effect, not a semi-elasticity change
and then a percentage movement. A proof is reported here. Let’s consider a multiple linear
model:
yi = XTi β + εi, εi ∼ IID(0,σ2ε )
Marginal outcome of X j is nothing more than the partial derivative of the conditional
expected value of yi on the focus explanatory. In mathematical terms:
∂ E[yi|Xi, j]
∂X j
= β j
Let’s concentrate on the log-lin non linear regression where OLS can again be exploited to
calculate estimators. Hence:
log(yi) = XTi β + εi
Using that, coefficients portraits semi-elasticity due to an unitary increment of a regressors
involves a β × 100% variation of the independent variable. Indeed:
∂ E[yi|Xi, j]
∂Xi, j
· 1
X j
˜˜ ∂ log(E[yi|X j])
∂X j
= β j
I have estimated the following general panel regression:
OustabdingBondsi,t = γi + γ1FinancialCrisist−1 + γ2BondsYield +
+ γ3SovereignBondholdingt−1 + γ4FinancialCrisis∗t−1BondsYieldst−1
+ γ5FinancialCrisis∗t−1SovereignBondholdingt−1 + vi,t
(3.7)
In some specifications, the original amount of public bonds purchased has been substituted
with a difference between sovereign bondholdings and the average pre-crisis called
SovereignNormalBusinessBondholding. This approach is useful to assess the result of
treasury securities differentials respect to in periods of normal business practice, to cite
Engel(2016), herd behavior of financial markets. Finally, I have evaluated how much the
quantity of banks’ government obligations explain the amount traded prior to the Q1 2008.
Table 3.4 recounts coefficients and White SEs with clustering correction to mitigate serial
correlation of errors. Columns (1)-(3) and models (5), (6), and (7) infer that the crisis have
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diminished the inclination of governments to emit debt instruments. In my opinion, this
can be attributed to bail out supplied to banks. Public bonds acquired by national
institutions offer a modest contribution to the outstanding debt equals to 0.018% on
average. When treasury holding is replaced by the correspondent time varying measure, the
semi-elasticity is similar. Potential gains from public debt discourage government to emit
obligations in the past decade afterward the crisis switched direction, nevertheless there
was not sufficient to cancel out the detrimental result which is like -0.05%. The forth
expression has been introduced for the reason that I have wanted to figure out the scenario
when the prosperous period in the U.S. markets flourished. For the purpose, I have
regressed traded securities on 10 year yields and possession of them until the first quarter
of 2008, so that the sample has been restricted approaching 242 data. The explicative
variables are statistically not important (adjusted r squared is negative because unlike the
standard R2, it imposes a penalize term when an additional X is meaningless). The dispatch
is precisely: banks and market reactions vis-a`-vis governments deficit did not scratch their
willingness to release medium and long-run investments in the form of
”government-backed” financial instruments.
Throughout the chapter, I have discussed about banks and their government bonds
scheduled agenda. This must not be confused with thoughts that institutions are exclusively
domestic, there may be branch of foreign financial firms, further they do not effectuate
investment exclusively into national instruments, whilst home bias might spring good
incentives for the government. Asonuma, Bakhache, and Hesse (2015) study on advanced
(AM) and emergent (EM) economies found out that home bias is not always a sorrow given
that borrowing costs drop for states whereby debt is restrained to high, favoring
governments to bear primary balance imbalances but the advantage is counterbalanced by a
pricey bill that states will pay in the future for fiscal consolidation postponement.
I conclude the chapter with some findings regarding CDS-public bonds basis that is defined
as the CDS premium minus the spread pf a fixed-coupon government bond of similar
maturity over a risk-free benchmark [Fontana and Scheicher, 2016]. The researchers
declared that sovereign CDS and treasury assets hold the equivalent risk and return of debt,
that is the basis should be zero. Processing weekly data from January 2007 to December
2012 where sovereign market distress episodes are embedded, they discovered credit risk
worsened frictions5 to enact short selling in sovereign bond markets with the appearance of
positive basis (that might partially answer to a negative value of UK banks bondholding
before the recession), conversely the financial mayhem adversely conditioned highly risky
treasury debt with a negative basis.
Chapter 4 will illustrate theoretical solutions to subdue a banking emergency via
start-of-the-art economic and financial tools.
5All direct and indirect costs for executing orders in capital markets such as fees, commissions, opportunity
cost of searching time, tax implications for transaction.
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Dependent variable:
log(OutstandingBonds)t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FinancialCrisist−1 −0.408∗∗∗ −0.372∗∗∗ −0.569∗∗∗ −0.410∗∗∗ −0.479∗∗∗ −0.487∗∗∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.121) (0.053) (0.098) (0.095)
BondsYieldt−1 −0.147∗∗∗ 0.023 −0.138∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.039) (0.026) (0.028)
SovereignBondholdingt−1 0.018∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SovereignDefaultt−1 −1.074∗∗∗ −0.148 −0.205
(0.095) (0.225) (0.225)
FinancialCrisist−1 ∗BondsYieldt−1 0.092∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.026) (0.026)
FinancialCrisist−1 ∗SovereignBondholdingt−1 −0.001 −0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PreCrisisSovereignBondholdingt−1 −0.003
(0.003)
SovereignTimeVaryingBondholdingt−1 0.028∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
FinancialCrisist−1 ∗SovereignTimeVaryingBondholdingt−1 −0.015∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country ∗ Quarter Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Observations 462 462 462 233 462 462 462
R2 0.173 0.269 0.390 0.008 0.191 0.402 0.404
Adjusted R2 0.058 0.166 0.301 −0.174 0.078 0.315 0.316
F Statistic 31.123∗∗∗ (df = 3; 447) 41.107∗∗∗ (df = 4; 446) 47.340∗∗∗ (df = 6; 444) 1.001 (df = 1; 197) 35.091∗∗∗ (df = 3; 447) 59.721∗∗∗ (df = 5; 445) 50.099∗∗∗ (df = 6; 444)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.4: Factors Explaining Government Bonds Issues
Author’s elaboration.
Chapter 4
How To Overcome The Financial Crisis?
Some Theoretical Proposals.
4.1 Performance-Sensitive Government Bonds
4.1.1 Structure and Working
The final part of the thesis will be devoted to incentive the discussion for notional
instruments which may be applicable in the foreseeable future to prevent or face recessions
taking the form of banking crisis. What we have leaned insofar can be enshrined in few
lines: government bonds are debt securities that traders negotiate a lot to make money as
safe as possible. Unfortunately, even treasury debt is not exempt from risk and this fact was
amplify after the world was overturned by the crisis alimented with Lehman Brother’s
default. Banks bought very much public bonds in that period to attain huge profits being
the premium yields were swollen in order to price such bonds at minimum historical levels.
Private indebtedness also favored the banks’ operation.
Policymakers adopted motley fiscal actions which would have helped to mitigate and
remedy the destructive tokens the meltdown left. The measures carried out the reverse
rather that they were hoping. We will move on this direction to explore a distinctive
innovative debt instrument that Bank et al. (2011) declared to be useful for public debt
handling.
There are a plenty of studies which highlight aversion of debt to not go down after a crisis
or legislative elections. Governments stock deficits with additional debt but they do not try
to reduce expenditures and shortfalls move up automatically. Let’s give the attention on
policymakers. A possible reason about why debt-to-GDP ratio hesitates to decline be that
elections years impose considerable costs for the state, e.g. ballot initiatives, propaganda,
manifestos. Attaching to it, parties or interest groups express the unwillingness to sustain
budget consolidations1, we can refer to them as public goods because there is no rivalry
1In accounting literature, budget consolidation means the operation of combining assets, equity, liabilities
and operating accounts of a parent firm and its subsidiaries into a comprehensive financial statement as the
reporting entity was unique.
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among politicians to enact consolidation, so to consume it, alternatively budget institutions
are able to discipline poor budget process instantiating auditing, transparency, or any other
devices to fulfill some criteria as Europe makes being subjected to Maastricht Treatment
and relative to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Difficulties to restrain government
spending is moreover linked to the lack of stimuluses that policymakers flaunt, otherwise
re-election flame might increasingly turn off. AM countries are very subjected to all
matters I have described because they issue debt assets in coalition, which implies the
poorest nations borrow without any limits and leverage shrinks at all. The thing which is
worser regarding a sort of ”isomorphism” that more developed economies engage seeing
the opportunity cost of debt ratio restriction crosses high degrees. To fix the gist in mind,
let us turn back to notorious GIIPS analyzed profusely in chapters 2 and 3. When Greece
asked help to the Union Area in 2010, the Greek government received collaterals, loans,
and subsidies to fight back and recover the access to Eurozone sovereign bond markets.
Despite the fact that the reliefs were suitable for such a country, default was not remedied
due to sending economic-financial tools to a vulnerable nations produces an incredible
consolidation effort which wears out in political instability and sovereign credit risk
explosion. The aforementioned authors attempted the reply to this complex environment
since as long as a bunch of inducements will not be handed, indebtedness will not fall and
short-term countermeasures by politicians to curb it will be ineffective. I am emphasizing
public debt since the instrument that I will present soon is anchored to policymakers
actions, albeit the Euro Area crash was not a sovereign debt crisis. The researchers
maintained that a debt restructuring will push economy trough a growing and welfare
long-run path. What they proposed are innovative debt securities called
Performance-Sensitive Government Bonds (PSGB). Coupons of obligations are related to
efforts a country done to enhance its leverage status. Bank and the other academics claimed
that such bonds will give governments a strong incentive to i) to timely restructure the
economy, and ii) to limit additional debt, in order to not only avoid higher coupon
payments for total outstanding debt but also to reduce financing costs.
Performance-sensitive debt (PSD) was also studied by Adam and Streitz (2013) to verify
whether a relationship between bank lending and PSD exist or not. They run a multinomial
logistic regression as follows:
PSDi,t = α+ αInd + αt + αRat + βRel(M)i,t + γXi,t + εi,t
where PSDi,t is a variable taking values in the range 0,1,2, specifically, 0 in case of straight
bond, 1 when the loan contract contains a performance pricing provision on an accounting
measure, the remain value if lending incorporates a performance pricing provision on the
borrower’s credit rating, Rel(M) one of the measures the authors have computed for the
loan investor-debtor relation, αRat an indicator for the goal of loan (such as takeover), X
loan and borrower features e.g. deal maturity, market-to-book asset ratio. The authors
discovered that PSD is evoked when hold- up if feasible. Hold-up problem, or commitment
118
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 4
problem, flourishes when there are some impediments in writing complete contracts. The
obstacle takes place when two factors are present. According to Rogerson (1992), First,
parties to a future transaction must make non-contractible specific investments prior to the
transaction in order to prepare for it. Second, the exact form of the optimal transaction...
cannot be specified with certainty ex-ante. The recourse to PSD becomes more moderate in
syndicated relationship loans2 due to a low occurrence of commitment issue. They
unmasked finally that PSD shortens hold-up whereby covenants.3
Coming back to PSGB, these public bonds are driven by choices politicians make affecting
economic policy and their coupon rates instantaneously. The three mainstays elevated by
PSGB limit governments to borrow at untenable tiers, encourage politicians to generate
reputation permanent with whom depresses financing costs, and restructure economy
framework. All the pillars galvanize state to effectuate budget consolidation when due in
order to plummet deficit. The coupons of those obligations move symmetrically to
underlying variable e.g. debt ratio or market price information whose rate is not fixed
though the key point are good economy policies which push coupon rates up and narrow
interest payments. Instead, they fluctuate besides schedule, one of the main characteristics
of bonds met in Chapter 1. The program is agreed before such floating policy-oriented
bonds will be traded in international markets. PSGB limits options with a burden attaches
to investors and the set of decisions contracts considerably (options constitute a premium
for agents, making interest rates to downturn). On the other hand, to not be long on bonds
penalize bad policy and award future traders when policy sphere works well could be thinly
interpreted by markets merely for seeing primary unbalance does not lessen which
strengthens credit risk premiums considering policymakers have done nothing to prevent
debt-to-GDP mitigation. The consequence are that obligations underlying PSD are the first
best also for politicians because if they promise to reduce shortfalls and promote budget
consolidation issuing this kind of bonds, traders will be time after time attracted by the new
investment chance which comports a positive externality for society at large and a feasible
future reelection.
2Syndicated loan is identified as a grant supplied by a group of creditors, named syndicate, who work
together in order to give a substantial proportion of money to a debtor. The loan can contain a pre-established
quantity of funds, a credit line, or both. The type of lending results suitable when it is difficult for a single
lender to afford the incurrence or an expertise trader is necessary for a specific security class.
3The generally accepted use of the term Covenant in finance refers to terms of financial contracts such as
a written document that claims constraints at which the debtor is able to lend ulteriorly. Investors utilize
covenants to protect themselves from borrower’s default who could not comply with obligations and the
recourse to financial actions looks deleterious.
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4.1.2 Opportunity Cost for Postponing Economic Growth
The cost of impeding the short-term resumption is not trivial as PSGB might trigger a
cycling effect due to governments aversion converges to postponing continuously the
enhancements discussed in the first paragraph. The target of politicians resonate elections,
no matter that undermines community in a big extent. To demonstrate how harmful
policymakers’ actions are dangerous, let’s start with Binomial Approach. Suppose that
politicians of a given country have got the decision for investing in infrastructure,
education, public services with the hope to achieve an output upturn in the near future.
Such decision-making process is equivalent to the exercise of a call option. The
government can wait for future prospects before to ”kill” the option. If public expenditures
program possesses sunk costs, investing now rather than waiting entails major opportunity
costs. First of all, I will introduce Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) approach and its main
limitations when uncertainty and irreversibility envelops the project. Let C0 be the actual
cost of the output growth, say, 10 billions of dollars. After one year, the investment can
assume one of the subsequent states of nature: V+1 = 16, V
−
1 = 6. Let’s impose that the
pattern of the investment coincides with a binomial process in which: V+1 = V0(1+u) and
V−1 = V0(1− d). The precedent states happen with probability q and 1− q that we
suppose be equal to 0.5. The net present value (NPV) of this project must be calculated
taking into consideration the opportunity cost. Let suppose that a security A is negotiated in
the market which has the same risks of the project where A+1 = 1/2 ·V+1 = 8 and
A−1 = 1/2 ·V−1 = 3. The current price of the instrument is set to 2 billion of dollars. The
risk-free interest rate is set to r f = 0.5% whose proxy are 1 year government bonds yield.
Expected return of the project is estimated as follows:
k =
E0[A1]
A0
−1 = 0.5 · (8 − 3)
2
−1 = 0.25 (25%)
The value of the GDP investment will be equal to:
V0 =
qV+1 + (1−q)V−1
1+ k
=
0.5 · (16 + 6)
1 + 0.25
= 8.8 (4.1)
Therefore: NPV = V0 − C0 = −1.2.
u and d values are derived in this way: u = V
+
1
V0
= 1610 = 1.6 and d =
V−1
V0
= 610 = 0.6 As
the NPV is negative, the project should not be considered.
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of GDP Investment in Discrete Time.
Author’s elaboration.
Let’s switch our mentality and enter into Contingent Claim Approach in order to have a
little bit of flexibility. Let Z be the value of the investment project which correlates with V
or S. To get the best optimal investment choice, we design an hedging strategy developing
a replicating portfolio. We long on S buying a specific quantity N and borrow a bulk of B at
r f to repay it. The value of the portfolio at time 0 will be: P0 = NS0 − B, while at t = 1:
P+1 = NS
+
1 + (1 + r f )B i f S1 = S
+
1 with probability q
P−1 = NS
−
1 + (1 − r f )B i f S1 = S−1 with probability 1−q
If one hypothesizes that P replicates the value of Z, at t1 one obtains:
F+1 = NS
+
1 − (1 + r f )B
F−1 = NS
−
1 − (1 + r f )B
Supposing that no-arbitrage assumption is not violated, one puts these latter equations into
a system to have values for N and B:
N =
F+1 + F
−
1
S+1 − S−1
B =
NS−1 − F−1
1 + r f
Then:
F0 =
pF+1 + (1− p)F−1
1 + r f
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p risk-neutral probability defines as: p =
(1 + r f )S0 − S−1
S+1 − S−1
. When there is possible
to wait before undertaking immediately the investment, contingent-claim approach modify
probabilities as the discount rate is affected by contingencies.So:
F+1 = (V
+
1 − I1)+= (16 − 11.005)+ = 4.995, F−1 = (V−1 − I1)+= (6 − 11.005)+ = 0
Politicians do not take action in the aftermath of they recognize the chance. The present
value of option will be:
F0 =
0.405 ·4.995 −0
1.005
≈ 2.013
The cost of postponing is set to: F0 −NPV = 2.013 − (−1.2) = 3.213 Using DCF,
F0 = 1.998, and opportunity cost: 1.998 − (−1.2) = 3.198. The hedging strategy
instead: N = 4.995 − 08 − 3 = 0.999, B = =
0.999 ·3 − 0
1.005
= ≈ 2.982,
F0 = 4.995 − 2.982 = 2.013. The government will not deal with DCF because the
option to invest can be purchased at a lower price under replicating portfolio. The
postponing cost is always relevant and burdens to public bond markets as a whole.
Let’s do further steps and pass to continuous time. We denote γ the expected return of the
GDP growth project V , ξ the payment of the investment, so that γ = ξ + θ , when θ
specifies an improvement of the capital invested. The relative change of Vt will assume the
structure:
Vt − Vt−1
Vt
= θ∆t = (γ − ξ )∆t. Supposing that the project is risky, its Data
Generator Process (DGP) is a Random Walk. In Time Series literature, one refers generally
to Random Walk as non-stationary stochastic process4 where the erratic term is a White
Noise (WN) and the process has this form:
Yt = Yt−1 + εt , εt ∼ WN(0,σ2ε )
Therefore:
∆Vt
Vt
= (γ − ξ )∆t + σ∆ηt , E[ηt ] = 0. The null expected value has the spin
that the deterministic component of ∆V/V is its trend, namely the lung-run movement the
process exhibits over time. If ηt matches a Standard Brownian Motion: ηt = εt
√
∆t, εt ∼
N(0,1). A Wiener process, or Standard Brownian Motion, is a continuous stochastic process
that associates ∀ r ∈ [0,1] a scalar or real random variable W (r) satisfying the conditions as
follow: i)W (0) = 0; ii)∀ 0≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tk ≤ 1, W (t2) − W (t1), ..., W (tk) − W (tk−1)
are independent normal variables with the shape: W (t) − W (s) ∼ N(0, t − s); iii)W (s) is
continuous in s. When one envisages little time intervals, differential form of Vt is written
in this manner: dVt = (γ − ξ )Vtdt + σVtdηt , V0 = c. At time t = 0, the process value is
a constant. Such a particular form of the investment in small intervals is called Geometric
Brownian Motion (GBM) in order Vt does be positive. GBM has an actual expected value
equals to E[
∫ ∞
0 Vte
−rtdt] = V0/(r − (γ − ξ )).
4A family of random variables indexed by time.
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Reusing the values of the precedent example, V0 = 10, (γ − xi) = u = 1.6 when
there is an increase of GDP at t1, (γ − xi) = d = 0.6 in case of the adverse event,
and taking r = 2.4, one obtains: E[V+1 ] = V0/(r − u) = 10/(2.4 − 1.6) = 12.5,
E[V−1 ] = V0/(r − d) = 10/(2.4 − 0.6) ' 5.56. An increment of one percentage point
of the capital put in the project, i.e. the expected rate of GDP raise, is associated to a cost of
124.820% of GDP surge, a huge postponing expenses for the state. PSGBs have to be enter
into financial markets because they may be the key for politicians to upgrade the situation
of community, thing that austerity does not make as cut spending mirrors the reelection
probability alteration and boost primary unbalance delays even more consolidation and all
plans for reviving the country.
4.1.3 Pricing
Computing the opportunity cost to not take any actions for economy improvement, we have
recognized the huge issue that a nation would find itself to defeat in the future induced by
policymakers’ refusal to opt for PSGB. Nevertheless, we have understand the incredible
importance the bonds attached to policy performances have to the overall society. Given
the fact that restructuring probability will be increase under those bonds, the cost of output
project will be narrow and traders will ask lower premiums. That is the great benefit of
PSGB. I will bring the model the authors of the paper made up for pricing the debt assets
with some rearrangements. Let DebtGDP be the debt-to-GDP ratio with a GBM pattern:
dDebtGDPt = µDebtGDPdt + σDebtGDPdWt
Wt is a standard Brownian motion, µ and σ the drift and volatility coefficients. I highlight
that dDebtGDPt/dt owns a normal distribution because dDebtGDPt is log-normally
distributed (which safeguards non-negativity). There is a default threshold d f t set to 150%
of GDP when sovereign risk must be disclosed. PSGB have been thought as public bonds
with a term to maturity sets to 30 years, they have got a coupon equivalent p and a variable
part given by DebtGDP times its marginal cash flow. GBM is not a Martingale process
under the real probability measure P. We would want DebtGDPt holds Martingale
assumption as this stochastic process has an expected value equals to 0∀t ∈ [0,T ] (a sort of
fair play property) and its expected value at time t conditional on past information at time s
is equal to the value at t = s. I have concentrated on the properties on Martingale at
continuous time. A definition rigorous is reported here: A stochastic process {Mt}t≥0 is a
Martingale with respect to the filtration {Ft}t≥0 when:
a) every Mt is measurable with regard toFt ;
b) every Mt is integrable;
c) E[Mt |Fs] = Ms
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A simple rule to state if a continuous process is a Martingale or not, after having applied
Itoˆ Lemma, concerns the presence of a dt part or not. When it is included, there is no
Martingality. DebtGDP is not a Martingale because it contains the drift part. To transform
it in a ”fair play” process, one shall applicate Girsanov Theorem which allows to switch
probability measure and to achieve a risk-neutral likelihood under which compute further
derivatives whose underlying is a PSGB. I will show the reader essential stages to arrive
at the desirable neutral form of the focus process. We have to choose a measure which
eliminates the dt component from DebtGDPt differential form. To do that, the theorem
makes available a Brownian motion Wˆt = Wt +
∫ t
0 ψzdz under the future neutral-probability
Q. Applying Girsanov to our model:
(P) dDebtGDPt = µDebtGDPtdt + σDebtGDPtdWt =
(Q) dDebtGDPt = µDebtGDPtdt + σDebtGDPdtWt =
(Q) = µDebtGDPdt +σDebtGDP(dWˆt − ψtdt) =
(Q) = DebtGDPtdt(µ − σψt) + σDebtGDPtdWˆt
To eliminate the drift coefficient, one select ψt = µ/σ which is a constant and Nokivov
condition that Girsanov Theorem must respect is satisfied a priori. The variable ψ outlines
the market price of cash flow risk. A closed form solution of derivatives connected to the
government-policy bonds is accomplished by Itoˆ Lemma. The theorem states that an Itoˆ
process Yt with dynamics: dYt = Ktdt + HtdSt , Y0 = y0, if one considers a function
f : R+ × R → R where f ∈ C1,2 with respect to time and Yt , i.e. f (t,Yt), then:
d f (t,Yt) =
∂ f (t,Yt)
∂ t
dt +
∂ f (t,Yt)
∂Yt
dYt +
1
2
∂ f (t,Yt)
∂Y 2t
dY 2t +
1
6
∂ f (t,Yt)
∂Y 3t
dY 3t + ...
It is worth noting that d2t = 0, dYt · dt = 0, dY 2t = H2t dt. We can stop at the second
power given that every dYt elevated to an exponent greater than 2 would be accompanied
by d2t . In our context, let G indicate a call option C to invest in PSGB where the mention
stochastic process is DebtGDPt . We have to invest in the bonds underlying when the
threshold DebtGDPOPT IMAL is reached since it means the optimal investment timing.
Taking into account that trading costs to purchase a call derivative contract is K, the
problem is represented in this way:
Ct(DebtGDP) = maxT E[(DebtGDPT − K)e−γT ]
γ expected return of a portfolio which includes the call option. To maximize such expected
value, we need Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP). In the time between 0 and
T OPT IMAL, a trader will not receive any cash amount as he or she is not investing in PSGB,
whereas when the threshold is crossed, the entity will obtain some cash flows because the
option has been exercised (i.e. ”kill” it). In the next page, I will synthesize the timing with
the support of a graph.
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Figure 4.2: Optimal PSGB Investment Decision
Author’s elaboration.
The value of a call option does not growth linear with the underlying. In the no investment
region, that is to say DebtGDP ≤ DebtGDPOPT IMAL, under Bellman Equation:
Ct(DebtGDPt) =
E[C(DebtGDPt + dDebtGDPt)]
1 + γdt
γCt(DebtGDP)dt = E[d(Ct(DebtGDPt))]
The last expression states that keeping option when it is cashed must be equivalent to the
gain on it. Another implication of the Bellman formula is an imperative to hold the call
option up to the optimal time for triggering the investment. Assuming that θ > 0, one
obtains by Itoˆ Lemma:
dCt(DebtGDPt) =
∂Ct(DebtGDPt)
∂ t
dt +
∂Ct(DebtGDPt)
∂Ct
dCt +
1
2
∂Ct(DebtGDPt)
∂C2t
dC2t =
=
(
Ct + µDebtGDPtC
′
t +
1
2
σ2DebtGDP2t C
′′
t
)
dt + σC
′
tdWt =
=
(
Ct + (µ − σψ)DebtGDPtC′t +
1
2
σ2DebtGDP2t C
′′
t
)
dt + σC
′
tdWˆt
(4.2)
We heave to change the probability measure from real to risk-neutral to compute the price
of the derivative instrument. Neutral measure expresses the neutrality of agents who do not
ask a premium offsets more risk they bear when uncertainty goes up, well PSGB improves
with a risk-free rate on average under Q.
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The expected value of the call derivative under such a measure will be:
E[dCt + (p + mDebtGDPt)dt] = r fCtdt (4.3)
Substituting Itoˆ decomposition in 4.2 inside the above formula and denote µQ = µ +
− σψ , it follows that:
1
2
σ2DebtGDP2C
′′
t + µ
QDebtGDPC
′
t + mDebtGDPt + p − r fCt = 0 (4.4)
Expression 4.4 is a stochastic ordinary differential equation where call option at time t is
zero if one considers perpetual public bonds. The guess solution form has the configuration
C(DebtGDP) = ADebtGDPβ . Putting this ideal condition into the overlying formula:
1
2
σ2Aβ (β −1)DebtGDP2DebtGDPβ−2 + µQAβDebtGDPDebtGDPβ−1 + mDebtGDPt +
+ p − r f ADebtGDPβ = 0 ↔ S(β ) := 12σ
2β (β −1) + µQβ + p − r f = 0
(4.5)
The final reduced form of 4.5 is a quadratic equation whose solutions are β1 and β2 which
take opposite sign (e.g. β1 > 0 and β2 < 0) having the following frame:
β1,2 =
1
2
− µ
Q
σ2
±
√(
1
2
− µ
Q
σ2
+
2r f
σ2
)
The plot 4.3 delineates the acceptable region of the roots of 4.5:
Figure 4.3: Feasible Region For Stochastic Ordinary Differential Equation Solutions
Author’s elaboration.
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The form of C(β ) should consequently be: Ct(β ) = A1DebtGDPβ1 + A2DebtGDPβ2 . We
add two boundary conditions, that is:
i)C(0) =
p
r f
;
ii)C(d f t) = V.
The first constraint is imposed when the debt ratio converges to 0, the second one claims in
case of debt goes beyond levels endurable, PSGB must be set to the rescue value V . The
solution for the stochastic differential equations is:
C(DebtGDP) =
p
r f
+
mDebtGDP
r f − µQ + A1DebtGDP
β1 + A2DebtGDPβ2 (4.6)
We eradicate A2 from the last expression because if DebtGDP goes to 0, DebtGDPβ2 → ∞
in order to have a bounded price of bonds. Putting into system the constraints where C is
replaced by its term in 4.6. The price for a PSGB will assume the shape:
C(DebtGDP) =
p
r f
+
mDebtGDP
r f − µQ +
(
V − p
r f
− mDebtGDP
r f − µQ
)(
DebtGDP
d f t
)β1
(4.7)
In case of fixed-rate debt security, i.e. when additional cash flows are null, PSGB will
become (coupons are q):
C(DebtGDP)FIXED =
q
r f
+
(
V − q
r f
)(
DebtGDP
d f t
)β1
(4.8)
4.1.4 Implications
To understand the evolution of bonds dependent on economy policy, Figure 4.4 displays it
with three different plots: in (a) debt-to-GDP and drift coefficient are the drivers, in (b) and
(c) PSGB in normal and straight debt conditions are influenced separately from µ , which
varies taking the values -2% (thick line), 0% (dashed line), 2% (dotted line). The authors
imposed the risk free rate at 3%, the volatility at 2%, the added cash flow payment m at 2,
fixed coupon equals to 3 for both kind of debt. Looking at the graph b), we note that the
value of PSD is sensible to debt-to-GDP for the overall fluctuation of drift parameter. The
same is not true for fixed-coupon debt security which presents a bit variation when µ is
diverse from the negative value of the range imposed. The considerations cannot hold
whether the drift moves during time span. Constant drift may be a too strong hypothesis
since it would mirror a flat trend over the investment horizon. The academics concentrated
on two scenarios completely different: i) a whole drift coefficient, ii) µ of PSGB is lower
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than the drift of straight debt. The former context is underpinned in the event that fixed
bonds are the only one issued and the government thinks to emit PSD, while the second
one has already included PSGB. Tables 4.1a and 4.1b illustrates results of the
landscapes.From the first table successive we delineate an inverse relationship for the
percentage of debt and the price of PSGB. Selecting µ = 2%, when debt raises from 60%
to 100% of GDP, the relative variation of C(DebtGDP) equals to −16.766% which is also
due to an increment of coupon rate achieves the top when the ratio approaches the default
limit, d f t = 150% (coupons rates regards the first period after they has been issued).
Nominal rates of policymakers-sensitive bonds are always lower than perpetual coupons
offered by straight obligations, indeed ∆ detects the basis which is the difference among the
rates and it could be elucidated for the simple reason that good economy policy narrows
interest rates required as debt and sovereign risk fall down. In contrast, if consolidation or
any adjustments boost economy are postponed, the cost will be so high that politicians
shall comply with restructuring to halt coupons and drift parameter upsurge.
The other panorama contains different trends for the closed-form of assets. Drift of PSGB
is -1%, the other one 2%. The researchers chosen parameters with opposite sign to clarify
more explicitly the reaction of financial markets when bonds attached to policy are just
traded. Basis is remarkable at high levels of debt (it overtakes 100 basis points close to
default), whereas price declines again when the restructure commitment is violated.
Coupon payments contact during time because of the negative value did for µPSGB. The
common feature of the analysis emerges benefits that such PSD instruments offer in
short/long-run according to low coupon disbursement especially when budget
consolidation, policy strengthens are undertaken for sustaining and enticing people to
invest in domestic economy.
The collateral effects might concern lack of sufficient secondary markets where negotiates
these new public bonds, albeit nominal amounts nourishing should preserve the threat,
speculation or arbitrage expertises practice altering the underlying of call option, although
predetermined schedule deadens the problem, or the elapsed time between the economic
shock and corrective intervention, known as inside lag, inside recognition, or decision lag
but this issue seems to be neutralized by coupons escalation (it is worth highlighting the
presence of an outside lag which is the time between fiscal or policy measure activation
and the effect on economy).
The section right after will be centred to Game Theory relevance in order to counteract
speculators who upturn the credit risk when they trade in sovereign Eurobond markets.
128
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 4
Figure 4.4: PSGB and Straight Bonds Value Variation
Source: Bank et al. (2011)
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(a) Unique Drift
(b) Diverse Drift Coefficients
Table 4.1: Performances of Debt in the two Scenarios
Source: Bank et al. (2011)
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4.2 Game Theory and The Tax To Eliminate Speculation
in Sovereign Bond Markets
4.2.1 Model Setup
We pass from SDP to Game Theory to verify if Economic doctrine will foster states which
are on the verge of collapse after the banks’ drama began. I want to suggest a work
painstaking that Carfı` and Musolino (2012) operated to revert public bond markets to stable
criteria having been left with volatility growing strongly and a lot of liquidity into them,
precluding yields do not react exaggeratedly to an eventual country’s default realization
with a soaring crazy by the use of a tax which lets the game be in the equilibrium condition
for running a gradual economic recovery. The model is articulated in three periods named
time 0, time 1/2 and time 1 which I abbreviate them hereafter t0, t1/2, and t2 where the
players are a broad speculative bank fills the role of speculator, a nation which satisfies the
definition of ”crisis country” that I have delineated in Chapter 2, and the European Central
Bank. There are no impediments for sovereign Euro Area markets for the speculator, I can
hazard the hypothesis of perfect competitive markets does not hold for the possibility to do
speculation and/or arbitrage which it appears to be within trading venues. At the present
time, i.e. t0, the bank is standing at a crossroads: to make short selling in the light of
predict downward future price changes, or to not go into public debt markets. At t1/2, the
EU Central Bank has the capability to understate yields growth acting with quantitative
easing5 probably, the Country would attain funds for the restoration. At t = 1, if the
speculator has short sell government bonds, it is binding to purchase and return them to the
original tenant.
Game theory is helpful for understanding the desired ideal situation of markets since
Myerson (1997) defined it as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation
between intelligent rational decision-makers. Game theory provides general mathematical
techniques for analyzing situations in which two or more individuals make decisions that
will influence one another’s welfare. The theory is eligible when symmetric information
and perfect competition assumption are not truthful. The fundamentals are the identity of
independent actors, their preferences and knowledge, decisions they make observing the
acts of other players, and how each decision impinge on final outcome of the game.
Discounted factor has been dropped because it is very low vis-a`-vis yields on the
government bonds, so the actualization or capitalization is negligible (if discount factor
would be greater than bond’s return, NPV of a project consisting to invest in such a bond
should be negative and the investment would not be pursued). I have changed some
symbols of variables from the original work. Let Q be the quantity of public bonds issued
5The program of the Central Bank dwindles interest rates because demand and prices of bonds move up.
The actuation is financed by printing new money placed into system. The dangerousness to adopt an expansive
monetary policy like this for a long time lies in the fact that inflation might bring up enormously which ends
up with the borne of Liquidity trap.
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by crisis state, x bank’s strategy which measures the percentage of debt bought at t0, well
s ∈ [0,1]. We have to include 0 recalling that the speculator could decide to not take any
purchasing actions at the present time. When t = 1/2, the Central Bank decides how
many fraction of Q securities pick up indicated with e ∈ [0,1]. The region of the game
strategy is portrayed as follows:
Figure 4.5: The Range of Strategy of The Game.
Source: Author’s re-elaboration from Carfı` and Musino (2012)
I will explain the game where the ”speculation killer” tax is absent, then I will go beyond
relaxing the assumption and put it into framework.
4.2.2 Equilibria Without Anti-Speculation Tax
The gain the speculator will take as to the trading conducted at t0 will become:
G(e,s)Speculator = sQ(Yield1(e,s) − Yield0), the fraction of bonds for which the bank
has been long times the differential between the rise expectation of yields from t = 0 to
t = T = 1. The actual nominal interest rate is exogenous and equivalent to r. At t1, it will
deal with marginality of operations that the speculator and the European Central Bank have
employed (pegged as u and v): Yield1(e,s) = r + u · s − v · e. The marginal outcome of
the Central Bank is negative because of a jump of demand decreases potential profits, short
selling poses the inverse spin (a surfeit of instruments leads markets to hike coupon rates).
Placing the expression of yields into the speculator’s profit function, it follows that:
G(e,s)Speculator = sQ(r + u · s − v · e − r) = sQ(u · s − v · e) (4.9)
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The Mario Draghi’s institution will meet earnings at t = 1/2 led by the current nominal
interest rate plus the weight of the speculator decision on trading venues.
Using maths: Yields1/2(e,s) = r + u ·s). The return function will be produced multiplying
yields for the amount of government debt hold by the central bank:
G(e,s)Central Bank = eQYields1/2 = eQ( r + u · s) (4.10)
The stumped country will have more favorable condition when nominal rates climb down
being the issuer of securities (it shall pay a stream of lower coupon rates). The payoff
function will be calculated from the product among issuances and the difference yields own
at time 0 and upon the residual player have their moves. As such:
G(e,s)Distressed Country = Q(Yield0 − Yield1(e,s)) = Q(r −r − s·u + e·v) = Q(e·v − s ·u)
(4.11)
Interest rates at the final stage will be lower or greater than their values at t0 upon the
dominance of one game plan on the other one. The authors represent the profit function
of the overall game with a vector where the bits are the mutual functions 4.9, 4.10, 4.11.
The game is nonlinear because its payoff function does not satisfy linearity. A definition of
linear game is presented by Broom and Rychta´rˇ (2016). A matrix game Ω is linear on the
left if it is linear in the strategy on the focal player p, i.e.:
Ω
[
∑
i
αi pi;Π
]
= ∑
i
αiΩ[pi;Π]
Π a population, pi a strategy of the focus player belong to the vector p = (p1, p2, ..., pm),
αi nonnegative constants whose sum amounts to one. A game is linear on the right if it is
linear in the strategy of the population:
Ω
[
p;∑
i
αiδqi
]
= ∑
i
αiΩ[p;δqi]
δqi is used to represent a population where the probability of a randomly selected player
being a q-player is 1. I stress that a linear matrix game can be written as Ω[p;qT ] = pAqT ,
A the payoff matrix equals to (ai, j)i, j = 1,...,n, with payoffs: ∑ j p j(AqT ) j or ∑ j(pA) jq j in
case of linearity for the overall population.
In our game, these conditions are not valid. Thus, to find out the critical space of the game
without anti-speculation tax, one needs to analyze the critical points of the region reported in
Figure 4.5. The critical zone is detected putting the determinant of Jacobian matrix equals
to 0 as we are treating potential profit function with two variables, e and s. The partial
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derivatives of the bank’s payoff will be:
∂G(e,s)Speculator
∂ s
= Q(2us− ve); ∂G(e,s)
Speculator
∂e
= −Qvs
For the European Central Bank:
∂G(e,s)CentralBank
∂ s
= Que;
∂G(e,s)CentralBank
∂ s
= Q(r + us)
The Jacobian matrix J(e,s) will contain the derivatives which has just been computed:
J(e,s) =

∂G(e,s)Speculator
∂ s
∂G(e,s)CentralBank
∂ s
∂G(e,s)Speculator
∂e
∂G(e,s)CentralBank
∂e
 =
Q(2us− ve) −Qvs
Que Q(r + us)

(4.12)
The determinant of a squared matrix can be calculated with the multiplication of the element
lie on the principal diagonal minus those of the secondary one:
|J(e,s)| = Q2(2us − ve)(r + us) + Q2uevs
Imposing that |J(e,s)| = 0 and s = u = 1/2, r = 0.25, we will arrive at a critical region
drawing as a segment (F0) of right arch of a translated parabola with equation
e = 1/2s2 + 1/4s.
Figure 4.6: The Critical Zone of The Game
Source: Author’s re-elaboration from Carfı` and Musolino (2012)
Introducing the concept of vector function in the strategy space displayed in 4.6, labeled
v and made up by G(s,e)Speculator and G(s,e)CentralBank, the researchers draw the payoff
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space trough a transformation of both critical and strategy region. Let’s start the operation
considering the segment FG of the square. Along this subset of the area, Mario Draghi’s
will not intervene to prevent speculation (e is always 0), s is comprised between 0 and 1.
We estimate the image of the point (s,0) for v: v(s,0) = (s2Qu, 0).
Setting: S = s2Qu and E = 0, where r, u, v holds the previous values and Q = 1, one
shall be obtained: S = 1/2s2. The image is hereby a segment with extremes (F
′
=
= v(F), G
′
= v(G)). Reiterating the method for the remain zones, the result will be:
Figure 4.7: The Payoff Region
Source: Adapted from Carfı` and Musolino (2012)
The ideal point for the country lies on F
′
I
′
as it get funds and does not pay a too high yield.
Nominal rates narrow thanks to expansive monetary policy carried out by the second player.
Reporting the thought at the game space, the equilibria should be I.
To maximize earnings, we have to select Nash equilibria theorem which determines the most
convenient strategy given plans of the other players. To lure out behaviors of the speculator
and the central bank, the actions which maximize G(·,e)Speculator and G(s, ·)CentralBank are
essential. When the actors, nation excluded, acquired the 50% of the bonds issued set to 1,
and recalling the composition of derivatives ∂G(s,e)Speculator/∂ s, ∂G(s,e)SCentral Bank/∂e,
then:
N(e)Speculator = {1 i f e < 1;
0,1 i f e = 1}
N(s)Central Bank = 1 ∀ s
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Central Bank
Act Not Act
Speculator
Enter (1,1) (1,0)
Not Enter (0,1) (0,0)
Table 4.2: The Nash Equilibria of the Game without Anti-Speculation Tax.
Author’s elaboration.
The Nash Equilibria will intersect N(s)Central Bank and the inverse of N(e)Speculator has been
formulated in conformity with the first entity. The optimal responses are {(1,1),(0,1)}.
(0,1) is not the first best for the bank as yields will low already at t1/2 when the European
Central Bank promotes the country’s bailout. The attention will fall to the first of the
obtained equilibrium which does not serve to the third entity.
4.2.3 Equilibrium Introducing The Tax
The authors of the paper designed a tax that eliminates completely profits yielded with
speculation, reassure to the government financings for relaunching the economy, and make
financial markets resilient again. The imposition shall be equal to the marginality of bank’s
trading us. The payoff of the former individual will feel the burden of such a incidence,
meaning that: G(s,e)Speculator = sQ(Yield1(e,s) − Yield0 − T (s)) =
sQ(r + uv − ve − r − uv) = −sQve, T (s) the ”benefactor” tax. For the European
Central Bank, the tax must be expensed in assets of balance sheet since it constitutes a
financial reserve being issued by regulatory authorities. The future earnings will follow this
path:
G(s,e)CentralBank = eQYields1/2 + eQT (s) = Qe(r + us) + Qs2u.
Money derived by speculation making matches the size of public bonds traded by the
financial institution. The authors claimed that the imposition does not impinge on the
country’s payoff and I agree with them. A tax considerable might perturb informed traders
by means of ex-post regret if they submit limit orders when price move toward and trough
their limit prices, seeing fulfilling will take place rapidly, yet markets move against their
positions loosing money. All those things would persuade speculators to go out from
markets and a large share of agents who are willing to purchase treasury assets would
disappear (I suppose the Central Bank will stop expansive monetary policy at a certain
time, otherwise a new crisis may occur), complicating the country’s potential gain from
sovereign debt issuance. The payoff is untouched, to wit:
G(s,e)Distressed Country = −Q(us − ve).
Partial derivatives will become:
∂G(e,s)Speculator
∂ s
= −Qve; ∂G(e,s)
Speculator
∂e
= −Qvs;
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∂G(e,s)Central Bank
∂ s
= Q(ue + 2us);
∂G(e,s)Central Bank
∂e
= Q(r + us).
Thus, the determinant of Jacobian matrix will be:
|J(s,e)| = −Q2ve(r + us) + Q2vs(ve +
+ 2vs). The critical space will remain FO segment though the focus of parabola is the
origin. Replicating the procedure for the payoff region, one will obtain:
Figure 4.8: Payoff Region When Tax Has Been Introduced
Source: Adapted from Carfı` and Musolino (2012)
What has been changed here is the loss that the speculator must sustain if it short sells
public bonds at t0 which broadens the second player’s profitability . The aggregate profits
is stable at 0.75 as when the tax is not added.
The Nash Equilibria will be attain estimating the best response of the entity in reference to
the others again. The strategies must maximize G(·,e)Speculator and G(·,e)Central Bank
respectively, for that reason we exploit the derivative of the payoff in s for the speculator,
and that in e for Mario Draghi’s central bank. With a amount of bonds issued at 1, nominal
interest rate at 0.25, and similar quantities of debt acquired (50% for the bank and the
European Central Bank), it follows that: N(e)Speculator = 0 i f e > 0;
{0,1} i f e = 0.
N(e)Central Bank = 1 ∀ e ∈ {0,1}. Taking the inverse of N(e)Speculator the greatest reply of
the monetary policy holder, the Nash equilibrium will be given by the intersection of the
two optimal strategies, therefore point I in Figure 4.6 which is good for all the players as
137
The holding of public bonds by banks Chapter 4
the state will pay lower coupon rates and is able to raise capital for the recovery, the large
bank does not negotiate without any contingent losses, and the central bank helps the first
entity to go out from the distress position. This optimality can be better explained with a
neoclassical economics term, Pareto improvement or Improvement in terms of Pareto due
to a redistribution of resources that enhances the condition of one individual without
exacerbates those of the other people.
4.2.4 Closing Thoughts
Imposing that the marginal trading gain of the speculator coincides with the tax works well,
the country debt interest rates do not augment and funds are available as the central bank
intervenes into markets. Relaxing the hypothesis, i.e. when no burdens are imposed on
speculation activity, the responses of the actors translate towards another place of the
square represents the decision area of the game. I maintain that selfish behavior under the
no tax game develops a dominant strategy to go into markets for the former institution and
to enact monetary policy countermeasures for the second large bank, even when the play
renders imperfect information such that at least one individual must react unless knowing
the choice done antecedently or by another gamer. To support the statement, let’s look at
the matrix in table 4.2. The bank is an informed trader and has skills to forecast a
downward trend of bonds’ prices in the next future. Whatever the plan of the central bank,
it will be inclined to participate to markets short selling the larger feasible amount of
government instruments with a view to repurchase them at narrower costs. In fact, the
payoff along G′H ′ oscillates around 0.5/0.75 as we can seen in the picture 4.7. The
European Central Bank increments the profitability by investing in treasury obligations, the
fraction of bank bondholding bolsters it. The first player owns the top earnings in case of
no Mario Draghi intervention. However, (1,1) shows the dominant strategy for the basic
game. The option ”not enter” is dominated by the willingness to negotiate as no sanctions
are charged.
The situation reverses when the expected profit from short selling is nullified by the fee. In
that circumstance, the informed trader will not take any positions into markets, it would
incur in detriments since trading costs are relevant when one submits orders. The
equilibrium passes to (0,1) with advantages for both the country and the quantitative
easing adopter. Imperfect information is a natural feature of markets, agents are equipped
with limited rationality, so they opt for opportunistic attitude and transactions happen with
asymmetries, yet the pivotal authority has an externality for the future of the national
government.
I will give the reader in the last part of the chapter the model that I have designed for
studying the timing of quantitative easing that the central bank should implement in case of
a financial crisis threat.
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4.3 Quantitative Easing Timing Model
4.3.1 Assumptions
A country trade in primary financial markets to issue public bonds in order to face
imbalances of its debt. The bonds will then be negotiated in secondary marketplaces in
whom a central bank covers the role of perfect potential buyer. Let’s assume that an abrupt
financial crisis may hit the international sovereign markets such that the focus state gets in
mayhem due to banks crash, high leverage of non-financial sector, and an economic slump.
The main authority holds the monetary tools for encouraging a slow restoration for the
country and I suppose the best facility is Quantitative easing cited more times in the thesis.
The institution undertakes the investment not only to aid the nation blown by the meltdown
but to resell the securities at better prices under a long-term vision. The idea behind the
strategy is that the state boosts interest rates to push remarkably down the cost of debt
when blown by the crisis. Let denote with c the trading costs for the central bank to acquire
an exogenous Q bulk of government debt instruments, strictly higher than 0 and expresses
in billion of dollars. The price of the central bank’s public debt follows a GBM whereby µ
stands for the expected improvement of interest rates, σ the instantaneous volatility6:
dSt = µStdt + σStdWt , S0 = k (4.13)
dWt represents differential form of a standard Brownian motion and k is a non-negative
constant. This is the basic version of the model which cannot allow for the reflection of the
turmoil. Let hypothesize that the total return of the program ρ is greater than µ and cash
flows public bonds delivered are discounted by a real rate sets to ρ − µ , the rate must be
lower than the investment return because I claim that the central bank calls for a payout
rate for the bailout undertaken, differently if there was an equality, all risk would be
diversified and the return of the project would be a risk-free interest rate.
Time span is enveloped in the range t ∈ [0,T ]. The occurrence of the financial calamity is
controlled by a Poisson process Pj. To model jump towards the crisis, Poisson stochastic
process is very fashion since it handles discrete non-systematic events which are
diversifiable. The frame is very similar to a Wiener process:
dPt =
 j with probability λdt0 with probability 1 − λdt
j the size of the jump which belongs to (0,1) and it can be random, λ the mean arrival rate
greater than 0.
6The square root of variance which weights equally returns. This is a weakness of the approach respect
to other estimators exploiting information like opening jump, maximum and minimum daily prices. For the
model, standard deviation of historical prices is good because we are not working with high frequency data.
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The monetary program is a equivalent to a call option:
H(St) = max
T
E[(St − c)e−ρT ] (4.14)
The Bellman Equation will be in the no-investment region (St < ST ∗):
ρH(St)dt = E[dH(St)]
The equation is a necessary condition under dynamic programming considering it assures
optimality and breaks the optimization into easier subproblems. The proof is reported as
follows: For small dt time intervals, the present value of H(St) can be decomposed as:
H(St) = Et
[∫ ∞
t
Sse−ρ(s − t)ds
]
= Et
[∫ t+dt
t
Sse−ρ(s − t)ds
]
+ Et
[∫ ∞
t+dt
Sse−ρ(s − t)ds
]
=
= Stdt + e−ρdtEt
[∫ ∞
t+dt
Seρdte−ρ(s − t)ds
]
= Stdt + e−ρdtEt
[∫ ∞
t+dt
Se−ρ(s − (t + dt))ds
]
=
= Stdt + e−ρdtEt [H(St + dt)]
As St + dt = St + dSt , one obtains the Bellman Equation:
H(St)dt = Sdt + e−ρdtEt [H(S + dS)]
Recalling that e−ρdt ' 1 − ρdt for Taylor expansion, the expression can be rearranged as
a hedging condition:
ρEt [H(St + dSt)] = St +
Et [H(St + dSt)] − H(St)
dt
For dSt → 0:
ρH(St) = St +
E[dH(St)]
dt
The second component of the R.H.S. is the capital gain.
The expected profit for selling bonds will be: Πt(S) = Q(SResellt − c), SResellt the raising
price to sell the option in the future.
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4.3.2 Programming
To figure out how the timing for ”killing” the quantitative easing option varies upon the
banking crumple, I will run two distinct programming problems. In the first place, status
jump will be overlooked due to supposition that the central bank has rationality which
allows it to exercise the derivative instrument if and only if when there is actually a
financial turmoil. Jump process will be then treated into the GBM of the public bonds’
prices to investigate how the optimal triggering threshold changes in response to the market
sentiment after the imposition of the crisis.
4.3.2.1 No Financial Crisis Jump
Let’s initiate the optimal dynamic programming with the simplest context. No jump process
is brought into play, the main authority decides to intervene when the banking disaster has
actually been begun in order the optimum threshold finding comes down to a standard real
option investment. Retrieving Itoˆ Lemma:
dH(Qt) =
∂H(Qt)
∂ t
dt +
∂H(Qt)
∂Ht
dSt +
1
2
∂ 2H(Qt)
∂H2t
dS2t + ...
The derivative with respect to time can be removed since it equals to 0 and we stop at the
second power as d2t would nullify the further derivatives. The expected value of monetary
policy’s project will follow the pattern:
E[dH(Qt)] = E
[
∂H(Qt)
∂Ht
dSt +
∂ 2H(Qt)
∂H2t
dS2t
]
=
∂H(Qt)
∂Ht
E[dS(Qt)] +
1
2
∂ 2H(Qt)
∂H2t
E[dS2t ]
(4.15)
Linearity of expected value has been used. Computing dS2t :
dS2t ≡ d[S,S]t = (µStdt + σStdWt) · (µStdt + σStdWt) =
= µ2S2t d
2t + 2µσS2t dtdWt + σ
2S2t dW
2
t = σ
2S2t dt
Then, replacing dSt and its quadratic form into (4.15), the equation will become:
E[dH(Qt)] =
∂H(Qt)
∂Ht
E[µStdt + σStdWt ] +
1
2
∂ 2H(Qt)
∂H2t
E[σ2S2t dt] =
= µ
∂H(Qt)
∂Ht
Stdt +
σ2
2
∂ 2H(Qt)
∂H2t
S2t dt
(4.16)
Remark: Wt ∼ N(0, t) → E[dWt ] = 0. Substituting (4.16) in Bellman Equation, one
obtains:
σ2
2
S2t H
′′
(St) + µStH
′
(St) − ρH(St) = 0 (4.17)
The wanted solution has the architecture: H(St) = AS
β
t .
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Inserting it into the above ordinary SDE:
O(β ) = 0 → σ
2
2
β (β − 1) + µβ − ρ = 0
Roots of the squared SDE will be composed in that manner:
β1,2 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
±
√(
1
2
− µ
σ2
)2
+ 2
ρ
σ2
.
We impose that β1 is the positive solution and β2 the negative root. The general solution
will be closed to: H(St) = A1S
β1
t + A2S
β2
t . We filter out β2, otherwise S
β2
t goes to infinity
when H(St) → 0. The financial intuition is that a bubble might appear. We construct a
system collects boundary conditions:
H(0) = 0
H(ST ∗)1 = ST ∗ − c
H
′
(ST ∗)1 = 1
The second constraint states that the rescuer must be indifferent among waiting and NPV of
the project when investment triggering threshold ST ∗ is reached (value matching condition),
the third tie takes care that linearity is retained in the model so that arbitrage will not take
place (smooth-pasting condition). Thus, focusing on these constraints:A1S
β1
T ∗ = ST ∗ − c
A1β1S
β1 − 1
T ∗ = 1
From which:
ST ∗ =
β1
β1 − 1c ; A1 =
ST ∗ − c
S β1T ∗
(4.18)
ST ∗
c
=
β1
β1 − 1 is called Tobin q and given the fact that it is higher than 1, markets allocate
to the invested capital a superior value than the costs backed. A1 is positive as ST ∗ > c.
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4.3.2.2 Financial Crisis Event
The jump from a corroded surroundings is incorporated in the framework. Public bonds
markets live the financial hurricane at some point which pushes the prices down. The event
has to be integrated in the stochastic process of the prices:dSt = µStdt + σStdWt − V dPtS0 = k (4.19)
Let assume that the Poisson process Pt is independent of the standard Brownian motion Wt
that follows that Cov[dPtdWt ] = E[dPtdWt ] = 0. Once the crisis has risen up, jump process
diminishes by a certain percentage j, St oscillates pursuant the GBM but it could endures a
reduction 1 − j of its original value with a probability λdt because of the crisis effect has
been inserted. Successively, the process keeps to oscillate until another shock happens. If
the size of the jump was unitary, the quantitative easing project value would fall to zero.
Let’s start the construction of the pattern determine the likelihood a first banking ”freezing”
will be borne in the impeding time interval (T, T + dt). Remembering that the density
function of a variable T ∼ Poisson(λ ) is: P(T = T ) = λTT ! e−λ , the probability will be:
P((T + dT ) − T = 1) = λTe−dT
The expected time up to the jump will occur is:
E[T ] =
∫ ∞
0
T f (T )dT =
∫ ∞
0
TλTe−dT dT =
1
λ
Passing to the dynamic optimization, let suppose that dPt can be diversified, i.e.
non-systematic, more easy to manage. A risk-free rate can be exploited which implies that
µ = r and γ = r − µ , the payout rate. Exploiting Bellman equation and Itoˆ Lemma
again:
σ2
2
S2t H(St)dt + (r − γ)StH(St)dt − λ (H(St) − H[(1 − j)St ])dt − rH(St)dt = 0 →
→ σ
2
2
S2t H(St) + (r − γ)StH(St) − (r + λ )H(St) + λH[(1 − j)St ] = 0
Value matching and smoothing-past conditions remains the same. The guess solution is still
H(St) = A1S
β
t , however the SODE is more complicated since it is resolvable by numerical
methods:
O(β ) :=
σ2
2
β (β − 1) + (r − γ)β − (r + λ ) + λ (1 − j)β = 0 (4.20)
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If the price St goes to 0, i.e. when the jump j = 1, the above equation can be solved
analytically and the positive root higher than 1 will have the form:
β1 =
1
2
− (r − γ)
σ2
+
√(
1
2
− (r − γ)
σ2
)2
+ 2
(r + λ )
σ2
The quantitative easing optimal threshold will be influenced by the mean of the jump
stochastic process being embedded in the solution of the equation just computed.
I have performed a simulation for the case of j = 1. The parameters assume the values:
r = 3%, σ = 60% (a high volatility has been chosen due to we suppose to work into
trading venues upset), trading costs c = 0.75%, γ = 0.01.
When λ varies, the root of O(β ), ST ∗ , and constant A1 are estimated. The underneath table
summarizes the outcomes simulated.
λ β1 ST ∗ A1
0.00 1.05 1.64 0.93
0.05 1.25 0.38 1.02
0.10 1.40 0.26 1.23
0.20 1.66 0.19 1.81
0.30 1.87 0.16 2.61
0.50 2.22 0.14 5.09
0.60 2.37 0.13 6.89
0.70 2.51 0.12 9.18
0.90 2.76 0.12 15.69
1.00 2.88 0.11 20.18
Table 4.3: Results of Optimal Quantitative Easing Model with Jump Process.
Author’s elaboration.
A small increment of the mean arrival rate drives a consistent fall of the threshold, while
the positive root growths slightly. When the mean arrival rate increases, the value of the
call option H(St) narrows which implies that the critical threshold ST ∗ is reduced. The
expected time until public bond prices jump feels the modification of λ . When the
parameter augments, the doldrums will be increasingly imminent due to E[T ] = 1/λ and
the rescuer will rapidly proceed with the plan.
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4.3.2.3 Real Option Game - The Preemption Game
This paragraph of the final chapter will prove how competition among a central bank and
a large investment bank destroys the chance to wait before investing in public bonds in
form of a bailout for a country which is really suffering from a banking crisis. Let impose
a continuous compounding and discrete time evolution where the two players can invest
now t = 0, tomorrow t = 1, or not pursue the project. The trading cost c are equivalent to
80 dollars for a call option written on a public bond, the risk-free interest rate r is set to
3%, the initial price of bonds is S0 = 100 $. At t1, the price can go up or down and it
becomes S+t1 = 150 or S
−
t1 = 70. The option value at t1 can be H(St1)
+ = (S+t1 − c)+ =
(150 − 80)+ = 70 or H(St1)− = (S−t1 − c)+ = (70 − 80)+ = 0 with probability q
and 1 − q. To price the call option at t0, we use the binomial tree model. The risk.neutral
probability will be equal to:
q =
er∆t − d
u − d =
e0.03 − 0.7
1.5 − 0.7 ' 0.413
u and d are the width of the upward and downward jump of the underlying. Thus, the price
of the invest at time 0:
H(S0) = e−r{q(H(St1)+) + (1 − q)H(St1)−}=
= e−0.03{(0.413 ·70) + (0.587 ·0)} ' 28.056
(4.21)
NPV at the start is the difference amid S0 − c = 20. Since the value of the call is higher
than NPV, the best strategy is wait and invest tomorrow if the option’s value surges. The
preemption effect makes sure that the financial institution which moves firstly will yield the
total share of the market. We are in the game theory context with four scenarios. If central
authority and investment bank enters contemporaneously into the market at t0, they split it
with payoffs which will be NPV/2. When one of the players enter and the other one wait,
the leading entity has the utter quota of the market, the payoff will coincide with (NPV/2;0)
or vice versa. Both banks can decide to postpone the project, so they enter at t1 and the
expected return will be equivalent to H(S0)/2.
Central Bank
Wait Invest
Investment Bank
Wait (14.028,14.028) (0,20)
Invest (20,0) (10,10)
Table 4.4: The Nash Equilibria of the Preemption Game.
Author’s elaboration.
The two banks prefers to invest albeit there are strategies with better returns (they do not
know the choice of the other gamer), a play similar to Prisoner Dilemma, a classic example
of incomplete information game in Economics literature.
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Conclusions
My work has led us to the conclusion that sovereign bonds are greatly employed to try to
restore the public debt. The investor cannot lend money without a guarantee that the
borrower will honor the repayment in the future. Certainly, go long on these securities
comports the bearing of some risks automatically, one need only think that the debtor could
not comply with all coupon payments, and the principal at the maturity date.
The evidence from this study suggests that banks held public bonds during the Global
Financial Crisis due to the sharp rise in bond yields up to the middle of the meltdown, and
the idea behind it stems from the price-interest rate relation, that is when interest rates
growth, bond’s prices decline. The crisis behavior made this kind of debt instrument very
cheap and appealing for financial institutions, so much so that their businesses were
substantially relocated to government bonds. The hope of help nations more shocked by
the financial hurricane, but above all, huge gains from buying obligations at minimum costs
now to resell them at higher prices changed the placement of banks inside sovereign bond
markets with larger shares. In general, the financial sector of every nation holds mostly the
number of public bonds, in whom banks and central banks are the principal buyers of them.
My research provides a blueprint for a new way to investigate the core of banks attitude at
the end of the previous decade. Banking crash will inevitably be an issue that the major
authorities have to monitor systematically using stress tests. The threat of a next bubble is
not an utopia as long as the ”cleaning” mechanism will not wipe out the entire traces
leaved by the previous crisis. Eurozone suffered from what the U.S.A. created with its real
estate collapse. Australia and India, as well as some developing or emerging countries,
endured less the allure of the recession.
I aware that my analysis may have three limitations. The first is the no presence of any
developing states which would have contributed to better explain the public bonds
phenomenon. The second is the limited number of countries available which are, excluding
the U.S., all European. The inclusion or ulterior AM countries might deliver robuster
results, such as Japan which was very distressed at the epoch even for the ”Lost Decades”
not completely overcome. These limitations are evidence of the difficulty of collecting data
for the whole variables and combining them efficiently.
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Another possible source of error is the treatment of missing data. Sophisticated multiple
imputation techniques for panel data might have produced more consistent estimators of
marginal effects of the explanatory variables for the fixed effects models adopted.
Nevertheless, advanced missing value management does not fit the scope of the thesis.
The findings of the empirical analyses support the thought that the percentage of
bondholding is climbed after the final quarter of 2007. The portion of public bonds kept by
banks in their portfolios is improved by 2.071 percentage points where the best participant
of the growth is the UK, with an increase of 7.465 percentage points. The upshot of this is
the possibility that yields stayed flat in the economic boom, pushing then UK banks to
invest in the national debt. The nominal rates give a benefit of 0.356% of holding more
public bonds on average, the private sector weight is lower and equal to 0.039%, while the
upturn of debt issuance has got a marginality close to zero. The unemployment rate is
meaningful at the country level, with a beta converges to -2%. This result was not
expected. However, it is probable that the reason for this is that a positive variation of the
number of unemployed declines the return of bonds. No statistical correlation has been
detected from the two entities running the experiments. The variable loses significance
when financial crisis dummy is iterated with the other quantitative regressors of the model.
Sovereign default correlates negatively with the holding of government debt which is
significant at 5% and 10% when we control for time or ”two ways” effect respectively.
This latter accounts for the unique Greek default in 2012. The picture is thus still
incomplete. Gennaioli et al. (July 2014) paper is a useful approach to the sovereign risk as
the author’s focus was to search how it impacts on the bank’s balance sheet, namely, the
percentage of government bonds in their assets.
The aversion of nations to issue new debt after the interbank markets stopping amounts to
-0.4% on average, whereas sovereign bondholding looks to benefit the public securities by
0.017% across the crisis period, the assistance is slighter when trading is carried out in
normal conditions, set to 0.013%.
Results so far have been very encouraging, and further work needs to be done to establish
whether the present findings can be extended to many other countries to confirm or refute
the theory of financial crisis-banks public bondholding nexus spotted.
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Appendix - Non Parametric Regression
Let’s shed light on non-parametric techniques, in particular, additive models which have
been exploited in a R package to reach resample estimates for missing information.
Let’s start with the comprehensive (homoschedastic) regression:
Yt = f (Xt) + at , at ∼ IID(0,σ2) (1)
f (·) delineates function links response variable to regressors. When f (Xt) = β0 + β1Xt ,
one refers to linear regression. If such a function is known and sets to f (Xt) = f (Xt ,θ),
there is a non linear parametric regression. If f is unknown, one uses smooth
non-parametric non-linear regression whose shape is not specified. The term ”smooth”
stands for derivable. The choice to select one of these specifications depends initially from
scatterplot of Yt against Xt , along with range of X , the number of observations N, and σ .
Let’s pay attention on non-parametric regression. The architecture of the model is equation
(1) where the bridge between the dependent variable and regressors is not linear. A method
to estimate it are smoothing splines. Spline is a polynomial in intervals function useful to
approximate a specific function that one knows its value in certain knots. The problem of
knots selection is bypass with smoothing splines method, this latter searches for f (x)
which minimizes the sum of squared of residuals with a penalization regarding irregularity
that f shows:
D( f ,λ ) =
N
∑
t=1
[Yt − f (Xt)]2 + λ
∫
( f
′′
(x))2dx (2)
f (x) must be derivable until the second grade with continuous derivatives. The former
component of equation (2) measures proximity of the function respect to data, while the
other one the degree of irregularity, λ can be thought as a smoothing parameter which
penalizes f if irregular and it tends to raise when f growths. If λ = 0, there are no penalties
for f irregularity, consequently one could employ any functions which interpolates data. On
the opposite, penalty is extreme when λ = ∞, i.e. f ′′(x) = 0 and f (x) = α + βx. For
simplicity’s sakes, I do not report the proof, even though one can demonstrate that a solution
of (2) is a natural cubic spline whose knots are Xt , t = 1, ...,N.
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Therefore:
f (x) =
N
∑
j=1
β jN j(x) (3)
N j(x) bases of natural cubic splines. Minimum problem imposes by (2) is equivalent to
minimize:
D( f ,λ ) = (Y − Nβ )T (Y − Nβ ) + λβTΩβ (4)
N the matrix whose j column collects N j(xi), i = 1, ...,N, [Ω] jk =
∫
N
′′
j N
′′
k (x)dx. β which
minimizes (4) has the following pattern:
βˆ SMOOT H = (NT N + λΩ)−1NTY
from which, one obtains:
fˆ SMOOT H(x) =
N
∑
j=1
βˆ SMOOT Hj N j(x)
Indicating fˆ SMOOT H(x) = ( fˆ SMOOT H(x1), ..., fˆ SMOOT H(xN)), it follows that:
fˆ SMOOT H(x) = N(NT N + λΩ)−1NTY = SλY
Sλ smoothing matrix and fˆ SMOOT H linear smoother of Y . Let DF(λ ) = tr(Sλ ), where tr(·)
denotes trace of a matrix, in other words, the sum of values placed in the principal diagonal.
Hence:
σˆ2 =
∑Nj=1(Yj − fˆ SMOOT H(X j,λ ))2
n − DF(λ )
To compute the estimator of λ , one tries to minimize Prediction expected error (PSEλ )
defined as PSEλ = E[(Y Tt − fˆλ (x))2], fˆλ (x) smoothing spline estimator of λ using
Cross-validation (CV) or generalized cross-validation (GCV). CV consists of assessing the
generalization of statistical results to an independent database (not known), being helpful
to avoid overfitting problem since the aim is to define a dataset to valuate the model in the
training phase. In the predictive environment, a model is given a database of known data on
which training is conducted (training database), and a database of unknown data against
which the model is tested (testing database). Given that we not know f (x) and Yt are
available, one must think to minimize the mean squared error (MSE) respect to h. MSE is
generally represented by the following formula:
MSE = E[( f (x) − fˆ (x))2]
One must avoid overfitting, that is the model is adapted for some aspects inside the sample
which in turn are not structural of the phenomenon analyzed, so that another sample will not
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represent them. Therefore:
CV (h) =
N
∑
j=1
(Y j − fˆ− jλ (X j))2
GCV (h) =
(1/n)∑Nj=1Yj − fˆλ (X j))2(
1− DF(λ )n
)2
fˆ− jλ (X j) fitted for all observations less j-th data. Let’s generalize the theory to mutual
explicative variables. Let’s suppose that the regression is composed by two regressors, say,
X and Z. Thereby:
Yt = f (Xt ,Zt) + at
One must estimate f in correspondence to point p = (x,z). Problems occur, especially
course of dimensionality, i.e. with increased p points scatter very fast. To compensate
the leap of spacing, the numerousness sample should be np, which make computation of f
onerous and quasi impossible. Efficacy statistical instruments are Additive models assuming
that: f (X1,t , ...,Xp,t) = f1(X1,t) + ... + fp(Xp,t) where the functions are univariate and
estimable with the methods we have seen so far. The deficit of the approach surrounds
identification. To overcome that, one can rely on the subsequent form called additive model:
Yt = µ+
p
∑
i=1
f jX j,t + at (5)
in whom µ = E[Yt ], E[ f jX j,t ] = 0 ∀ j = 1, ..., p. This model is less restrictive than OLS
regression where all partial functions must be linear and simultaneously more restraining
than non-parametric regression. To compute estimators, backfitting algorithm permits
estimation of every f j. Let’s suppose that such functions are well-defined with splines:
f j(X) = ∑iβiSi ≡ f j(β j,X) and E[Yt ] = 0. The target is to arrive at betas which make
minimum the following expression:
N
∑
t=1
[Yt − f1(X1,t ,β1) − ... − fp(Xp,t ,βp)]2 (6)
The algorithm begins from primary values of β2, ...,βp and minimize (6) with regard to β1.
Once considers next βˆ1, ...,β3, ...,βp and makes minimum the aforementioned formula
respect to β2, then βˆ1, βˆ2, ...,β4, ...,βp is taken into account to compute βˆ3 up to achieve all
estimator of betas. One (βˆ1, βˆ2, ..., βˆp)T vector is available, the procedure initiates again to
calculate β1 until a stability criteria is reached for functions f j.
Figure 3.5 uses Local Regression (LOESS), or Nearest Neighbors, a variant pf the Local
Polynomial Regression which will be described hereafter, to fit the data. The corresponding
150
The holding of public bonds by banks Appendix
lines are therefore drawn by this type of non-linear regression. The original model is (1)
again, where f (x) is a smooth function. Let the function be derivable in the point x0 as
many times as necessary. Using Taylor expansion, f (x) can be approximated around x0 by
the polynomial:
f (x) = f (x0) + f
′
(x0) +
f
′′
(x0)
2!
+ ... +
f p(x0)
p!
+ rest
Then:
f (x) ≈
p
∑
j=0
β j(x − x0) j
in whom
β0 = f (x0)
β1 = f
′
(x0)
...
βp = f p(x0)
The local polynomial is estimated by Weight Least squares (WLS) method as:
min
β
n
∑
i=1
(
Yt −
p
∑
j=0
β j(x − x0) j
)2
Kh(Xt − x0)
h stand for the bandwidth. The estimator will be obtained by the following expression:
βˆ (x) = (XTWX)−1XTWY (7)
where W = diag(Kh(Xt − x0)). Local estimator of f (x0) will be equal to:
fˆ (x0) = βˆ0(x0)
The complete function is computed by varying x.
To implement (7) p,h, and K must be selected. p is usually low for both theoretical and
practical reasons. Fan and Gujbels (1996) suggest to estimate f p(x) with a polynomial of a
grade equals to p + 1. For instance, if the goal is to calculate f
′
(x), p = 2. K coincides
usually with Epanichnikov kernel: K(u) = 34(1 − u2), |u| < 1. The choice of h is critical
because:
h → 0 fˆ (Xt) → Yt
h → ∞ fˆ (Xt) → parametric estimate with a polynomial o f grade p
When h goes to zero, there is overfitting problem
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Concerning CV:
CV (h) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(Yi − fˆh,−i(Xi))2
fˆh,−i(Xi) is the local polynomial estimator of f (·) without the i− th observation (Yi,Xi). The
non-parametric local regression seen so far uses a constant h. LOESS considers a floating h
which varies along the X axis, in particular, it depends on the degree of dispersion of data.
The method expresses the smoothing parameter as a fraction of observations, with which is
possible to estimate the ordinate exploiting a fraction s of data only, called span. Higher s,
less local the regression is.
Parameters are estimated through equation (7) using the portion s of the data. Let X1, ... ,Xn
be observations, x the point whereby the regression will be computed, and r = [sn]. The
bandwidth hx is defined as the twice of the r-th ordinary statistics of |Xt − x|, ∀ t = 1, ...,n.
It is worth noting that h is affected by x now. LOESS applies the tricube function to the
observations around x which makes this method robust against outliers.
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